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In this qualitative study of the apparel industry, I analyze the governance of buyer-
supplier interfaces in outsourced global value chains through an institutional theory lens. 
I set forth that transactional and relational cross-national barriers, linked to institutional 
distance between home and host country in outsourced production networks, and 
supplier capabilities are key determinants of variations in the governance mode chosen 
by lead buyers for their outsourced value chain. I further posit that lead buyers respond 
to the additional costs imposed by home–host country institutional distance and by 
structural supplier capability constraints, by means of governance modes that provide 
institutional brokerage, and examine how the lead buyers’ stock and strategic 
investment in institutional brokerage capabilities moderates both country and supplier 
level determinants of their governance choice.  
 This study contributes to theory in two ways: it provides an institutional 
explanation of lead buyers’ choices of governance mode in their GVCs, and introduces the 
institutional brokerage construct to describe lead firm strategies aimed at lowering the 
costs associated with home-host country institutional distance, and with the varying 
capability levels of supplier in the global value chain. The study also provides a useful 
contribution to management, by highlighting vital brokerage activities and capabilities 





apparel global value chains migrate from East and South Asia to lower factor-cost 
countries, like Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana, which are characterized by greater 
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The object of this dissertation is the governance of the buyer-supplier interfaces in 
outsourced global value chains (GVC). Through the analysis of transactional and relational 
cross-national barriers between the US and the main apparel suppliers to the US, I set 
forth that institutional distance (Kostova 1997), which reflects  differences in cognitive, 
normative and regulative characteristics between two countries, and supplier capabilities 
are key determinants of variation in the governance modes chosen by US lead buyers for 
their transactions and relationships with suppliers in GVC host countries.  I propose that 
lead buyers respond to the additional costs imposed by home–host country institutional 
distance and by supplier capability constraints, by means of governance modes that 
provide institutional brokerage, and further posit that the lead buyers’ stock and 
strategic investment in institutional brokerage capabilities moderates both country and 
supplier level determinants of their governance choice.  
1.1 IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) can be described as the complex, interlinked cross-border 
value creation activities that bring a product to life from conception, to sourcing and 





(Humphrey 2001). Their growing importance in the world economy is reflected in the 
increased attention from academia and international organizations; in particular, 
UNCTAD, after devoting the 2011 World Investment Report to non-equity entry modes 
(UNCTAD 2011), has dedicated the entire 2013 report to Global Value Chains (UNCTAD 
2013). The economic importance of GVCs is undeniable: after adjusting for the double-
counting inherent in the trade statistics for intermediate inputs of production, the total 
value of GVC economic output is estimated to be close to US$ 14 trillion by 2010 (UNCTAD 
2013), with approximately 80%  of the total  coordinated by multinational corporations.  
In recent years, there has been a strategic shift in structure and ownership of 
MNCs production networks, shifting from internalization with FDI with manufacturing 
subsidiaries owned and managed by the firm, towards externalization through global 
value chains (Buckley 2009). Improvements in communications technology, the upgrading 
of emerging markets vendor capabilities (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000) and patterns of 
mutual dependency between lead buyers and suppliers have resulted in wide range of 
governance structures in which effective  control of production is decoupled from 
ownership of the productive assets (Herrigel and Zeitlin 2010).  In many instances, what 
may have originally been a make-or-buy decision is now de facto a procurement decision, 
a form of a priori abstention-based outsourcing (Gilley and Rasheed 2000) by large firms 
that no longer have any in-house manufacturing capabilities, and are headquartered in 
countries that have lost their production capacity to emerging markets, primarily to China 
and other Asian regions. This country migration is exemplified by the GAP Inc., U.S.’s 





Asia and 25% in Southeast Asia, with the remainder located in central America, West 
Africa and the Middle East, and only 5% in developed countries (UNCTAD 2011). The GAP 
Inc. is hardly an exception in the US$ 200 billion apparel industry in the US, where 94% of 
all garments sold are outsourced offshore to developing countries and subsequently 
imported (Gereffi and Frederick 2010).  
This drive toward strategic outsourcing  (Hilmer and Quinn 1994) does not stop at 
dependence on outsourced manufacturing, but it extends to other sourcing services as 
well, as lead buyers pursue asset-light strategies to focus on core competencies (Prahalad 
and Hamel 1990), eschewing the investment and organizational complexity associated 
with non-core overseas operations. The decoupling of control over production from 
ownership of manufacturing assets raises the importance of governance of the buyer-
supplier interface, with lead buyers adopting a variety of governance modes to control 
and manage their global value chain. 
1.2 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH PROBLEM  
My interest in studying global value chains is motivated by what I consider a great paradox 
in IB scholarship: in spite of their importance in the global economy, until recently, global 
value chains have been generally neglected by IB scholars (Gereffi and Lee 2012), who 
continue to pursue a research agenda focused primarily on equity entry modes, and on 
the challenges associated with foreign direct investment by MNCs (Buckley 2002). 
Research on global value chains, on its end, has continued to be characterized by great 
unevenness and “theoretical eclecticism” (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008). The existing research, 





Gereffi, emphasizes the role of participation in global value chains for economic 
development in emerging economies, and looks primarily at transaction cost economics 
to explain their governance (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008).  
Although the subject of host country institutions has received some attention from 
scholars (Bair 2005), their role, and lead buyer strategies beyond the outsourcing decision 
itself, have not been incorporated in the proposed global value chains governance 
framework, which posits that governance modes are determined by three main factors:  
transaction complexity, codifiability of production knowledge and supplier capabilities  
(Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005). The neglect of host country institutions and of lead buyer 
strategies by IB scholarship is even more puzzling considering the transaction frequency 
that characterizes buyer-led GVCs, and of the governance challenges faced by developed 
economies MNCs seeking to exercise control over production, without ownership of 
productive assets, in geographically remote emerging economies, characterized by great 
cultural and institutional distance. 
The broad research objective in this study is to gain a better understanding of the 
determinants of governance mode choices in global value chains. I propose that the 
choice of governance mode in each buyer-supplier dyad is shaped by institutional and 
structural factors, namely home-host country institutional distance and supplier 
capabilities, moderated by lead firm agency. I build on the liability of foreignness literature 
to analyze transactional and relational barriers at the cross-national business interface in 
GVCs within the cognitive, normative and regulative institutional pillars framework (Scott 





allows me then to  define lead firm strategies aimed at reducing the cost associated with 
the liability of foreignness (Eden and Miller 2004) in terms of institutional brokerage. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This study seeks a more complete understanding of the determinants of the lead buyer’s 
choice of governance mode for buyer–supplier dyads in the GVC. Specifically, what are the 
key factors that play into the lead buyer’s decision whether to internalize the supplier 
interface, with direct sourcing, or to externalize it, through agents or trade 
intermediaries? To answer this main question, I developed a theoretical model that 
identifies the differences between the institutional environments in the home and host 
countries, supplier capabilities and lead firm strategies as determinants of the GVC 
governance choice, leading to the following research questions: 
1. How does home-host country institutional distance affect the lead buyer’s choice 
of governance in each GVC buyer-supplier dyad? 
2. How do supplier capabilities affect the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the 
GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
3. How do the institutional brokerage activities and capabilities of the lead firm affect 
the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
1.4 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The main theoretical lens throughout this study is institutional theory, with an ambition 
to place some of its building blocks in context, understanding how they apply to global 





(Zaheer 1995) black box, by breaking down institutional distance in a conceptual matrix 
of transactional and relational cross-national institutional barriers, and structuring my 
interview protocols accordingly, provided a strong theoretical compass to my field 
research. Scott’s cognitive, normative and regulative pillars of institutions (Scott 1995, 
Scott 2008), and the derived institutional distance construct (Kostova 1997) provide a 
helpful analytical framework to examine in detail the transactional  and relational barriers 
in global value chains, and to understand how the associated costs drive the governance 
of the buyer-supplier relationship The global value chains literature contributes greatly to 
the development of the theoretical model, through its focus on GVC governance 
(Humphrey 2001, Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005), and on supplier capabilities. My 
theoretical model retains supplier capabilities as a structural determinant of GVC 
governance. These structural factors, namely the barriers imposed by supplier 
capabilities, combined with the institutional distance between home and host countries, 
lead to a strategic response by lead buyers, in either developing or procuring of 
institutional brokerage to minimize the associated costs, and to maximize the benefits of 
global sourcing. This strategic response is evidenced in the governance choice.  
Institutional brokerage has a static dimension, made up of transactional 
capabilities, centered on contracting and order management skills, and on sourcing 
routines and policies leading to operational effectiveness, and a dynamic dimension, 
founded on relational capabilities that maximize the lead buyers’ access to supplier 
capabilities and resources, and allow them to sense and respond more rapidly to trend 





the former is a set of potentially imitable skills, the latter represents a strategic resource 
(Barney 1991), founded on a strategic choice to develop and enhance the accumulated 
stock of international business knowledge and cross-cultural intelligence, and a potential 
source of sustainable competitive advantage.  
The level and type of lead buyer investment in institutional brokerage capabilities 
is interrelated with the GVC governance choice, with lower investment resulting in the 
externalization of the buyer-supplier interface to trade intermediaries. Focus on 
transactional institutional brokerage tends to be associated with a variable cost 
minimization strategy through direct sourcing, which emphasizes lead buyer control, 
contracts and transactional effectiveness, while focus on relational institutional 
brokerage reflects a social capital strategy aimed at maximizing firm product capabilities 
and access to resources in the global value chain, at a cost premium. 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
Because of the complexity of the phenomenon under study, I chose a qualitative 
constructivist research approach (Lincoln and Guba 2013), centered on in-depth 
interviews of key sourcing decision makers in the US specialty apparel retail sector. This 
particular subset of the US apparel industry is characterized by  complete dependence on 
imports from a handful of developing nations (OTEXA 2015) and represents a perfect 
‘laboratory’ for the study, with all firms sourcing through extended global value chains.  
First, US specialty apparel retailers import thousands of individual styles (SKUs) 





high number of cross-border interfaces. The sheer volume of cross-border transactional 
and relational ‘points of contact’, and the number of people and firms involved, amplify 
the barrier effect of institutional distance, and of the capability constraints at the supplier 
interface , exposing lead buyers to critical governance choices to deal with country risk, 
to control production, to monitor supplier cost, quality and delivery performance, and to 
ensure supplier compliance with labor and safety standards (Birnbaum 2015).  
Second, the firms in my sample engage in a very large number of cross-border 
transactions of comparable complexity, producing goods of similar construction. This  
allows me to control for two of the three governance determinants suggested in the 
extant GVC governance literature: the complexity of the transaction and the codifiability 
of the product information (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005). Finally, virtually all the 
specialty retailers in the sample are focused almost exclusively on sourcing for the US 
consumer market; this eliminates the concern that marketing interests in the host country 
(as would be the case of an entry in the Chinese market) could drive the decision where 
to source and the choice of governance mode. 
Sampling for this study was purposive (Merriam 2002), aimed at reaching 
participants with the experience and a level of executive responsibility that could yield 
rich description (Geertz 1973), and help develop knowledge of how structural factors in 
the global value chain drive sourcing decisions and the governance of relations with 
suppliers. It was vital for this purpose to interview executives who have made governance 





agents and intermediaries, contacted through a referral chain, was also critical to ensure 
study quality and trustworthiness through source triangulation (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
Recorded interviews with 15 retail and apparel industry executives in the US, Hong Kong 
and Indonesia yielded over 650 pages of transcripts, and an in depth understanding of the 
interplay of structural factors in the GVC and lead firm strategies. 
My preparation and construction of the interviews was strongly influenced by 
practical guidelines from ethnography  (McCracken 1988), however the starting point of 
this research was a theoretical model, not a tabula rasa,  and the participants’ profile 
required a stronger researcher voice in order to elicit informative responses than 
recommended in ethnographic studies or grounded theory.  Interviewing business elites 
also requires the ability to challenge participants (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015) used to 
being interviewed and to expressing opinions ‘on the record’, to contribute more than 
‘talking points’ and truisms about industry practices. I sought to use to my advantage an 
extensive business background in the areas of global sourcing and international trade, 
and to capitalize on the professional legitimacy coming from over twenty years of 
experience in business meetings and negotiations at the executive level. The ability to 
“talk shop” and engage executives with ease contributed to a more open dialogue, often 
resulting in a natural extension of the time initially set aside for the interview. 
While the quality of interview contributions met my highest expectations, and 
resulted in the desired evolutionary co-creation of knowledge through consensus among 





findings. By nature, qualitative studies are more phenomenology-focused than studies of 
direct cause-effect relationships, and do not result into directly testable hypothesis but 
rather in conditional propositions, which may not be generalizable beyond the domain to 
which they apply. That said, this study makes a plausible argument for an institutional 
analysis of global value chains by successfully applying it to one of the largest industry 
sectors operating in GVCs. Furthermore, with the institutional brokerage construct, it 
offers a framework for the inclusion of lead firm strategic capabilities in the governance 
mode calculus.  
1.6 CONTRIBUTION  
This study contributes to theory in two ways: it provides an institutional explanation of 
lead buyers’ choices of governance mode in their GVCs, and introduces the institutional 
brokerage construct to describe lead firm strategies aimed at lowering the costs 
associated with home-host country institutional distance and with the varying capability 
levels of supplier in the global value chain. The first contribution is achieved by breaking 
down institutional distance into a transactional and a relational dimension, analyzing the 
transactional and relational impact of cognitive, normative and regulative barriers at the 
buyer-supplier cross-border interface. In-depth interviews with experienced sourcing 
professionals reveal that these barriers are persistent and affect exchange at the 
interpersonal, firm-to-firm and country-to country levels, and that the associated costs 
influence firm sourcing strategy. The second contribution proposes that lead firms engage 
in institutional brokerage, a series of activities that reduce institutional distance and its 





chains. The relational complexity and transaction frequency of many GVCs, combined 
with lead buyers’ dependency on global production networks makes institutional 
brokerage more than just a series of operational effectiveness tasks, a checklist of I’s to 
dot and T’s to cross. 
The study also provides a useful contribution to management, by highlighting 
brokerage activities and capabilities that will be critical for success, as apparel global value 
chains continue to migrate to lower factor cost countries, like Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Ghana, which are characterized by greater institutional distance and a less mature 
supplier base. Investments in institutional brokerage capabilities by the lead buyer or its 
intermediaries will be essential to overcome the barriers to exchange and coordination in 
these new sourcing markets. The optimal governance mode for the buyer-supplier 

















This research studies the choice of governance mode of lead buyers in global value chains, 
in response to institutional differences between the home and host countries, and to 
differences in supplier capabilities. It builds on the existing literature on global value 
chains and analyzing governance choice through an institutional theory lens. In this 
chapter, I review the foundational literature on global value chains, with a special focus 
on their governance, and the relevant institutional theory, with emphasis on the pillars of 
institutions and on institutional distance. 
2.1 GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS  
The concept of value chain, first introduced by Porter, describes the full range of activities 
that firms and workers perform to bring a product from its conception to its end use and 
beyond (Porter 1985). These activities include design, production, marketing, distribution 
and support to the end consumer. Value chain activities can be internalized within the 
firm or divided among different firms. In the last few decades, value creation has spanned 
across borders, giving rise to complex global commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
1994). International production, which started with arms-length contract manufacturing 
and assembly work in low labor cost nations, gradually evolved to a more complex and 





firms. Technological upgrading of overseas vendors and export driven development 
strategies favored the emergence in developed economies of asset-light strategies that 
focused on core competencies, relying on smart outsourcing of a greater number of 
functions of increasing complexity (Gereffi 1999). This evolution gave rise to producer 
driven global commodity chains in capital and technology intensive industries (e.g. 
automotive), and to buyer-driven commodity chains in low tech, labor intensive 
productions such as apparel, footwear,  toys,  housewares, small appliances and 
consumer electronics (Gereffi 2001), which we call Global Value Chains. While the 
globalization of value chains has certainly been enabled by the operational efficiencies 
resulting from these technological and trade policy factors, the scale and scope of cross-
national trade in global value chains (UNCTAD 2013), their growing importance seems to 
reflect a more permanent  shift of the boundary of the firm, as MNCs refocus from 
internalization of activities and functions (Buckley and Casson 1976) to outsourcing.  
The first articulation of this shift redefines the firm as a portfolio of competencies 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Under this view, the future of organizations depends on their 
ability to develop (faster, and at a lower cost than the competition) core competencies 
that will spawn unanticipated products, technology or application breakthroughs that can 
translate into sustainable competitive advantage. It is critical to that effect that the firm 
dedicates all its available resources to the development of these core competencies. The 
valuable, rare, non-imitable and non-substitutable strategic resources so critical to 
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991) are then the result of an unrelenting 





make a strategic choice to outsource a number of non-core activities to outside firms 
(Quinn 1994); not only does strategic outsourcing reduce investment in non-essential or 
low value-added activities and functions, but it also allows the firm to outsource them to 
other specialized firms that make those particular functions and activities their own core 
competency, often resulting in superior components and greater operational efficiencies.   
The reduction of trade barriers, especially after the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of 
GATT, starting in 1973, combined with the emergence of ISO global standards in 
containerized shipping starting in the late 1960s, improvements in information and 
communication technology, and other advances in logistics created the premises for the 
slicing of the value chain across firm boundaries and national borders (Krugman, Cooper 
et al. 1995). These factors accelerated a trend towards the disintegration of production, 
enabling firms to offshore manufacturing activities to countries with lower factor costs, 
and eventually to outsource them to remote and geographically dispersed (Herrigel and 
Zeitlin 2010), and vertically specialized (Jacobides and Winter 2005)  third party firms. 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) are defined as a complex transnational chain of 
coordinated parallel and sequential value-added activities that transform raw materials 
into finished goods. Often directed by developed economies MNC firms, they represent 
the natural evolution of the international division of labor from simple trade of inputs of 
production and contract manufacturing to the de facto disintegration of production and 
its dispersion to geographically remote developing countries with more favorable factors 





to offshore production networks and is characterized by multi-step production and trade 
of intermediate inputs of production, which are finally shipped to the lead buyer as 
finished goods. Typically, the lead firms focus on the design and marketing of the 
products, and on directing and monitoring the GVC, while externalizing production and 
logistics to the firms that make up their Global Value Chains. The growth of Global Value 
Chains can be ascribed to the convergence of three synergistic factors. From the policy 
perspective, the reduction of trade barriers promoted by successive GATT Rounds 
beginning from the late 1950s enabled most low-income countries in East Asia to eschew 
import substitution in favor of export driven industrialization models, exploiting their 
labor cost advantages in low-tech production and assemblies. Lower tariffs and trade 
barriers, combined with various government industrial incentives to domestic and foreign 
investors, and the creation of special economic zones with tax and tariff exemptions, all 
contributed to creating a vibrant industrial base in East and Southeast Asia. Technological 
improvement in information and communication technologies, in particular after the 
advent of the internet is the second contributing factor. These advances have lowered 
transaction cost in dealing with remote vendors, and fundamentally moved the bounds 
of human rationality. More complex knowledge and information can now be codified, 
transmitted to geographically dispersed production sites and its use monitored in real 
time, in parallel and synchronously. It is now technologically possible for any manager to 
monitor production and intervene in case of any deviation from desired inputs or outputs, 
simultaneously at multiple locations from any office with an internet connection. This 





exchanges, further contributing to the disintegration and geographic dispersion of 
production.  
These favorable trade winds and the shift in the information and communication 
technological frontier enabled a change in the strategic investment focus of developed 
country firms from core products to core competencies. Strategic outsourcing allowed 
firms to invest in strategic resources such as R&D, design, marketing and branding, while 
transferring large parts of production and shedding many non-core functions to third-
party vendors, domestically and more commonly overseas, in lower labor cost emerging 
economies. This movement towards strategic outsourcing quickly reached a point of no 
return in the 1990s, as vendor capabilities quickly surpassed in-house capabilities, and 
greater economies of scale were achieved by vendors serving multiple buyers, with the 
risks associated with asset specificity better pooled at industry level rather than at the 
firm level. The benefits of specialization and lower transaction costs favored the 
disintegration of production in extended chains of specialized vendor-buyer relations, 
driven by lead buyers that design and market products but in many cases, have no 
substantial manufacturing assets.  Because of this shift in capabilities, value creation has 
progressively shifted from production to ‘softer’ skills, with profits deriving not so much 
from economies of scale but rather from research, design, sales and marketing, and from 
the orchestration of supply capabilities with demand (Gereffi 1999). It is in this context 
that many lead apparel brand marketers became ‘manufacturers without factories’. In 
the buyer driven apparel global value chains, which are the focus of this study, lead buyers 





chain, compressing suppliers’ profits. The ability to coordinate remotely and closely 
control the activities of multiple vendors, enabled lead-firms to forego in-house 
production altogether, and to shed traditionally costs support functions like technical 
design, pattern-making, grading, and sample-making by transferring them to overseas 
contractors. This transfer was facilitated by a convergence of interests of suppliers 
seeking to upgrade their service capabilities to capture higher value added activities in 
the commodity chain, and the desire of discount stores such as Wal-Mart and Target, 
specialty retailers, and brand marketers to focus on design, sales and marketing. Thus, 
the vendor capabilities and lead buyers’ procurement approach continued to evolve from 
basic assemblies like cut, make and trim (CMT) in the apparel industry to full-package 
production, which includes inputs in design, raw material sourcing, and logistics (Gereffi 
1999). 
While, in theory, strategic outsourcing is a means to free up firm resources 
towards capabilities development, in practice, its fundamental calculus is transaction cost 
minimization, whereby the benefits of outsourcing must exceed the transaction and 
governance costs associated with market exchanges, a perspective that remains 
dominant in the analysis of global value chains. As a result, the commodity chains (Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz 1994), that originally fed the procurement needs of lead buyers in 
developed markets, were initially characterized by strategies of tariff circumvention and 
international labor cost exploitation investments (Dunning 1981), with triangular trade 





development strategies were embraced far earlier than in other low-factor cost regions 
(Dicken and Thrift 1992). 
Outsourcing firms have benefitted from strategic outsourcing to global value 
chains in both cost leadership strategies and differentiation strategies (Gilley and Rasheed 
2000). Some of the advantages of outsourcing are associated with the irreversible shift of 
economies of scale in production from the individual lead firm level to cluster or industry 
level, resulting in many industries in the substitution of the hierarchical vertically 
integrated firm with modular organizational forms (Schilling and Steensma 2001). By 
using specialized third-party vendors, lead firms not only reduce their investment in 
production specific assets, lowering their hurdle rate and break-even point, but also gain 
technological and commercial flexibility, benefitting from lower production switching 
costs.  These tangible advantages are often accompanied by improved product quality 
resulting from the use of the best available outside resources. Taken to the extreme, 
strategic outsourcing has allowed the emergence of successful marketers of 
manufactured goods that have outsourced all production from their inception, a 
phenomenon described as abstention based outsourcing (Gilley and Rasheed 2000).  
Several apparel retailers in this research sample fit this description. 
Countering the obvious gains in operational efficiency from strategic outsourcing, 
some scholars have pointed at serious risks associated with excessive reliance on it.  Key 
among them are a decline in innovation capabilities of the lead firm, with a loss of R&D 





breakthroughs (Kotabe 1992) . The potential hollowing out of lead firms (Levinson 2013) 
due to this erosion of capabilities, is coupled with the risk of competitive market entry by 
suppliers (Prahalad and Hamels 1990), a phenomenon observed in recent years in the 
cases of Samsung and HTC in electronics, and Li & Fung in apparel. Concerns with the 
growing power and concentration of capabilities by large sourcing intermediaries have on 
occasion influenced lead buyer’s GVC governance choices, motivating the GAP’s to buy 
out Li & Fung’s equity stake in GAP International Sourcing Ltd, and Wal-Mart’s to bring in-
house to its Walmart Global Sourcing subsidiary’s relationships with suppliers that were 
previously handled through Li & Fung (WSJ 2015).  
2.1.1 GVCs IN THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITERATURE   
In spite of the economic scale of global value chains, with value added close to 20% of 
total world GDP  (UNCTAD 2013), until recently (Gereffi and Lee 2012), they have not 
received their due attention in the International Business scholarship as an entry mode 
at par in importance with equity entry modes, a research skew attributable to the legacy 
of the discipline’s early years. The IB field’s original focus was in some way an extension 
of theories of the firm, seeking to explain why firms internalize assets and activities across 
national borders, and choose to enter foreign markets with equity entry modes. The 
legacy of the internalization lens shared by original IB research  (Hymer 1960, Buckley and 
Casson 1976, Johanson and Vahlne 1977, Dunning 1981, Johanson and Vahlne 2009) is 
that internationalization became somewhat synonymous with FDI, and with equity entry 






Global value chains represent a different course.  Productive and non-core 
activities are externalized because, due to the trade policy evolution and technological 
revolution in the last half century, some of the premises for internalization no longer hold 
true. Lower transaction costs and accelerated knowledge codification and transfer, 
thanks to advanced computing and telecommunication, opened new opportunities for 
MNCs to outsource production and service activities, and to coordinate them across 
complex transnational networks of specialized vendors and subcontractors. In many 
cases, with the possible exclusion of capital-intensive oligopolistic industries, the locus of 
the MNC’s ownership advantages is their human capital and not the factory, and 
internationalization takes places largely without FDI. Internationalization through GVCs is 
largely asset-light, seeking to exploit location advantages through externalization of 
production. Unlike FDI, it keeps the boundaries of the firm in the lead firm’s home 
country, with the possible exception of some sourcing support functions that may be 
transferred to overseas subsidiaries. 
2.1.2 GVC GOVERNANCE  
The organization of production in networks of geographically dispersed clusters, across 
industry-specific agglomeration and industrial districts (Sturgeon 2001) raises governance 
costs for lead buyers seeking to control extended outsourced supply and production 
chains, supplier performance and their compliance with acceptable labor and safety 
standards. These global value chains tend to be neither markets, nor hierarchies but 
rather networks (Powell 2003) in which informal mechanisms of non-market coordination 





supporting institutions that characterize the US economic system (Sable and Zeitlin 2004), 
where an ad hoc arms-length contracting model is dominant (Langlois 2003). As a result, 
economic exchanges in global value chains are often coordinated within long-term 
informal buyer-supplier relations that require the lead firm to make substantial 
relationship-specific investments in staffing, systems and support activities, thus 
increasing their governance costs. 
Governance choice, and the resulting level of control and power asymmetry (from 
market to hierarchy) in the apparel industry global value chains has been linked in the 
literature to three key factors (Humphrey 2001): 
1. The complexity of the tasks transferred  
2. The codifiability and institutionalized standardization of the requisite knowledge 
3. Supplier capabilities, enhanced through industrial upgrading (Gereffi 1999) 
Governance mechanisms in a product value chain are in place to control what 
goods are produced, the specifications and technology to be employed in producing the 
goods, the locations where production can take place, the timing of production, and the 
price of the various inputs of production and of the final goods (Humphrey 2001). Building 
on these three determinant factors, seminal work on the governance of global value 
chains has identified five modes, on a continuum from pure markets governance to pure 
hierarchy (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005): 
1. Market governance is characterized by contractual arrangements with third party 





is based on transient contractual relationships to manufacture production 
intermediates or finished goods within specific tolerances, with expendable 
suppliers who compete on price with one another, with relatively low switching 
costs.   
2. Modular governance is preferred when greater coordination between the parties 
responsible for different stages of the value chain is required; in these cases, the 
activities of the suppliers of inputs of production and finished are linked in 
coordinated production modules, to make the finished goods as specified by the 
buyer. The modules are relatively interchangeable and compete with one another 
on price. 
3. Relational governance is dominant when the complexity of the supply chain 
imposes tighter coordination among the different stages of the value chain, with 
a steep learning curve in the buyer-supplier relationship that raises switching 
costs. In this governance mode, well-performing incumbents generally have a 
marked advantage over new suppliers, and a significant part of contracted work is 
given to the same suppliers from season to season.    
4. Captive governance can effectively substitute for lead firm ownership of the 
manufacturing assets when dedicated production lines are a strategic driver for 
the lead firm. In this arrangement, the lead buyer has a long-term exclusive 
manufacturing contract with a third party that uses up its capacity.  The underlying 
contract between the two firms reduces transaction costs on both ends, and 





5. Hierarchy. In this instance, the lead buyer’s GVC is vertically integrated but may 
be geographically dispersed to various locations, depending on cost and 
availability of inputs and factors of production. This arrangement minimizes 
transaction costs and maximizes control over procurement, production processes 
and intellectual property.  
The governance mode determines the network topology, the boundaries of the 
firm and the key international business interfaces.  The apparel industry appears to rely 
largely on relational governance, with supplier and agent networks, and on modular 
governance, relying on trade intermediaries like Hong Kong based Li & Fung to 
orchestrate a modular value chain. The focus on transaction costs, industrial upgrading 
and governance in the outsourcing and global value chains research has been critiqued 
by some scholars, who press for greater attention to the institutional context in which the 
GVCs are embedded (Bair 2005). Specifically, Bair identifies institutional factors that can 
be as important as transaction costs and vendor capabilities in determining GVC 
governance. Among them, regulatory mechanisms and trade policies shape the 
geography and configuration of GVCs and the power relations among its participants; 
transnational agreements can influence location choices as much as factor costs. This is 
evidenced by the development of a very large apparel sector in a ‘difficult’ country like 
Bangladesh, in large measure because of its duty-free status with the European Union and 
the absence of production quota with the US. Finally, local social and institutional 
frameworks where the GVC operates, and where the local actors are embedded, have 





This criticism by Bair echoes views of comparative capitalism scholars who view 
institutional arbitrage as equally important as factor arbitrage in internationalization. It 
has been shown for example that institutional factors (e.g. the protection of IPR) will limit 
offshore outsourcing in certain instances more than the intrinsic value of internalization 
(Doh 2005). In this context, relation building capabilities, and knowledge-sharing routines 
and systems appear critical for the firm to engage in strategic outsourcing. These drivers, 
combined with the commoditization of organizational practices, give rise to hybrid 
organizational forms and increased levels of network governance (Lewin and Peeters 
2006). Global value chains represent a permanent shift in strategic firm boundary 
decisions that hinge on the relative efficiencies of markets vs. hierarchies (Holcomb and 
Hitt 2007). Many of the same transaction cost considerations that apply to offshoring of 
production apply to offshore outsourcing of services, with perhaps greater emphasis on 
organizational costs and on the uncertainties associated with relationship development 
(Ellram, Tate et al. 2007); as the support services component of outsourced production 
increases, these considerations increase in importance for global value chains as well.  
As relationship development rises in importance, cultural and institutional 
distance between the lead buyer’s home country and the GVC host countries become 
more salient. Greater distance can be generally associated with rising relational costs, 
possibly affecting supplier and country selection, and as global value chains become more 
information-rich, interaction costs are emerging as critical determinants of the 
outsourcing decision (Walters 2007). These interactions are often complicated by the 





markets, especially in East Asia, where vendors tend to be embedded in networks of social 
relationships (Granovetter 1985). These emerging economies see the prevalence of trust-
based network governance structures (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008) that can be incompatible 
with the more formalized system of contract based relations more prevalent in the US 
(Langlois 2003). 
2.2 INSTITUTIONS 
The GVC literature has given only cursory attention to host countries institutions (Bair 
2005), and to the effects of cultural and institutional distance in global value chains 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2016). However, it is reasonable to expect that both would 
have significant impact on the entry decision and on the governance of the buyer-supplier 
relationship, because of the transaction intensity and because the relational complexity 
intrinsic to its modular production networks. An argument could be made that business 
scholarship on institutions began with the acknowledgement of market imperfections, 
and with the question of the origins of the firm (Coase 1937), a vital institution in 
economic life that can be treated as an entity in economic modeling, but whose existence 
cannot be fully explained in a world of perfectly efficient markets.  Institutional theory 
implicitly accepts market imperfections and the existence of the firm, and other forms of 
non-market coordination, to focus on defining institutions, and on explaining the 
behavior of economic actors as the resultant of institutional structure, and of economic 
and social agency.  
A widely-adopted definition of institutions, and a starting point of institutional 





humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and influence social, 
economic and political exchange. They can be described as the rules of the game in 
society” (North 1990). North further defines the field by explicitly distinguishing between 
institutions, the constraining structures, and organizations, political, economic and social 
entities created purposefully to exploit the opportunities afforded by the particular 
institutional framework and by economic opportunity. In taking advantage of these 
opportunities, organizations are also agents of institutional change. By defining 
institutions as both formal and informal constraints, North’s seminal work opened the 
field to a wide range of institutional effects, to analyze the influence of human society as 
it is with all its complexity on the organization and coordination of production and 
economic exchange. On the other hand, in continuity with the field of economics’ view of 
institutions as market imperfections, by defining them as “humanly devised constraints” 
(emphasis mine), North also oriented the field’s research towards a treatment of 
institutions as moderator variables, as inefficient and costly hurdles to economic 
exchange to be managed and overcome. 
Although not impervious to change, formal and informal institutions tend to be 
stable, and in the short run they can be treated as social facts, external influences on 
individuals, that exert a coercive power on the individuals by means of education, social 
rules and norms, religion, and/or laws that are internalized by individuals (Durkheim 
1893) and taken for granted. The process by which such internalization takes place has 
been described as institutionalization (Selznick 1956), a process that takes place in 





become infused with value, outliving their utility, to the point where the existence of the 
institution itself becomes the purpose of the institution. In an international context, the 
differences in institutionalized practices, norms and behaviors are part and parcel of the 
liability of foreignness. Owing in part to Durkheim’s social determinism, the early work on 
institutions tended to be top-down (structural, deterministic) models of institutional 
influence (Scott 2005), with social and economic actors as institution-takers. A more 
dynamic framework in which social and economic actors interact with stable institutions 
and bring about institutional change, was another key contribution of North’s research 
on institutions. In his analysis, institutions are stable in the short run, and but susceptible 
to path-dependent change effected by social and economic actors (North 1990). 
Richard Scott extended North’s work on institutions and sought to refine the 
definition of institutions to include both formal and informal structural elements of social 
organization, identifying “cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources provide stability and meaning to social 
life” (Scott 2008). This particular articulation of the pillars of institutions provides a 
versatile tool for comparative analyses of those cross-national institutional differences 
that are of particular interest in global value chains as sources of comparative institutional 
advantage that firms can exploit through institutional arbitrage (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Under this lens, institutions are not just viewed as constraints, barriers to be lowered and 
overcome but also as factors of production, with specific cultural, normative and 
regulative institutional endowments favoring specific types of production, and 





and value-based interpretations of culture under the institutional domain, the pillars 
framework overcomes the shortcomings of approaches to institutional distance that limit 
themselves to the comparison of measures of formal institutions efficiency (e.g. World 
Governance Indicators). By accounting for all the formal and informal institutional factors 
affecting economic actors in cross-national business, the pillars framework paves the way 
for an institutional analysis of the liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995). 
2.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE 
The additional costs associated with doing business abroad haven been linked to 
‘distance’; whether defined from the subjective perspective of psychic distance (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977), or through purportedly more objective measures like cultural distance 
(Kogut and Singh 1988) or institutional distance (Kostova 1997, Kostova 1999, Kostova 
and Zaheer 1999, Xu and Shenkar 2002) ‘distance’ appears to be positively correlated with 
the liability of foreignness, raising transaction costs, influencing entry decision, and the 
specific choice of equity entry mode (FDI, acquisition or JV).  
The concept of distance was introduced by the Uppsala School (Johanson and 
Vahlne 1977). Taking a firm-centric approach to distance, these scholars introduced the 
concept of psychic distance, defined as the perception of the risks posed by differences 
between the firm’s home country and host country environments to the free flow of 
information between firm and markets. Psychic distance is greater as linguistic and 
cultural differences increase, which leads firms to expand following an ink stain pattern, 
investing in countries that are more similar first, often neighboring countries, and only 





first operationalization contains in nuce many of the conceptual challenges for the 
distance construct, starting from the definition and measurement of culture and 
‘environment’, down to questions of relevance of national boundaries in analyzing 
culture. In this context, Hofstede’s original work on national culture, measured along four 
dimensions (Hofstede 1980), subsequently extended to five (Hofstede and Hofstede 
2001), has provided great impetus to the research on cultural distance: not only could 
differences between nations along key cultural dimensions be given a numerical value, 
but also the direction of those differences could provide insights on national differences 
in value systems, and help predict cross-national management challenges.  
Hofstede’s four original dimensions were combined to create a single numerical 
cultural distance index, CDI, which in turn was used to predict MNC entry mode in foreign 
markets (Kogut and Singh 1988). The leading hypothesis of research on cultural distance 
is that the greater the cultural distance, the more the entering firm would prefer an entry 
mode that gives it greater control on its investment, choosing wholly owned subsidiaries 
to joint ventures and acquisitions. In many ways, this is simply an application of 
transaction cost economics and internalization theory, whereby high cultural distance is 
associated with higher information costs, more difficult transfer of corporate skills, and 
in general with greater outcome uncertainty, which can be mitigated through 
internalization of activities within the firm (Williamson 1985).  Agency costs have also 
been shown to rise as an effect of cultural distance (Roth and O'Donnell 1996). This effect, 
however, varies across industries, and with firm experience with cross-border 





have sometimes proven to be better predictors than the CDI, as in the case of uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) and FDI (Barkema and Vermeulen 1997, Shenkar 2001) suggesting that 
different cultural dimensions have different weights and that their influence may be 
domain specific. Extensive research on cultural dimensions and finance (Kwok and 
Tadesse 2006) also show more satisfactory greater predictive and explanatory power for 
individual cultural dimensions as opposed to the CDI.   
In spite of its appeal and parsimony, the CDI oversimplifies an intangible and hard-
to-measure construct (Boyacigiller, Kleinberg et al. 2004) and has been critiqued on 
several grounds. Shenkar, for example, argues that cultural distance is not symmetric (Da-
>b ≠ D b->a), that its effect on FDI is not linear, and that the casual link with entry mode 
is questionable (Shenkar 2001).  More importantly, he questions whether besides being 
conceived as a hurdle, a negative moderator, cultural distance could also be in certain 
circumstances complementary and attractive, which would result in a reversal of 
predicted firm behaviors, and outcomes. The impact of cultural distance also seems to be 
mitigated over time by the process of acculturation, the diffusion of cultural elements in 
both directions (Berry 1980), and by staffing strategies, with expatriates and bi-cultural 
individuals catalyzing cross-fertilization (Shenkar 2001) at the cross-national interface.   
In light of these complexities, it is not surprising that the overall evidence of the 
effects of cultural and institutional distance is mixed (Tihanyi, Griffith et al. 2005). Firstly, 
there are intrinsic issues with the reduction of a complex phenomenon to a simple scale: 





the underlying dimensions of national culture (Hofstede 1980) and their combination in 
a non-weighted index (Shenkar 2001). Secondly, macro-economic factors such as GDP, 
GDP per capita and market size dwarf distance as determinants of FDI flows: a significant 
proportion of FDI is market-seeking and as result flows within developed countries, which 
are more homogenous in institutional development and tend to be geographically 
concentrated in North America, and in the European Union. Developed economies plus 
China, which takes the lion share of FDI outside of developed economies, account for over 
73% of total FDI stock, and over 53 % of total FDI flows (UNCTAD 2013). Finally, firm 
experience in internationalization also appears to play a role in the entry decision, and in 
the FDI entry mode, with more experienced firms choosing wholly owned subsidiaries 
over joint ventures even in market characterized by greater institutional and cultural 
distance where the distance model would predict externalization of risk. 
The effect of cultural and institutional distance on the strategic choices of 
internationalizing firms has been analyzed under two lenses: the entry decision itself, and 
the entry mode, namely the MNC ownership and control decisions in the foreign market. 
Although the empirical findings have been somewhat mixed, there is a consensus that 
distance matters (Ghemawat 2001), and that MNCs tend to prefer entry in markets that 
pose fewer distance challenges. The challenges faced by firms entering markets with 
greater distance stem from an inferior understanding of the local culture and business 
norms (Meyer & Rowan 1977), and from the conflict between isomorphic local 
legitimization pressures and internal consistency within the MNC itself (Di Maggio & 





entry risk by choosing joint ventures with local partners and exercising full control by 
internalizing the risk with wholly owns subsidiaries. The cost of the trade-offs between 
ownership and control seems to rise with distance. 
The need for a more comprehensive treatment of distance that would capture the 
complexity of cross-border exchanges leads to the concept of institutional distance 
(Kostova 1997), which applies Scott’s pillars directly, by proposing the creation of country 
institutional profiles, and then using them to measure institutional distance in home-host 
country dyads. This study acknowledges that with institutions, thus defined, institutional 
distance cannot be gauged through a fixed objective measure, but because it affects 
different industry and areas of management differently, it requires a domain specific 
instrument for its measurement to have applicable validity. Subsequent empirical work 
using survey instruments with regulatory, normative and cognitive items in the 
entrepreneurial domain (Busenitz, Gomez et al. 2000), and in the adoption of 
organizational practices (Kostova and Roth 2002), confirms the promise of this approach 
and lend support to this study’s use of the pillars framework in the analysis of institutional 
distance in the domain of buyer-led global value chains. The IB interface is not only 
affected by the cross-national differences in culture discussed above, but also by the 
institutional environments of the host country, and by the institutional distance between 
the home and host country (Kostova 1999). Based on the cultural-cognitive, normative 
and regulative pillars of institutions (Scott 1995, 2008), the institutional distance 
construct subsumes cultural distance, and accounts for differences in both formal and 





culture it overcomes the dichotomy between cognitive vs. value based views of culture, 
finding place for both, with the cognitive pillar accounting for cognitive differences 
(language and schemata) operating at the interpersonal interface, while the normative 
pillar accounts for the organizing effects of host country values and norms at firm level. 
The interface between internationalizing firm and host country formal institutions is 
captured under the regulatory pillar. 
Institutional distance poses conflicting demands on the MNC, with host country 
isomorphic pressure to adopt local practices to establish legitimacy (Kostova and Zaheer 
1999) on one hand, and the need to transfer its successful corporate practices unchanged, 
unmitigated by the local environment (Kostova 1999). This situation of institutional 
duality (Kostova and Roth 2002) can give rise to internal strains within the organization, 
and possibly tilt the entry strategy to non-equity entry modes, when the internal costs 
associated with these strains exceed the anticipated costs of partnering with a host 
country firm. This could be the case, for example, when the level of informality of the host 
country’s economic exchange environment is incompatible with, or substantially different 
from strict formal governance structures in the MNC home country. There is a clear link 
between institutional distance, liability of foreignness and cost of doing business abroad 
(Eden and Miller 2004). However, the fact that the distance literature focuses exclusively 
on MNC equity mode market entries may be responsible for less than overwhelming 
evidence of decisive institutional effect on MNC entry decisions and on subsidiary 
performance (Tihanyi, Griffith et al. 2005). The impact of capital investment, and MNC 





pressure from the host country than the distance literature would predict, leading some 
scholars to suggest that MNCs entering foreign markets with equity entry modes operate 
in their own institutional field, shielded from host country institutional pressures 
(Kostova, Roth et al. 2008). 
2.2.2 CROSS-BORDER BARRIERS AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE  
The domain specificity of country institutional profiles (Kostova 1997) suggests that 
institutional distance operates differently in different contexts and that the barriers to 
economic exchange can vary as a function of its associated activities. It is useful to this 
effect to analyze institutional distance in terms of the cognitive, normative and regulative 
barriers it creates at the cross-border business interface in global value chains.  
 The most obvious cognitive barrier in global value chains is linked to language: 
although English has become the lingua franca of trade, for most of the overseas suppliers 
it is a second or third language, learned in school and through trade. At the simplest level, 
these language barriers affect every aspect of the transaction, increasing search, 
contracting and monitoring costs, and complicate execution, where instructions are 
misunderstood and key information is ‘lost in translation’. The impact of communication 
failures is compounded by communication styles (Hall 1976) and, for many Asian hosts, 
by mianzi, the need to save ‘face’, which prevents them from acknowledging the 
communication breakdown. The linguistic barriers may have a more profound effect on 
both transactions and relations between US buyers and their overseas suppliers if we 
consider that linguistic differences may contribute to different perceptions of reality, as 





(Boroditsky 2001). Far from supporting a strong Whorfian hypothesis, I submit that 
different language structures combined with the different metaphors used to describe 
reality in different cultures may prevent the emergence of ‘shared meaning’ across 
cultures even with fluent English speakers. 
The communication gaps that can result from the interplay of cognition and 
culture (Nisbett and Norenzayan 2002) lead to divergent, and at times incommensurable 
schemata, as can be seen in the case of the ancient Chinese and Greek traditions. While 
the Greek tradition tends to be deterministic, emphasizing abstraction and objective 
ontology in knowledge through logical use of categories and rules, the Chinese tradition 
tends to have a more subjective ontology, it is experience-based, holistic (Nisbett, Peng 
et al. 2001), with greater tolerance for ambiguity and for the coexistence of opposites, 
reconciling or transcending differences.  
Individuals from different cultures will automatically fit experience within their 
culturally available schemata, or representations of knowledge (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991), resulting in different behavioral scripts; combined, these schemata and scripts 
constitute institutionalized culture, a set of cognitive shortcuts that promote efficiency 
and accuracy in exchanges within a society.  These taken-for-granted schemata operate 
almost as the operating system of our ‘auto-pilot’ fast mind (Kahneman 2011) and are 
responsible for the cross-border barriers to shared sense-making. The constraint is 





language and in everyday practices constrains individuals’ ability to conceive of 
alternative views of reality” (Gramsci 1990). 
Just as they are embedded in culture, economic actors are also embedded in 
network of social relations (Granovetter 1985), and as a result, differences in cultural 
norms and value can raise significant barriers to cross-border exchange. Transactions are 
complicated by those differences in national culture (Hofstede and Hofstede 2001) that 
have been framed in the IB literature as cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 1988). This 
distance manifests itself in differences in business practices and in firm organization that 
can complicate what lead buyers may conceive as a simple ‘directive’ transactional 
business relationship, with orders and instructions flowing from buyer to supplier. This 
cultural difference begins with the role of individuals in the organization.  In apparel GVCs, 
for example the typical merchandiser or technical designer in the supplier organization is 
not empowered to the same degree as her counterpart in a US retail organization, and is 
subject to the constraints of a much more hierarchical command structure. These 
differences are as much the result of business culture, characterized in the top exporting 
countries by greater power distance index and uncertainty avoidance compared to the 
US, as they are the result of the active roles that the closed network of business owners 
and their kin take in the supplier organizations. In collectivistic cultures, individuals tend 
to view themselves as more interdependent (Nisbett and Norenzayan 2002), and more 
reliant on family and on the social networks within which they are embedded. With 
network strength more dependent on closure than on brokerage (Burt 2005), these 





true trust relations, and exhibit a strong in-group bias. This affects transaction and 
communication patterns, and trust development between US lead buyers and the 
supplier networks. Since access to these remote supplier networks is a critical factor the 
lead buyers’ strategic options, and ultimately in its performance, distance in the 
normative pillar could be reframed as “outsidership”, which describes the barriers to 
network access (Johanson and Vahlne 2009); successful internationalization strategies 
would then be more heavily dependent on social capital and trust . 
Regulative distance will also have an obvious impact on trade transactions. The 
existence of non-tariff trade barriers, in the form of permits, licenses, fees and number of 
procedures, delay contract fulfilment, and raise transaction costs directly and indirectly, 
through increases in organization complexity to manage the production cycle in the host 
country. Transaction costs will not only rise because of trade barriers, but also because of 
the deficiencies in the overall legal system, and of the inefficiency and lack of 
transparency of law enforcement. When specific trade regulations delay and possibly 
prevent the import of inputs of production such as fabric and trim, the alternative is to 
transact with local sources, increasing the lead buyer’s exposure to poor contract 
enforcement, with limited remedies after the fact. In either case, the home-host country 
regulative distance results in higher governance costs for the buyer supplier interface.  
Lax enforcement of labor laws raises serious concerns for the US buyer the areas 
of supplier compliance with labor law, specifically in the areas of child labor, workplace 





can either be dispatched from a regional sourcing office or outsourced to a third party. 
Sourcing agents are also able to providing such monitoring, but do not insulate the buyer 
as effectively as export intermediaries that take title to the goods, thus offering retailers 
a level of plausible deniability in the event of some major compliance violation or 
accident. The risks associated with sourcing directly in non-compliant countries was laid 
bare by the 2012 Tazreen Factory fire, and by the Rana Plaza incident in 2013, in which 
1129 factory workers were killed in the collapse of an unsafe factory building. Lack of 
transparency and low reporting requirements in the host countries also dramatically 
increase search costs, exposing the buyer to agency costs associated with moral hazard, 


















Building on the global value chains and institutional theory literature discussed above, in 
this chapter I develop a theoretical model that extends the aforementioned GVC 
governance framework (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005) providing an institutional 
explanation of the lead buyers choice of governance for each buyer-supplier dyads in their 
global value chain. Figure 3.1 below summarizes the proposed theoretical model.  
 
Figure 3.1 Explaining GVCs Governance Modes  
 It proposes that the choice of governance mode in GVCs is influenced by one key 





structural factor, supplier capabilities. The effects of these two key determinants are 
moderated by the lead firm’s agency, in the form of institutional brokerage capabilities.  
3.1. GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN  
The proposed model retains supplier capabilities from the dominant GVC governance 
framework; I suggest that, while codifiability of information and complexity of 
transactions, considered determinants in the GVC literature (Humphrey 2001) are source 
of variation in governance across industry sectors, they are not as important within each 
industry sector. The specific subset of the apparel industry chosen for this study was 
chosen in part because it allows the exclusion from the model of both codifiability and 
complexity of transaction, by virtue of product similarities among the different specialty 
retailer brands. Industry characteristics also allow me to eliminate from consideration 
some of the governance forms proposed in Gereffi’s model. Because of the complexity 
and scope of the specialty retailers’ product lines, with over a thousand distinct products 
being sold throughout the year, production is entirely outsourced, almost entirely 
offshore. As a result, the hierarchy mode, intended as ownership of the production assets, 
is virtually non-existent. On the other end, product complexity, technical coordination, 
procurement of inputs of production, and product differentiation make true market 
governance also impossible: capable suppliers, to produce most garments, are not 
fungible. 
Based on these considerations, the whole governance problem for specialty 
apparel retailers is one of control without ownership, and one of firm operational 





conformance and performance quality, as well as their compliance with accepted labor 
and safety standards. Lead buyers are now doing a lot more than placing orders with 
approved suppliers: they create, shape, coordinate the global value chain through direct 
sourcing, agents, overseas buying offices,  or trade intermediaries like Hong Kong based 
Li & Fung (Sturgeon 2008), establishing different business routines and interfaces in 
response to the limits to GVC governance imposed by local institutions and business 
culture  (Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck et al. 2008). The apparel global value chains tend to 
be neither markets, nor hierarchies but rather networks (Powell 2000) in which informal 
mechanisms of non-market coordination tend to be predominant because developing 
countries that do not have the market-supporting institutions that characterize the US 
economic system (Sable and Zeitlin 2004), where an ad hoc arms-length contracting 
model is dominant (Langlois 2003).  
Thus, economic exchanges in global value chains are often coordinated within 
long-term informal buyer-supplier relations that require the lead firm to make substantial 
relationship-specific investments in staffing, systems and support activities, thus 
increasing their governance costs. With thousands of products outsourced to dozens of 
suppliers in four or five different countries, and close to one hundred distinct steps 
involved from conception to delivery for each garment sourced (Birnbaum 2000), the 
buyer-supplier interface for a typical specialty retailer is potentially characterized by 
millions of individual cross-country points of contact, prompting necessary trade-off 





(Birnbaum 2015), two derived from a cost focus and one from a capabilities-driven 
strategy:  
1. Direct sourcing.  In this governance mode, the lead firm fully internalizes the 
buyer-supplier interface, establishing unmediated principal-to-principal relationships 
with its suppliers (Figure 3.2).  
 
S = Suppliers; SC = Subcontractor  
 
Figure 3.2 Buyer-Supplier Dyads in Direct Sourcing  
 The supplier may be viewed as a strategic partner or as a simple order taker, but in 





(the lowest unit price). This is a highly transactional approach to the global value chain, 
with great emphasis on buyer requirements, order execution and pricing.  
2.  Sourcing through agents. In this governance mode, the lead firm maintains some 
direct principal-to-principal relationship with the supplier but outsources most of the 
interface with the supplier to a sourcing agent with a strong presence in the supplier’s 
country. This governance mode tends to lead to triangular relationship among supplier, 
agent and retailer (Figure 3.3), in which supplier and agent are viewed as extensions of 
the firm, with complementary capabilities.   
 
S = supplier; SC = subcontractor  
 





3. Sourcing from trade intermediaries (trading companies). In this governance 
mode, the lead buyer externalizes the supplier interface to a specialized trading 
company, outsourcing the sourcing function. In this instance, the lead buyer’s focus is 
fixed cost minimization, and GVC governance is reduced in complexity to a single 
critical interface with one specialized intermediary (Figure 3.4).  
 
 
S = Suppliers; SC = Subcontractor  
 
 





3.2 INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN  
In the theoretical model that I set forth, institutional distance between the lead buyers’ 
home country, the US in this study, and the countries to which production is outsourced 
is a key determinant of the governance mode chosen by the buyer for the buyer-supplier 
interface. For clarity in context, I first introduce the countries that participate in the 
apparel global value chains and discuss some of their institutional characteristics. 
Subsequently, I identify two types of the costs imposed by institutional distance in global 
value chains: transactional, directly related to transaction frequency and relational, linked 
to the high degree of buyer-supplier coordination and cooperation required for the GVC 
to function. I then proceed to set forth propositions linking the different choice of 
governance mode for the buyer-supplier interface varies with the varying levels of 
transactional and relational institutional distance.       
3.2.1 APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN COUNTRIES  
The apparel global value chain is a prototypical buyer-led global value chain (Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz 1994), with lead buyers located in developed countries and production 
concentrated in a relatively small number of developing countries, primarily in Asia, and 
secondarily in central and South America. US firms are responsible for almost 40% of the 








Table 3.1 Top Exporters to the US - Apparel HTS Chapter 61 and 62 
 
 
As the data in Table 3.1 show, the top four exporters, and seven of the top ten 
exporting countries are in Asia, accounting for 69.0% of total apparel imports, with China 
taking the lion share. With some variation, all the countries in the list are low-wage 
countries, a critically important factor for garment manufacturing, which despite 
advances in manufacturing automation, remains a labor-intensive business, centered on 
the cutting and sewing machines. Low wages alone do not explain the country selection, 
as economic, infrastructural and institutional factors weigh in the final country selection, 
which also varies depending on the specific balance among price, quality and speed 
sought by the lead buyer. Free trade agreements like CAFTA and NAFTA on one hand, and 





restrictions on imports from China, contributed to the development of an apparel-
manufacturing base in countries that would have otherwise been by-passed. These 
distortions also account for some national level differences in supplier capabilities. 
Chinese suppliers, for example, responded to the quota restrictions under the MFA by 
upgrading their capabilities to higher value-added full-service production, to offset the 
high duties and the cost of quota, which was traded feverishly while the MFA was in 
effect. Other countries that still rely primarily on low-wages and moderately skilled labor 
force, like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, continue to engage primarily in CMT (Cut Make and 
Trim) assembly (Gereffi and Frederick 2010). The country selection equation is further 
complicated by within-country variation in countries like China or India, that are just too 
large and complex to be viewed as homogeneous in terms of labor costs and institutions, 
and by country migration of established manufacturers in Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
who bring their capabilities to lower wage countries like Vietnam and Indonesia.  This 
migration is explained in part by rising wages in China (Figure 3.5), but is also fueled by 
lead buyers’ desire to balance traditionally China-centric sourcing strategies, by sourcing 






Figure 3.5 Rising manufacturing Costs in China  
Thus, although Bangladesh remains specialized in long production runs of cheap 
knit-tops, while China and Vietnam continue to be the first choices to produce structured 
garments like suits, pants and jackets, there is a sufficient range of supplier quality and 
capabilities in most of the top Asian exporting countries, to give buyers more than one 
country option in each product category (Birnbaum 2008). This analysis is strongly 
influenced by the factor-seeking nature of apparel GVCs, with developed country lead 
buyers placing virtually all apparel contract manufacturing in geographically remote 
developing countries that are all characterized by significant institutional distance. The 
governance choice for a buyer-supplier dyad in any specific country is of course influenced 
by supplier and buyer characteristics, which are also the object of this study, so that a 
variety of governance forms will be observed in each country, however, certain host 





governance choice, and to limit the ability of suppliers to influence this choice through 
capabilities upgrading. There is one fundamental difference between equity entry modes 
such as FDI and global value chains: while FDI flows, in the aggregate, tends to privilege 
destinations with low institutional and cultural distance, trade has been positively 
correlated with distance (Slangen 2005).  When MNCs internationalize through equity 
entry modes, they tend to control the isomorphic pressures from the host country’s 
institutional environment through ownership, and there is some evidence that MNCs 
investing around the world are in part shielded from these pressures by the investment 
itself that allows them to carve their own institutional field in the host country (Kostova, 
Roth et al. 2008).   
There is no reason to suppose that lead firms in GVCs are equally shielded from 
the institutional distance between home and host country. On the contrary, the high 
frequency of negotiation and transactions would suggest an amplification of distance 
effects in factor-seeking, non-equity entry modes. While investment tends to privilege 
low-distance destinations, there is some indication that although it decreases exchange 
efficiency, distance is not a deterrent of trade. In at least one meta-analysis cultural 
distance has been found to be positively correlated with trade (Linders, Slangen et al. 
2005). This finding is logical given that over 60% of world trade is organized in factor-
seeking global value chains, in which MNCs from developed economies source 
intermediate and finished goods in low-cost developing nations (UNCTAD 2013), which 
tend to be geographically remote, with different cultural traditions, and lower levels of 





While institutional distance does not deter trade, we can expect it to create both 
transactional and relational barriers at the buyer-supplier interface in global value chains, 
raising transaction costs, and creating a governance problem for the lead buyer seeking 
to clear a large number of transactions, and to coordinate production across such 
distance.  These transactional and relational barriers faced by the lead buyer in the GVC 
can be broken down in their cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative institutional 
components (Scott 1995, 2008), defining a matrix of transactional and relational 
institutional barriers (Table 3.2) that maps institutional distance, and isolates individual 
drivers of the cost of doing business abroad.  
Table 3.2 Matrix of institutional barriers in the Global Value Chain 
 
The cultural differences begin with the role of individuals in the organization.  In apparel 
global value chains, the typical merchandiser or technical designer in the supplier 
organization is not empowered to the same degree as her counterpart in a US retail 
organization, and is subject to the constraints of a much more hierarchical command 
structure. This is as much the result of business culture, characterized in the top exporting 
countries by greater power distance index and uncertainty avoidance compared to the 
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US, as they are the result of the direct role of the business owners and their kin in the 
supplier organizations.  With regard to cultural distance, the intuitive differences between 
the US and the top apparel exporting countries are confirmed by a comparison of each 
country’s five cultural dimensions (geert-hofstede.com 2015), with all countries scoring 
higher in long term orientation and power distance index, and lower in the individualism 
dimension (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3 Cultural Dimensions of Top Asian Apparel Exporters to the US 
  PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO 
USA 40 91 62 46 29 
Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 40 
China  80 20 66 30 118 
Indonesia 78 14 46 48 62 
Vietnam 70 20 40 30 80 
India 77 48 56 40 61 
       Source: www.gert-hofstede.com 
  
The differences between the US and the various host countries are striking (Figure 
3.6), suggesting the presence of significant cultural distance barriers for US buyers doing 
business in Asian developing countries. The most striking differences between the US and 
the main Asian apparel GVC host countries can be seen in the individualism, power 
distance and long-term orientation dimensions, which directly affect work organization 
and the role of individuals in organizations. Unfortunately, although helpful in framing the 
discourse on the relationship between business and culture, Hofstede’s cultural 





similar host countries, and taken in isolation, insufficient to differentiate the effects of 
cultural distance on the GVC governance choices made by US lead buyers.  
 
Figure 3.6 Cultural Dimensions of the top Five Asian Apparel Exporters to the US 
 
A similar problem can be found in instruments aimed at measuring the 
effectiveness of formal institutions. A commonly used measure of institutional 
development, the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WB 2016), confirms 
striking institutional differences between the US and the various Asian host countries 
(Figure 3.7), but it fails to sufficiently differentiate institutional development among host 
countries in a way that could help explain differences in the lead buyer’s governance 






















Figure 3.7 World Governance Indicators for top Asian Apparel Exporters to the US 
  
There are however, significant differences among the top Asian apparel exporters, 
well captured by the World Bank’s Doing Business reports (Table 3.4), which highlight the 
extent by which East Asian countries outperform South Asian countries in the regulative 
pillar (WB 2016)  
Table 3.4 DB Rankings for the Top Asian Apparel Exporters to the US (2016)  
  
Ease of Doing 
Business  
Trade Barriers  Contract 
Enforcement  
China  78 96 5 
Vietnam 82 93 69 
Indonesia 91 108 166 
India  130 143 172 
Bangladesh 176 173 189 
 
Part of this research aims at unbundling the different components of institutional 
distance to understand how the transactional and relational barriers come into play in 













the day-to-day management of buyer-supplier relationships in global value chains. It is 
reasonable to expect that certain institutional distance barriers will have greater 
influence on the coordination of trade exchanges than others, and that the experience 
and capabilities of the various participants, as well as established business practices may 
reduce or mask their effects. However, I set forth that transactional and relational 
institutional distance are persistent and ubiquitous in the global value chain, and that they 
are a determinant of the governance mode chosen by US lead buyers in each host 
country. 
3.2.2. DIMENSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE IN GVCs 
The cognitive, normative and regulative barriers to exchange associated with institutional 
distance are amplified in the apparel GVC by the number of steps and stages in each 
transaction, by the number of points of contact between the buyer and the overseas 
supplier, and by the level of cooperation and coordination necessary to ensure that goods 
of the desired quality are produced and delivered in a timely fashion and at the agreed 
upon price. Considering the intensely transactional and relational nature of the buyer-
supplier interface in GVCs, it is useful to define institutional distance in terms of 
transactional and relational types, which cut across the cognitive normative and 
regulative pillars. The first of these two types, transactional institutional distance, relates 
directly to the cost of doing business abroad (Eden and Miller 2004) and details the effect 
of institutional distance from a transaction and agency cost perspective. Analyzing 
transactional cost drivers through an institutional theory lens creates a detailed matrix of 





Table 3.5 Transactional Institutional Distance – Transactional Barriers in the GVC 
 
 
Cognitive factors such as language and mental schemata will affect transactions in 
all areas where information needs to be gathered and communicated, resulting in loss in 
translation and equivocation, misunderstanding of instructions leading to errors in 
production and cost overruns. Far from being a one-way barrier to communication from 
the buyer to the supplier, cognitive barriers will limit the quality of information a buyer 
can effectively gather on supplier capabilities, with an adverse effect on supplier 
selection. Normative factors such as business culture and the embeddedness of suppliers 
in local networks and allegiances can hinder effective monitoring of production and be 
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detrimental to the timely communication of problems as they arise, such as late delivery 
of inputs of production, machinery issues, or quality in production. In environments in 
which it is the messenger who “gets shot”, immediate self-reporting of defects or errors, 
which could allow remedies to be sought early on, limiting their overall costs, is unlikely 
to fit the business culture.  Besides these informal institutions, a country’s trade and labor 
regulation can also have a dramatic impact on the cost of doing business there, and the 
vagaries of ill-defined property rights, contract law and their enforcement can limit the 
remedies available to a foreign firm, and dramatically complicate outsourcing production 
to that country and limit the remedies available to a foreign firm.  
In light of the costs associated with transactional institutional distance, and given 
the ever-changing demands of fashion, the extent of production outsourced overseas by 
US specialty retailers, and the desired degree of process and production control by the 
buyer, the apparel GVC would be best served by lasting buyer-supplier relationships 
founded on trust, with a two-way flow of information and knowledge. The ability of the 
lead buyer to develop such relations is limited by the relational institutional distance 
between the home and host country, a dimension that relates directly to the 
organizational complexity and the costs associated with the development of trust and 
with the transfer of knowledge and practices between the buyer and the overseas 
supplier.  As in the case of transactional institutional distance, the analysis of barriers to 
trust development and knowledge transfer through an institutional lens creates a detailed 





Table 3.6 Relational Institutional Distance – Relational Barriers in the GVC   
 
The first hurdle to trust development is practical: there are significant cognitive 
barriers to assessing the competence of the other party, a prerequisite of trust in a 
contract manufacturing arrangement.  Although primarily inhibiting trust development 
by US buyers because of the business at risk and because of their focus on performance 
in trust development, both parties may distrust each other’s competence. Matters are 
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complicated by the level of scrutiny required to assess performance, which may be 
undesirable for the suppliers’ organization, and possibly counterproductive in trust 
building.  The lack of trust-supporting formal institutions in some host countries, such as 
disclosure and transparency, as well as timely dispute resolution mechanisms will also 
contribute to higher perceived risk for the buyer in trusting the competence of suppliers. 
Trust itself is not a universal, invariant concept: much cross-cultural research on trust has 
highlighted striking country-level differences in generalized trust (Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994), and in social and behavioral norms designed to reduce the risk of 
uncertainty in social and economic exchanges. At the risk of generalizing the findings, in 
collectivistic cultures trust is more likely to be based on kin, and on embeddedness in a 
highly networked social structures, strongly favoring the in-group (Chua, Morris et al. 
2009), while individualistic cultures are more likely to develop trust through economic 
exchange, based on performance. The fact that US business people are more open to 
establishing ad hoc trust relationships makes their trust behaviors more transient, and in 
the eyes of their counterparts in Asia more expedient. 
Conversely, Asian particularism (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998) 
presents a challenge for US buyers in assessing suppliers’ trustworthiness, clashing with 
Western universalism, a culture that excludes the coexistence of opposites, founded on a 
dichotomous nature of truth (either true or untrue) and on the law of the excluded 
middle. These differences and different concepts of the ‘self’ complicate the assessment 
of trustworthiness in the buyer supplier relationship. The Chinese interdependent self  





obligations to his kin, his friends and his support network that precede any obligation to 
an unrelated individual with whom he enters an arm’s length contractual agreement. The 
absence of strong trust-supporting institutions in the host country, such as clear 
contractual rights, rapid and transparent contract enforcement, raise the transaction risk 
and therefore transaction costs for the US buyer.  
Without a suitable mechanism to develop trust across high institutional distance, 
the transfer of knowledge and business practices from the buyer to the supplier is also 
hampered by lack of trust on the buyers’ part, and by cognitive barriers on the suppliers’ 
end. Lack of trust and cognitive barriers may also present legitimacy challenges for the 
lead buyer, as suppliers fail to understand and subscribe to the practices that buyers seek 
to transfer and embrace the requirements that these impose (Kostova and Roth 2002). 
This can be troublesome for a US retailer, if the suppliers fail to honor or only pay lip 
service (Meyer and Rowan 1977) to compliance requirements in areas of product safety, 
or working conditions or child labor.   
 3.2.3 INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE AND CHOICE OF GOVERNANCE MODE  
Figure 3.8 below visualizes the above discussion. If we analyze institutional distance 
between the home and host country in terms of the transactional and relational barriers 
to cross-border exchange and cooperation, we can represent it in a 2x2 matrix defined by 
assigning low and high values to each type of barrier. This results in three possible 





a. Low/Low in the lower left quadrant, corresponding to the lowest level of 
institutional distance  
b. Low/High in the upper left quadrant, corresponding to an intermediate level of 
institutional distance  
c. High/High in the upper right quadrant, corresponding to the highest level of 
institutional distance. The fourth quadrant representing an unrealistic country, with low 
relational and high transactional barrier and as such it is excluded from further analysis. 
 
Figure 3.8 Transactional and Relational Institutional Distance  
 Institutional distance is then defined in a continuum from low to high, represented 
by the arrow, in direction of increasing distance. As institutional distance increases, from 





giving rise to greater governance challenges. In the extreme, high institutional distance 
may lead to a decision not to enter the host country. If the lead buyers decide to source 
there, they may find managing the transactions and the relationships with suppliers 
prohibitively expensive, and outsource the supplier interface to a third party.    
Proposition 1. As the institutional distance between the lead buyer’s home 
country and the host country increases, the lead buyer will tend to choose 
governance modes that externalize the supplier interface to sourcing agents or 
trade intermediaries.   
The fact that for the outsourcing firm, greater institutional distance is associated 
with a governance mode that externalizes the supplier interface, appears to contradict 
the accepted view that in the equity entry mode, firms will respond to large institutional 
distance by internalizing the activities within the firm (Xu and Shenkar 2002), for greater 
control. The apparent contradiction however is explained by the different drivers of 
outsourcing, namely the externalization of non-core activities to firms that make those 
activities their core competency.  Greater institutional distance with the country hosting 
production imposes greater demands on the lead buyer’s resources, and a set of 
capabilities that falls farther from the retailer’s core activity, which consists in designing 
and selling apparel. In these high distance countries, the buyer will effectively lower its 
governance costs by outsourcing management of the interface with supplier to a single 
trade intermediary, simplifying the GVC governance to a relationship with one vendor for 





Proposition 2. As transactional institutional distance between the lead buyer’s 
home country and host country increases, then the lead buyer is more likely to 
externalize the supplier interface to international trade intermediaries.   
The high intermediation costs associated with using trading companies, as well as 
concerns with supply chain visibility motivate the lead firm to exercise direct control over 
its suppliers, and to transact directly with them. When transactional barriers in a host 
country are low, lead buyers will prefer to enter a principal-to-principal contractual 
relationship with the actual supplier (the manufacturer) rather than with an intermediary. 
If the relational barriers in the host country are persistently high, then the lead buyer will 
typically choose to outsource the relationship with suppliers to local sourcing agents, with 
experience in dealing with the specific culture and institutions of the host country, and in 
mediating with US buyers.  
Proposition 3. As the relational institutional distance between the lead buyer’s 
home country and host country increases, then the lead buyer is more likely to 
externalize the supplier interface to sourcing agents. 
Conversely, when transactional and relational barriers with the host country are 
low, the buyer will avoid all intermediation costs and source directly from the supplier, 
managing both transactions and relationships with suppliers in that country directly, 





Proposition 4. As transactional and relational distance between the lead buyer’s 
home and the host country decrease, then the lead buyer is more likely to 
internalize the supplier interface, through direct sourcing. 
Figure 3.9 below visualizes the above propositions. The 2x2 institutional distance 
matrix shown above (Figure 3.8) can be applied to define the relationship between 
institutional distance and GVC governance modes (Figure 3.9).  
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Figure 3.9 Institutional Distance and GVC Governance  
In the resultant matrix, the arrow represents increasing institutional distance, 
associated with greater externalization of the buyer-supplier interface (Proposition 1), 
and each quadrant corresponds to different levels of institutional distance, each 





includes countries with highest level of institutional distance from the lead buyer’s home 
country, with high transactional and relational barriers to exchange, where governance 
tends to be externalized to trading companies (Proposition 2). The AGENT quadrant, 
including host countries characterized by an intermediate level of institutional distance 
from the lead buyer’s home country, with low transactional barriers but high relational 
barriers, with governance externalized through sourcing agents (Proposition 3). The 
DIRECT quadrant, representing host countries with lower institutional distance, in which 
governance is internalized in a direct buyer-supplier interface, without intermediaries 
(Proposition 4). 
3.3. SUPPLIER CAPABILITIES  
For the purposes of this research, a supplier is a maker of goods, that owns garment 
manufacturing facilities, unlike other types of ‘vendors’ in the apparel global value chains, 
such as agents and trading companies. Offshore outsourcing of garment production was 
originally a relatively simple arm’s length contract manufacturing arrangement in which 
a buyer, usually a retailer, or a marketer of branded goods from a developed economy, 
designed a garment, selected and purchased the fabric and trim, which would then be cut 
and made into a finished garment following the buyers’ specifications by the factory in a 
low labor cost country. The garment would then be inspected and picked up at that 
location by the buyer, who would then arrange for its shipment and distribution. This 
arrangement, known in the industry as Cut, Make & Trim (CMT) has fallen largely out of 
favor, at least in its original form, as buyers sought to transfer more functions and 





a larger share of the value added. In today’s market, the closest thing to a CMT factory 
will at least purchase the fabric and trim, and move goods to the port, selling on an FOB 
(Free on Board) port basis; for simplicity, and following industry practice (Birnbaum 2000), 
I will still refer to this type of basic contract manufacturer as CMT.  
Over the decades, the buyers’ strategic outsourcing impetus and supplier 
upgrading (Sturgeon 2006) have led to a much wider range of supplier capabilities, and to 
different levels of buyer reliance on them. Factories become much more involved in the 
pre-production phase, developing varying level of competence in technical design, sample 
production, grading, fit, dying and testing, fabric and trim sourcing and in post-production 
services performing packing, labelling tagging, and then managing logistics. The best, 
most sophisticated suppliers can be expected to engage in product design, bringing their 
own ideas to buyers and in keeping buyers abreast with evolving trends and technologies.  
Proposition 5. As supplier capabilities increase, lead buyers will tend to choose 
governance modes that internalizes the buyer-supplier interface.   
From a transactional perspective, supplier production service capabilities can be 
envisioned as a continuum from enhanced CMT factories to full service, but they tend to 
be clustered at the two polar ends, with suppliers focusing either on manufacturing 
efficiency and cost, or on providing a full range of creative, technical services that 
complement and supplement the buyers’ own capabilities. For the purposes of this study, 
this clustering allows the simplification of this continuum into a dichotomous variable, 





suppliers and full service suppliers respectively. The buyers’ desire for services and control 
is necessarily tempered by the associated transaction costs and organizational 
complexity; low service capability suppliers tend to locally embedded firms regarded 
solely for their manufacturing assets, with limited potential benefits from direct 
partnership As a result, low service capability suppliers tend to be the domain of trading 
companies, who provide the ‘boots on the ground’ to monitor production and 
compliance, taking responsibility for delivery and product, performing their traditional 
role as experts and guarantors of quality in a principal-to-principal relationship  This type 
of suppliers tends to be locally embedded, with underdeveloped relationships with raw 
material supplier and global retailers, offering primarily low-cost manufacturing. 
Although technically capable of producing garments of acceptable quality, they impose 
significant transactional burdens to potential lead buyers, requiring assistance in 
procuring raw materials, extensive monitoring during production and logistical support to 
ship the finished goods. 
Proposition 6. If a supplier has low cross-border transactional capabilities, then 
the lead buyer is more likely to externalize the supplier interface to trading 
companies. 
Conversely, suppliers with greater service capabilities bring more valuable 
strategic resources to the exchange, and are more suitable for partnership, with higher 
level of direct coordination, cooperation and strategic planning, with a more direct 





more valuable to the lead buyer, the supplier’s relational capabilities become more 
salient. The preferred governance mode with suppliers with full service capabilities can 
be either a triangular relationship mediated by a sourcing agent, or a direct principal-to-
principal relationship between the lead buyer and the supplier, depending on the 
supplier’s capability to deal with global buyers on a relational level. The critical supplier 
characteristic that determines the governance choice is their level of global integration, 
and just as in the case of service capabilities, suppliers in China and in Southeast Asia, the 
suppliers’ capabilities tend to be clustered at the two ends of the integration continuum.  
Some suppliers invest in production capacity and development capabilities, but 
remain locally embedded order-takers. These are often single-plant, single category 
factories in the top exporting countries with large production capacity, and full 
package/full service capabilities that remain however profoundly embedded in their local 
business culture, relying on a local network of suppliers and subcontractors; the business 
owners may take great pride in their production capabilities, but lack the business 
sophistication to develop and maintain a direct principal-to-principal relationship with US 
based lead buyers. At the same time, considering their scale and full-service capabilities, 
these firms are often unwilling to submit themselves to constraints of becoming part of 
the modular production networks orchestrated by the large trading companies like Hong 





Proposition 7. If a supplier has greater cross-border transactional capabilities but 
limited relational capabilities, then the lead buyer is more likely to externalize 
the supplier interface to sourcing agents.  
On the other end of the global integration continuum, we find a class of globally 
integrated, second and third generation multinational factory groups, the descendants of 
the early apparel suppliers, originally based in Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, that over 
time have moved their production facilities into China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand.  These factory groups have made the strategic investments in manufacturing 
capacity in low wage countries, while developing the full-service capabilities desired by 
global buyers in their home countries, with technical staff from the best local universities 
overseeing the technical aspects of product development and technical design, and 
western educated ownership and top management facilitating the relationship with 
global lead buyers. These firms are best suited for direct principal-to-principal governance 
with US buyers, and tend to by-pass intermediaries, agents, and in many cases even the 
buyer’s own local office, if there is one. 
Proposition 8. If a supplier has greater cross-border transactional and relational 
capabilities, then the lead buyer is more likely to internalize the supplier, with 
direct sourcing. 
Figure 3.10 below visualizes the propositions on supplier capabilities. The four 
supplier-related propositions can be illustrated schematically treating the suppliers’ 





In the resultant matrix (Figure 3.10), three general types of suppliers of can be identified, 
each corresponding to a distinct governance mode: 
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Figure 3.10 Supplier capabilities and GVC Governance  
The TRADE INTERMEDIARY quadrant includes locally embedded suppliers with low 
service capabilities, with governance externalized to trading companies (Proposition 6). 
The AGENT quadrant, includes locally embedded firms with high service capabilities, with 
governance externalized through sourcing agents (Proposition 7). The DIRECT quadrant 
includes globally integrated suppliers with high service capability, with governance 
internalized in a direct buyer-supplier interface, without intermediaries (Proposition 8).  





integration and low service capabilities, which was excluded from further analysis. Finally, 
the arrow represents the degree of internalization of the buyer-supplier interface, which 
increases as supplier capabilities increase (Proposition 5). 
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BROKERAGE 
In the preceding discussion, I identified institutional distance and supplier capabilities as 
key determinants of the governance mode that lead buyers choose for their cross-border 
interface with suppliers in their Global Value Chain. The primacy of structure over agency 
has a long tradition in institutional theory with roots that date back to Durkheim’s social 
determinism (Durkheim 1895), and was further developed in more modern times in the 
neo-institutionalist literature that views social and economic actors under isomorphic 
pressures from their institutional environment to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). Variations in firm behavior and in economic outcomes seem however to suggest 
that the relationship between structure and agency is more dialectical, and that outcomes 
are the resultant of their interplay (Bourdieu 1984); while economic actors will necessarily 
operate within the bounds of institutions (March 1994), creativity and competence play 
a role in the strategies employed in response to institutionalized structure and contribute 
to explain the observed variation. The dialectic tension between structure and agency is 
observed in institutional entrepreneurship (Eisenstadt 1980; DiMaggio 1988) in which 
individual and collective actors effect institutional change; the internationalizing firm can 
induce change in the institutional environment in which it operates, or at the very least 
carve its own institutional field in the host country and largely avoid isomorphic pressure 





Lead firms in global value chains have a smaller institutional footprint: they may 
not be cultural dupes (Hirsch Lounsbury 1997) but they are, to a large extent, institution-
takers who seek to seek to control outcomes with their activities and with the governance 
of the buyer supplier interface. I propose that the relationships specified in the above 
propositions are moderated by the lead firm’s institutional brokerage, which I define as 
institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) consisting in a set of activities and their 
associated capabilities that lower institutional distance and structural barriers to cross-
national exchange at the buyer supplier interface, minimizing the associated transaction 
and relational costs, maximizing exchange efficiency, and allowing the full realization of 
economic arbitrage opportunities in their global value chains. The concept of institutional 
brokerage owes to social capital theories of brokerage and closure (Burt 2005) and to 
actor network theory: when institutional distance is instantiated at the international 
business interface, institutional brokerage bridges the institutional gaps between the lead 
buyer and host country supplier networks, which tend to be governed by closure.  
Institutional brokerage functions very much in the same way as a chemical 
catalyst. In organic chemistry, many exothermal reactions, reactions that are favored to 
take place on energy considerations alone, do not take place unless energy is provided, 
or a catalyst is used to lower the potential energy barriers to the reaction. Once initiated, 
the exothermal reaction will then self-sustain. Similarly, the interaction of a lead buyer 
and a supplier in the GVC will only generate its potential economic advantages if the costs 
associated with cross-national transactional and relational institutional barriers to 





institutional brokerage on the exchange efficiency in the global value change is illustrated 
in Figure 3.11. The full unit cost of production outsourced offshore rises at first, as an 
effect of institutional barriers to the new relationship, which materialize in greater front-
end set up costs and suboptimal pricing, and then declines as a natural effect of learning 
curves. By reducing barriers to exchange, institutional brokerage activities play a key role 
in reducing the break-even quantity to be outsourced thus making more buyer-supplier 
relationships viable, and make the attainment of ‘stretch’ unit cost goals possible, 
maximizing the economic value of the exchange for the lead buyer. 
 
Figure 3.11 Institutional Brokerage Effect on GVC Costs  
 Analyzing institutional distance and supplier capabilities in terms of their 
transactional and relational dimensions, leads me to identify two types of institutional 
brokerage that represent lead firm strategic responses to the barriers to coordination and 





As discussed above, the transactional and relational barriers faced by the lead buyer can 
be broken down in their cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative institutional 
components (Scott 1995, 2008), and in their transactional and relational components, 
defining a matrix (Table 3.2) that maps institutional distance and isolates individual 
drivers of the cost of doing business abroad. At the IB interface, institutional barrier costs 
arise from a variety of regulative, normative as well as cultural-cognitive factors that 
constitute the essence of institutional distance. At the host-country firm level, these 
factors hamper the realization of comparative institutional advantage by impeding trust 
development, raising governance costs and decreasing the willingness to commit to 
relationship specific investment that would facilitate knowledge and practices transfer 
from the GVC lead buyer. This leads to inefficiencies in management of the buyer/supplier 
relationship, resulting in reduced opportunity. For the lead firm, all these factors impose 
additional burdens from increased organizational and vendor interface complexity, and 
higher overall GVC governance costs. The cumulative effect of institutional barrier costs 
can be high enough to suppress exchange opportunity altogether, leaving the host 
country potential untapped. In this case, besides lowering interface barriers, lead buyers’ 
institutional brokerage activities lower host country marketing costs, enabling the 
realization of latent host country comparative institutional advantages, and the capture 
their economic value.  
More generally, institutional brokerage activities in the GVC will yield gains in 
operational effectiveness that maximize lead buyers’ return by lowering cross-national 





friction and enhancing exchange efficiency. Institutional brokerage in GVC encompasses 
a complex set of related activities, which vary as a function of firm objectives, scope of 
the international operations, and of the institutional profile (Kostova 1997) of each 
country hosting the production network. Institutional brokerage represents then the 
agency response of the lead firm to structural constraints imposed by home-to-host 
country institutional distance, and by supplier capabilities, and moderates their effect on 
the GVC governance choices.  
Institutional brokerage can be viewed as a form of institutional work (Lawrence & 
Suddaby 2006). It can come in the form of transaction enabling activities work, 
contractual and normative in nature, often in the form of routines and detailed 
specifications and standard operating procedures, monitoring and policing activities, 
mostly in the form of inspections, and deterring activities mostly in the form hold up of 
payment and future orders to address the moral hazard agency problem. Each of these 
types of activities represent a transactional response to categories of transaction costs.  
The essence of transactional institutional brokerage consists in embedding and 
routinizing the lead buyer directed normative foundations of the buyer supplier 
relationship into the suppliers’ staff daily work life (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Great 
emphasis is placed on lowering the country level transactional barriers, on developing 
efficient, transparent and consistent practices aimed at controlling behavior variation on 
the supplier’s end. Typical activities and skill sets associated with transactional 





costs, focusing on order processing skills, and detailed order management routines and 
procedures, aimed at minimizing the transaction costs associated with the institutional 
barriers characteristic of each host country.  The relationship with the supplier tends to 
be directive, with information flowing in one direction, from buyer to supplier; it has a 
strong contractual connotation, founded on master vendor agreements and on detailed 
purchase orders.  Transactional institutional brokerage tends to promote arm’s length 
principal-to-principal contract manufacturing relationships, in which suppliers are seen 
primarily as manufacturing resources.  
Transactional institutional brokerage tends to overlook the relationship effects 
that are stable and enduring elements of institutions (Law 1992), which reflecting the 
dynamic struggle between competitive buyers and the supplier actor-networks, which act 
as institutional structures and instantiate institutional distance. This dynamic tension is 
the focus of relational institutional brokerage which takes a different approach, seeking 
to lower the country level relational barriers through more collaborative buyer-supplier 
partnerships, maximizing lead firm access to supply resources and maximizing its 
capabilities. Developing efficient, transparent and consistent practices aimed at 
controlling behavior variation on the supplier’s end is still important, but perceived as less 
critical compared to value creation through partnering. Lead buyers engaged in relational 
institutional brokerage will view vendors as firm resources with complementary 
capabilities, and will put greater strategic focus on maximizing firm access to suppliers’ 
product creation resources, capabilities and know-how. The relationship with the supplier 





buyer and supplier, and aims at developing trust and understanding in the GVC. Relational 
institutional brokerage strategies emphasize the importance of individual and 
organizational cultural intelligence, of knowledge and understanding of each host 
country’s institutional make-up. The firm’s focus is on the continuous improvement in 
managerial and executive cross-cultural communications and negotiations skills, placing 
trust development in the buyer-supplier relationship above short-term gain. As a result, 
relational institutional brokerage is often characterized by triangular relationships in 
which a direct buyer-supplier relationship coexists with a mediated relationship through 
a local sourcing agent, which complements and supplements the direct buyer-supplier 
connection.   
Institutional brokerage activities have significant associated costs. Buyers with 
sourcing strategies focused on minimizing fixed costs characteristically limit their 
investment in the associated capabilities, and will be more likely to externalize the 
supplier interface to trade intermediaries in the face of high country level institutional 
barriers. While, as posited above, greater institutional distance in the GVC tends to be 
associated with the externalization of the buyer-supplier interface, investment in 
transactional or relational institutional brokerage capabilities offer a wider range of 
governance choices to the lead firm, and the ability to engage in a more direct interface 
with suppliers in the countries hosting their global value chains, and can moderate the 






Figure 3.12 Institutional brokerage, Institutional distance and GVC governance.  
 
Proposition 9. Lead buyer institutional brokerage activities moderate the 
relationship between institutional distance and choice of governance mode for 
their GVC, reducing the buyer’s preference for externalization of the buyer-
supplier interface that would be expected with greater institutional distance.   
While the essence of institutional brokerage is primarily defined by the country 
level institutional barriers to be lowered in the global value chain, the associated activities 
translate directly into the lead buyer’s ability to work with overseas suppliers, in response 
to their different capabilities level. The same type transactional institutional brokerage 
activities that help overcome the transaction barriers that generalize across suppliers in 





the host country. By the same token, relational institutional brokerage will make the 
establishment of long term trusting relationships with suppliers with good productive and 
service capability but who don’t necessarily have the level of sophistication, and the 
global integration required to sustain on their own a direct buyer-supplier relationship 
with a global buyer. In both instances, we can see that institutional brokerage capabilities 
facilitate a more direct governance mode of the relationship between global buyer and 
local suppliers in the global value chain. Institutional brokerage therefore enhances the 
supplier capability effect on governance choice, because its activities contribute to 
bridging supplier-specific transactional and relational capability gaps (Figure 3.13) 
 
Figure 3.13 Institutional brokerage, supplier capabilities and GVC governance.  
Proposition 10. Lead buyer institutional brokerage activities enhance the 





their GVC, whereby greater supplier capabilities are associated with greater 
internalization of the buyer-supplier interface by the lead buyer. 
If we combine the various levels of institutional distance and supplier capabilities, 
in one single 3x3 matrix (Figure 3.14), we can see the possible combinations and the 
resulting governance modes. Four possible combinations are effectively competed out, 
leaving a total of five combinations, with three combinations in which the governance 
mode predicted by institutional distance and supplier capabilities coincide and are 
therefore univocally determined. In the two instances in which the predominant 
governance choice is not univocally determined (quadrants AGE ITI and ITI AGE), lead 
buyer institutional brokerage type tends to be the tiebreaker. In these instances, 
relational institutional brokerage will resolve in favor of principal to agent relationship 
leading to governance of the buyer-supplier interface through sourcing agents (AGE), 
while transactional IBR resolves in favor of a principal to principal relationship, 






Figure 3.14 Institutional Brokerage and GVC Governance Modes  
Proposition 11. The type of institutional brokerage chosen by the lead firm 
determines the lead buyer’s choice of governance mode in instances in which 
predictions based on institutional distance and supplier capabilities diverge. 
Transactional institutional brokerage will resolve in favor externalization of the 
buyer–supplier interface to trade intermediaries, while relational brokerage will 













4.1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW – PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This research started from inception as a qualitative study based on theory, seeking in 
depth understanding of the limits imposed by institutional barriers and structural factors 
on possible governance modes of the buyer-supplier interface in the global value chains, 
and of the way lead buyers’ capabilities and strategies influence their final governance 
choice. With this study I seek to complement and supplement existing literature on the 
governance of global value chains according to which the combination of three main 
factors: complexity of transaction, supplier capabilities and codifiability of information 
results in five main GVC governance modes, along a hierarchy to markets continuum 
(Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005). I retain supplier transactional and relational capabilities, 
from earlier models, shifting the focus to two other important determinant factors which 
have only received cursory attention in the global value chains literature: institutional 
distance between the lead buyer’s home country and the host countries to which they 
production is outsourced, and the lead firm’s agency, in the form of institutional 
brokerage, which lowers the transactional and relational challenges barriers imposed by 






4.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study posits that institutional barriers at the buyer-supplier interface and the supplier 
capabilities are structural determinants of the governance mode for each supplier-buyer 
dyad, and that suppliers’ agency, their institutional brokerage, moderates these 
determinants; it also assumes that there is sufficient variation in each of these factors to 
propose a model that explains the variation in governance choices based on them.         
The thrust of this research is to understand what determines the choice of the 
governance mode of lead buyer–supplier dyads in the GVC by answering the following 
research question:  
1. How does home-host country institutional distance affect the lead buyer’s choice 
of governance in each GVC buyer-supplier dyad? 
2. How do supplier capabilities affect the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the 
GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
3. How do the institutional brokerage activities and capabilities of the lead firm affect 
the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
4.3. RATIONALE FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The selection of a qualitative research method is a direct result of the nature of the 
phenomena under investigation. I am studying complex phenomena at the nexus of 
national culture, country institutions and industry structure, as well as the perceptions of 
these phenomena by key decision makers in the GVC, seeking to understand how the 





specifically, I am seeking to shed light on the way objective institutional and structural 
factors, through subjective judgements by key GVC decision makers, play out in the 
governance decision in determining the degree to which the lead buyer will internalize or 
externalize the buyer-supplier interface. While the level of analysis regarding governance 
choice by the lead buyer is the firm-to-firm (buyer-supplier) dyad, the cognitive, 
normative and regulative barriers to cross-country exchange operate at multiple levels, 
interpersonal, inter-firm, and country-to-country, influencing key decision makers’ 
perceptions and strategies. Institutional theory and transaction cost economics provide 
useful frameworks to break down the overall cross-country barriers into smaller analytical 
units, suggesting that the costs associated with each type of barrier are determinants of 
sourcing and governance strategies. However, there is no theory-based way to prioritize 
and rank order all these factors, and to determine whether and how, in light of existing 
practice and solutions, they actually affect lead firm behavior.  Not only are there no data 
on most of these factors, but preliminary interviews and reviews of specialized apparel 
industry press indicate that most specialty retailers do not actually measure the true cost 
of doing business in the various countries that host their GVC, and that there is no 
agreement on which metrics could be used. For the most part, all sourcing overhead costs 
are evenly allocated across all products (Birnbaum 2015), regardless of where the costs 
are incurred. 
For these reason, in-depth interviews of key participants in the global value chains 
have been the primary intended source of data from this study’s inception. At the cost of 





well in one widely cited text on qualitative research: “If you want to know how people 
understand their world and their lives, why not talk with them?” (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009). The use of in depth interviews as the primary source of data fits the exploratory 
nature of this research and its quest for an emergent construct such as institutional 
brokerage. It also matches the discovery process used by practitioners in international 
trade and global sourcing, for whom hands-on experience and face-to-face interaction 
with the participants in the global value chain is exceedingly critical in making judgments 
and business decisions when faced with so much incomplete information.  
4.4. RATIONALE FOR CONSTRUCTIVISM  
Scientific positivism tends to assume the existence of foundational, objective truths that 
can be universally known, and views science primarily as progressing by means of tests of 
hypotheses through measurement and quantitative studies. This approach, however, 
leaves a lot to be desired when we seek to understand complex phenomena pertaining 
to culture and human society; reality in such complex systems can be emergent and 
knowledge contextual.  The positivist idea of an objective, knowable reality may simply 
not be adequate in the social sciences (Lincoln and Guba 2013)  34.. The assumption of 
an objective ontology of reality demeans human abstraction capabilities and oversells the 
objectivity of our sense perception and its measurement instruments. Are the patterns 
that we can observe in human behavior less real and our hypotheses about them less 






Historically, much scientific progress has been engendered by breaks from existing 
accepted paradigms that enabled scientist to formulate new theories providing improved 
understanding of previously unexplained phenomena (Kuhn 1962). The emergence and 
gradual gain of acceptance of the subjective ontology underlying the postmodernist view 
of the social construction of social reality, and of the partiality of all truths, is quite 
possibly a methodological paradigm shift in science. The constructivist ontology is 
subjectivist, with multiple constructed realities rather than a single true ‘objective’ reality, 
the result of cultural context and individual’s experiences and perceptions, and the 
researcher-participant interaction. Socially constructed knowledge can be then  
transmitted within societies, and concepts pertaining to reality become institutionalized 
through custom into what is perceived as objective reality, and taken for granted; this 
process of socialization can then align subjective reality with the institutionalized 
objective reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966)  13. If reality is in truth relative, subjective 
and contextual, then human science entities are matters of definitions and convention: 
they exist in the minds of the researcher but they do not really exist.  
“Realities exist in the form of multiple mental constructions, socially and 
experientially based, local and specific, dependent for their form on the 
persons who hold them.”  (Guba 1990). 
 This means that we construct knowledge through our lived experiences and 
through our interactions with other members of society. As such, as researchers, we must 





knowledge that is reflective of their reality (Lincoln, Lynham et al. 2011). In a 
constructivist approach, the construction of knowledge is dynamic and evolutionary, 
taking place through sense-making (Lincoln and Guba 2013) and through the 
development of constructs that can turn the random congeries of sense-perception into 
an  ordered conceptual structure, dealing with confusion of an unordered reality by 
means of semiotic organization (Lincoln and Guba 2013) 45. This theoretical knowledge 
is developed during in depth interviews through a conscious systematic sense-making 
effort, with individual and collective reconstructions coalescing around a consensus 
(Guba 2005)  196 to develop a deeper, more inclusive and more sophisticated 
construction of reality than currently available. The goals of constructivist research is 
necessarily emic and idiographic (Ponterotto 2005), seeking to understand the  meaning 
of social phenomena, through an in depth investigation of the participants lived 
experiences (Schwandt 1994).  
The starting point however can never be a tabula rasa: participants and researcher 
bring their stock of knowledge and experiences, with theory built on theory. I came to 
this research with a small set of theoretical assumptions: that the buyer-supplier interface 
governance choices by lead firms follow patterns, and that these patterns are explainable 
as the resultant of structural factors such as country level institution, and supplier level 
characteristics, and of firm agency. Consistent with a constructivist approach, I have used 
these theoretical frameworks as foundations, but did not embrace a priori any specific 
hierarchy of governance determinants, nor did I assume a rank order of the governance 





variation in institutional distance between the US and the focal Asian host countries to 
influence the governance choice, or whether supplier capabilities might cluster by 
country. Another source of uncertainty came from the lack of suitable metrics for my 
informants to assess the importance, and economic impact of the determinants I set 
forth, exposing me to the risk that they could summarily dismiss them, without an in-
depth discussion. This was a critical risk considering the centrality in constructivist 
research of the dialectical investigator-participant interaction in the co-creation of 
knowledge, through consensus and source triangulation. I was able to largely avert the 
risk of participant default from the process of knowledge co-creation thanks to clues 
provided by pre-interview conversations with some key informants and by practitioner 
publications, which ensured the centrality of the object of my research for key sourcing 
decision makers in my focal industry, and the potential usefulness of my findings to 
practitioners. 
4.5. THE RESEARCHER ROLE 
“What is the relationship between the researcher and that being researched?” (Creswell 
and Clark 2007). The answer to this key epistemological question in qualitative research 
descends directly from the subjective ontology views underlying constructivism, which 
casts the researcher as an active participant in the creation of knowledge. In this 
methodological approach, the centrality of the investigator-participant interaction is a 
distinguishing characteristic: inquirer and inquired are fused into a single entity (Guba 






“As such, as researchers, we must participate in the research process with 
our subjects to ensure that we are producing knowledge that is reflective 
of their reality (Lincoln, Lynham et al. 2011).”  
 The starting point of any quest for new knowledge is therefore not a tabula rasa, 
but rather participant and researcher bring their stock of knowledge and experiences, and 
the results of sense making of result of cultural context, individual experiences and 
perceptions. If knowledge is co-created, then process of research should be  
“Hermeneutic, dialectic: individual constructions are elicited and refined 
hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted dialectically, with the aim 
of generating one or a few constructions on which there is substantial 
consensus (Guba, 1990) 27” 
 The need for in depth interviews in this research descends from the fact that 
governance decisions are affected by professional and personal judgments that do not 
get measured or tested, and operate subconsciously, through heuristics and biases. Key 
business decisions are frequently made with incomplete information, often based on 
experience and anecdotal knowledge, and important causal relations and decision 
outcomes are often overlooked and under-analyzed. In-depth interviews of key decision 
makers and operatives offer an opportunity to probe their understanding, past the 
management clichés and ‘truisms” and the automatic-pilot answers that would be 





towards awareness of the higher order complexity of their environment and experience, 
to elicit responses that are more sophisticated. 
 From this perspective, the researcher needs a unique set of personal and 
professional skills and experiences to assume the role as orchestrator of knowledge 
construction (Creswell and Clark 2007). In my specific case, this was the result of over two 
decades of managerial and entrepreneurial experience in global sourcing and 
international trade in the same countries that host the apparel global value chains, and 
knowledge derived from twenty years of family involvement in the apparel industry. This 
background, known to all participants, facilitated a more open and higher level discussion 
with the interview participants than would be possible for a researcher with no field 
experience in international business, expediting the discovery process. More importantly, 
over two decades of experience in cross-cultural business negotiations supported my 
research agenda with professional legitimacy, allowing me to challenge the elite interview 
participants, as often as necessary to elicit deeper analysis, beyond pre-packaged or 
condescending answers (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015) 171.  
4.6. INFORMATION NEEDED 
The research design reflects the complexity of the information needed to shed light on 
the study’s research questions. The first step is to assess the relevance of some key 
underlying ideas and assumptions upon which the theoretical model guiding this research 





1. That institutional distance between the US and the GVC host countries manifests 
itself in the form of transactional and relational barriers to cross-border exchange, 
which result in additional transaction costs borne by the two parties of the 
exchange. 
2. That qualitative and quantitative variation in institutional distance between the 
home and host countries is in fact a determinant of the different governance 
choices made by the lead buyer for their interface with suppliers in each country. 
3. That variation in suppliers’ transactional and relational capabilities is in fact a 
determinant of how lead firms choose to govern their interface with each supplier, 
as suggested by prior research. 
4. That lead buyers vary in their critical brokerage capabilities aimed at lowering 
transactional and institutional barriers, and that variation in such institutional 
brokerage capabilities channels the governance decision in different directions. 
Borrowing freely from early interactionist theory (Lewin 1935) which postulates 
that behavior is a function of the individual and his environment [B = f (P,E), the guiding 
idea behind this study is that governance is a function of the lead firm (its strategic 
investment in institutional brokerage capabilities) and its environment (institutions and 
suppliers), the result of the interaction of institutional and industry structure and firm 
agency. The challenge in this research is to build on a background of contextual 
information from trade data, industry publications and scholarly studies to map how 
subjective perceptions and experiences by lead firm sourcing executives regarding these 





choices.  While there is an abundance of available trade data (OTEXA 2016) to determine 
the most important host countries on which to focus during the interviews, the 
governance of the buyer-supplier interface is typically proprietary information and an 
analysis of supply chain presentation and documents from lead specialty retailers yields 
limited information. Thus, I relied primarily on the interview process to gain knowledge 
on the buyers’ governance choices and their drivers.  
4.7. RESEARCH SAMPLE AND SAMPLING STRATEGY 
The apparel industry, together with consumer electronics and auto parts is one of the 
three largest finished goods sectors that rely extensively on global value chains to fulfill 
their customer demand (UNCTAD 2011), with a traded goods value in excess of US$ 200 
billion, about 40% of which is imported by the United States (OTEXA 2016). Following the 
virtual demise of domestic apparel manufacturing, with import penetration in excess of 
94% (Gereffi and Frederick 2010), the US apparel is completely dependent on  the apparel 
global value chains, eliminating the need to control for competition with domestic firms. 
The supplier choice will therefore be strictly a function of supplier capabilities and of the 
host country characteristics. 
The top US specialty apparel retailers are an especially suitable subset for this 
study for several reasons. First and foremost, they are economically important, taking the 
lion share of the US$ 200 billion in total apparel sales, with the top 25 specialty retailers 
accounting for about 40% of the total US apparel sales (APPENDIX F.).  Second, there are 





governance modes for their interface with suppliers; this effectively controls for two of 
the three determinants of GVC governance in the extant literature, transaction frequency 
and codifiability of product information (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005).  The reduction 
of this original set of variables to just one, supplier capabilities, allows me to introduce 
two other proposed determinants of the governance choice, country level institutions and 
lead firm brokerage capabilities, without sacrificing parsimony. Third , transaction 
frequency (thousands of transaction in average for each retailer) , and repeated business 
with key suppliers allows me to expose the transactional and relational country level 
institutional barriers that persist after learning curve gains are exhausted, and despite the 
significant gains in capabilities and sophistication of the supplier base (Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003). Finally, the US specialty retailer subset is uniquely suited for this 
research because of the insularity of its brands. Almost none of the top specialty apparel 
brands have significant product sales outside the US and Canada, which removes the 
concern that market-seeking considerations (for example entry in China) may affect 
sourcing location choices and distort the findings.    
Drawing from a commercial database of apparel retailers (CSG 2014), I extracted 
a subset of specialty retailers engaged in sourcing their own proprietary lines, trying to 
limit as much as possible the subset to women’s wear apparel lines to reduce the variation 
of product complexity and target markets within the sample. Thus, retailers specializing 
in children wear, accessory, and men’s wear were not included. Retailers who purchase 
primarily in the merchant markets such as Nordstrom, or Saks Fifth Avenue, retail 





apparel sales data like Target and Wal-Mart, were excluded from consideration. Foreign 
firms like Zara, H&M, Gucci and Armani were also excluded, as the study focuses on the 
sourcing activities of US lead buyers.  After all these exclusions, I identified a subset of 43 
specialty retailers (Appendix F.) accounting for over one third of total US apparel sales, 
and over 50% of US women’s wear. 
 
Consistent with the constructivist approach, my sampling strategy was purposive 
(Merriam 2002) and the individuals, selected directly, and then through referral (snowball 
sampling), were chosen based on their potential to be most informative (Patton 1990) 
and to contribute to  knowledge creation with thick description (Geertz 1973). Experience 
at the executive level before and after the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) was phased out 
in 2005, eliminating the quota restrictions that limited garment sourcing in China, was 
also an important consideration in selecting participants. A second important criterion in 
the sample construction, namely the interviews of suppliers and intermediaries in Asia, 
seeks to address issues of research quality, providing much needed source triangulation 
across stakeholder roles. I was fortunate enough to be referred to chief executives at 
some of the top suppliers and intermediaries in the industry, giving me a more critical and 
three-dimensional view of lead buyer activities and characteristics.    
One of the expected advantages of selecting senior executives was their 
willingness to have a probing but wide-ranging discussion on their own industry, and their 
desire to be heard. With very few exceptions, that expectation was exceeded in the field, 





aside for the interview. Most found the process rewarding and expressed interest in 
learning about the research outcome. As a practical matter, for retail sourcing executives, 
I used the following criteria for inclusion: 
• At least 10 years of executive level sourcing experience, at Sr. Director and Vice 
President or above at one or more top 100 specialty retailers 
• At least 10 years of experience directing a sourcing team.  
• At least 15 years of experience travelling to Asian manufacturing locations. 
• P/L sourcing responsibility for annual volume greater than US$ 100 MM 
wholesale. 
Participants in other roles were  
• A principal of the world largest sourcing intermediary, based in Hong Kong.  
• The CEO and one Vice President of the largest US apparel intermediary, based in 
New York. 
• The Managing Director and one Vice President of one of Hong Kong’s premier 
apparel sourcing agents, based in Hong Kong.  
• The former Indonesian managing director of a Hong Kong based sourcing agent. 
• The principal and CEO of the world’s largest shirt factory, based in Hong Kong.    
• A principal of the world’s largest knit sweater manufacturer, based in Hong Kong.  
The participant demographics are summarized in Table 4.1.  
At the time of the interview, the participants with retail background were either 





the top retailers listed in Appendix F., accounting for about 50% of the subset’s sales.  This 
direct industry coverage is supplemented by the insights from intermediaries and 
manufacturers, whose customer base includes most of the other firms in the subset, 
providing further depth and scope to the analysis. 




The sample size is consistent with the intent of an interview based qualitative 
study. The objective here is not to generalize across industry and contexts, but rather to 
gain in depth knowledge of sourcing activities through an institutional lens in a large 
subset of the US apparel industry. The main thrust of the research is to bring to light 
activities and capabilities that practitioners do not usually rationalize, but that make up 
an industry culture. Lead US retailers tend to source in the same countries, and source 











ID1 32 20 5 Master F 50-54 USA 240
ID2 40 30 7 1 Master, JD M 65-69 USA 180
ID3 20 10 2 1 Master F 45-49 USA 90
ID4 20 15 1 Bachelor F 45-49 USA 120
ID5 36 25 3 Master M 60-64 USA 140
ID6 25 20 4 Bachelor M 45-49 USA 60
ID7 25 15 2 Bachelor F 45-49 USA 100
ID8 35 25 1 Bachelor M 60-64 USA 90
ID9 15 10 1 Bachelor F 35-39 USA 90
ID10 20 20 1 Master M 45-49 HONG KONG 150
ID11 40 35 1 Doctoral M 60-64 HONG KONG 100
ID12 40 30 2 1 Bachelor F 55-59 INDONESIA 150
ID13 25 20 1 Master M 45-49 HONG KONG 60
ID14 25 15 2 Master F 45-49 HONG KONG 90





on a relatively small group of well-known sourcing agents and intermediaries. Mobility of 
executives and managers within the industry also contributes to the diffusion of the 
generalized set of assumptions about the challenges of cross-border exchanges that 
constitute this industry culture. Thus, this study can be viewed as a study of variation 
within one industry culture, seeking to cast light on how individual perceptions of key 
decision makers bring about variability in strategic responses to these shared challenges. 
A study of this nature seeks richness of information through purposive sampling which by 
itself makes the concept of sample size, inherently linked to statistical power in 
quantitative studies, largely irrelevant. My sample size, with 15 distinct participants and 
content-rich interviews averaging just short of two hours each, fits within existing 
guidelines for sample size for interview based qualitative studies, which range from a low 
of eight  (McCracken 1988) to 20-30 (d'Andrade 1995), and is sufficient to gain in depth 
understanding of the phenomenon under study, as well as to ensure study quality and 
trustworthiness through source triangulation (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
4.8. RESEARCH PROCESS 
This research started with a simple observation in the global apparel global value chain, 
that specialty retailers rely to a varying degree on the services of sourcing agents and 
trade intermediaries to interface with suppliers in their sourcing regions, despite the 
significant intermediation costs, and that they do so even though they have fully staffed 
sourcing departments. The research process emerged in three distinct stages: 
Stage 1. The first critical stage was the definition of the research question, more 





performed by intermediaries in the apparel GVC and the extent to which these functions 
can be performed by the lead firm directly. Also important in the problem definition was 
a thorough review, and continuous monitoring of industry data and publications to ensure 
that the emergent theoretical research questions were relevant to industry practice. 
 
 






The definition of the research problem, illustrated in Figure 4.1, was the lengthiest 
stage, as it entailed a thorough review of theoretical literature, the examination of retailer 
annual reports and presentations, case studies, and industry studies from international 
organizations, think tanks and industry watchdogs, as well as respected books on apparel 
sourcing, and industry paper and online publications.  From the examination of existing 
information, it became apparent that only in-depth interviews with key decision makers 
in the apparel GVC with a constructivist approach could create theoretically insightful and 
reality-proofed knowledge on the emergent research questions regarding the structural 
and strategic determinants of firm boundaries in offshore outsourcing.  
Stage 2. With the research problem framed and an initial theoretical model as a guideline, 
I moved on to the second stage, developing the field study (Figure 4.2). I tackled at first 
the critical issue of securing the participation of a sufficiently diverse sample of industry 
sourcing executives that could bring depth of direct knowledge regarding both daily 
practice and strategic decision-making, and at the same time allow the required source 






Figure 4.2 Developing Qualitative Study and Field Research 
 
Sampling for the interviews was purposive, seeking to include global sourcing 
executives with experience at multiple top US specialty retailers. Source triangulation was 
ensured by interviews with executives with the industry’s premier agents and 
intermediaries in the US and in Asia, as well as with owners of large factory groups in Asia, 
who serve many of the other retailers not directly included in the sample.  I then 





developed an interview protocol (Appendix B), based on the study’s theoretical model, 
with questions on the pros and cons of the different supplier interface governance modes, 
followed by multiple questions and prompts for each of the determinant variables under 
study. I conducted the interviews in three distinct rounds scheduled a few weeks apart, 
which allowed me to adjust the interview protocol between rounds. The different 
stakeholder roles of agents and intermediaries in the GVC also required the development 
of a related but distinct interview protocol for them (Appendix C). In the process, I 
removed questions that only lead buyers can answer, and adding a few supplemental 
questions on trust in the GVC, to investigate more in depth the relational barriers in the 
buyer-supplier interface, and how trust gaps in cross-border exchange are brokered. 
Stage 3. The field work was concluded a few weeks after the last round of interviews, with 
the verbatim transcription of all interviews, ushering the study into its third stage (Figure 
4.3.), that consisted of analysis of the findings, their mapping against the theoretical 







Figure 4.3 Analyzing the Research Data  
 
As a first step, I edited the verbatim transcriptions to remove certain 
colloquialisms, occasional banter, and some of the characteristic choppiness of 
conversational oral communication. In the process, I also added some initial coding and 
comments, in MS Word document comment format. These codes were developed in 
progress, primarily to allow a first mapping of the participants’ statements against the 





to assess patterns of concordance and patterns of contrast in the responses. This is a 
critical part of the constructivist approach, in which knowledge is constructed through 
consensus in the participants’ contributions. In consideration of the volume and 
sophistication of the information collected, as well as the dialectic nature and the 
variations in order and content of the interviews, I opted against the use of software tools 
like NVIvo to code and analyze the transcription. Word clouds developed for the full 
interviews, and for the response portions failed to yield interesting insights, but rather 
appeared to reflect the idiosyncratic use of language of the individual participants. The 
number of non-native English speakers, as well as the different national contexts in which 
the participants live and work also contributed to my choice to eschew the use of text-
analysis software, and to map the results manually. 
4.9. PRELIMINARY DATA COLLECTION  
While there is relatively little literature analyzing GVC governance choices through an 
institutional lens, there is an abundance of trade information and practitioner 
publications that have been a great aid in ensuring that the phenomenon under study 
was relevant, and that the analysis stayed solidly anchored to the real-world practice. The 
initial data collection from secondary sources served three main functions: a) defining the 
research problem, b) limiting the scope of the study and c) preparing for the in-depth 
interviews. To accomplish this, I followed two parallel tracks: a theoretical track consisting 
of an extensive literature review, identifying the state-of-the-art and the potential gaps 
in the strategic outsourcing and global value chains literature, and a practitioner track 





trade press, and apparel trade data to identify the key exporters to the US. The 
practitioner track also included the review of top retailers’ annual reports and sourcing 
presentations, and of studies published by the Global Fung Institute, a research center 
funded by Hong Kong based Li & Fung, the world’s largest apparel sourcing intermediary 
and agent.  Finally, pre-interview conversations with three key informants and online 
searches helped me identify a few sourcing books widely used by practitioners as 
references, enhancing my understanding of real world sourcing functions and of the 
critical issues in lead buyers’ interface with suppliers in the key sourcing countries. The 
most helpful resources are summarized in Table 4.3.  
Two tragic events that took place during the early stages of this research widened 
the scope of perspectives to be included during the interviews. The Tazreen Fashion 
factory fire in late 2012 and the Rana Plaza factory building collapse in May of 2013 in 
which over 1000 workers perished brought the institutional weaknesses of certain 
apparel-exporting countries to the forefront, highlighting the importance for lead buyers 
to assess and ensure compliance with international safety and labor standards among the 









Table 4.3 Select Secondary Industry data and Information Sources  
Birnbaum, D. (2005)  Birnbaum's Global Guide to Winning 
the Great Garment War 
Birnbaum, D. (2008)  Crisis in the 21st Century garment 
Industry and Breakthrough Unified 
Strategies 
Birnbaum, D. (2015)  Birnbaum's Global Guide to Agents and 
Buying Offices 
Fung, V.K; Fung, W.K. and Wild, Y. (2007)  Competing in a Flat World: Building 
Enterprises for a Borderless World  
International Trade Administration  http://otexa.ita.doc.gov 
Chain Store Guide www.chainstoreguide.com  
Women's Wear Daily  www.wwd.com 
Just-style.com www.just-style.com 
Apparel Sourcing  www.sourcingjournalonline.com 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited 
Production 
www.wrapcompliance.org 
World Bank www.worldbank.org 
Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org 
International Labor Organization www.ilo.org 
Oxfam www.oxfam.org 
United Nations Global Compact  www.unglobalcompact.org 
 
4.10. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION: INTERVIEWS 
Recorded in-person interviews with sourcing executives in the apparel global value chain 
have been the intended method of primary data collection for this study from inception. 
Their successful execution posed significant practical and methodological challenges, not 
the least, optimal use of travel funds from the CIBER research grant that supported this 
study. To conduct the interviews, in most instances, I travelled to the participants’ office 
locations in Fort Myers FL, New York City, Hong Kong, and in Seminyak Indonesia, 
consistent with recommendation that interviews be conducted in the participants’ 





executives were conducted in the business lounge of my hotel, and at one at the 
participant’s home, at her suggestion, to avoid interruptions.  
 As a first practical consideration, I took a series of steps to ensure that the 
interviews be properly recorded in digital form and to ensure the preservation of the 
interview recordings. For the purpose, I chose to use two recording devices in each 
session: a SONY Digital Voice Recorder 27-ICD PX440, with 4GB built-in flash memory, 
which generates very high quality digital recordings, easily transferred to my computer 
by means of a micro-USB cable, and I also used my IPhone 5s Voice Memo as a recording 
back u Both devices performed flawlessly throughout the process. At the end of each 
interview, I transferred the recording to my laptop computer in .MP3 format, and saved 
a back-up copy in Seagate Slim Portable Drive. At the end of each round of interviews, I 
also created an additional back-up file on my home desktop computer. 
I conducted the interviews in three rounds a few weeks a part, and after each 
round, I personally transcribed each interview verbatim into a MS Word document, a time 
consuming but critical process that I felt should not be contracted out. Listening to the 
recordings multiple times to transcribe them accurately resulted in crucial improvements 
in my line of inquiry and in the phrasing of questions, helping me identify critical areas of 
resistance to the process of discovery. Transcribing the interviews shortly after 
conducting them also allowed me to perform a review of the quality of each interview in 
terms of their actual content and contribution, beyond my subjective perceptions 
regarding their ease and flow, and to make critical improvement to my interviewing style 





company name and interview date, and to ensure their preservation saved them in an 
‘Interview Transcriptions’ folder that I duplicated and stored in multiple locations. 
The interviews were semi-structured by design, guided by an interview protocol 
(Appendix I) based on my theoretical model. As could be expected in expert interviews, 
some participants were particularly eager to speak about their lifelong professional 
experience, to share their insights, and to participate in the emergent process of theory 
creation, leaving me no choice but to treat the interview protocol as a checklist, marking 
off answers as they flowed naturally from the conversation, to maintain control and to 
limit scope creep in the interview (McCracken 1988) p25. In other cases, participants 
struggled to speak ad lib and it was necessary to follow the protocols more closely. In the 
initial design the interview process was to follow a series of standardized steps:  
1. Prior to the interview, each participant would receive a copy of participant 
invitation and informed consent letter describing the study, stating their rights as 
participants and addressing any concerns with regard to  confidentiality and anonimity, 
as required.  
2. I would then read and record a pre-interview statement 
3. I would record the interview  
4. I would read and record a post-interview statement thanking the participants, and 
asking whether they had any questions before we concluded the interview.     
Time constraints and friendly feedback from two of my key informants, who found 





deviation from this plan, especially with participants whom I reached through referrals 
from trusted colleagues or customers. In most cases, the invitation and informed consent 
letter was sent to the participants ahead of time via e-mail attachment, accompanied by 
an additional explanation of the research intent as a pre-condition for their participation 
in the body of the e-mail. Disposing with these formalities before the meetings saved 
time, and ensured friendlier introductions, that contributed to create a more free-flowing 
discursive climate throughout the interview. 
In preparation for the interviews I relied heavily on insights from two well-know 
and authoritative books on the methodology: McCracken’s The Long Interview 
(McCracken 1988) which provides a “systematic guide to the theory and method of the 
long qualitative interview” (McCracken 1988) and Kvale and Brinkman’s InterViews 
(Brinkmann and Kvale 2015), which analyzes in greater detail the interviews styles and 
the challenges depending on the different type of participants. This proved particularly 
useful in interviewing top executives and owners of top firms in the industry: 
“Elites are used to being asked about their opinions and thoughts, and an 
interviewer with some expertise concerning the interview topic may 
provide for an interesting conversation partner. The interviewer should be 
knowledgeable about the topic of concern and master the technical 
language, as well as be familiar with the social situation and biography of 





Most importantly, this source alerted me to a potential challenge to the quality of 
responses that experts  may pose to an interviewer lacking academic and professional 
legitimacy to challenge the opinions expressed in the course of the interview: “[Experts 
may] have prepared “talking tracks ”to promote the viewpoints they want to 
communicate  by means of the interview, which requires considerable skill to get beyond” 
(Brinkmann and Kvale 2015) 172.  
Professional experience also contributed to my awareness of these challenges, 
preparing me to adopt interview strategies that could break-up the virtual dance in which 
the various participants, linked through decades in their stakeholder roles in the apparel 
GVC,  were engaged with one another, trying to preempt and counter one another’s 
opinions during the interview process. Part of the strategy to counter the “talking tracks” 
involved exhibiting a high level of professionalism, in everything from attire to diction 
level, to assert my legitimacy not just as an academic researcher, but also as an 
experienced trade professional on my own, to retain control of the interview and to 
politely remind the participants of the existence of well-defined meeting objectives when 
the conversation strayed too far from the research agenda. 
One of the concerns in the interview process was to elicit a deeper reflection from 
individuals in positions of high responsibility, extremely pressed for time, who over the 
years have devised solutions within their global value chains that may not be optimal, but 
that offer a path of least resistance to global sourcing, and are taken for granted.  To take 





I occasionally resorted to cognitive dissonance, contrasting responses from other 
interviews with the ones offered by the participant, or changing the level of analysis, 
stimulating a switch from the fast to the slow mind (Kahneman 2011), eliciting a more 
conscious, thought-through response. As observed elsewhere (McCracken 1988), many 
participants engaged in this lively discovery process ‘con gusto’, giving the interviews 
more time than initially allocated. This challenging approach had to be tempered by the 
existence of the same cultural barriers that are the object of this study, between me, a 
male middle-aged American businessman and academic researcher with Italian 
upbringing, and the male and female interview participants from the US, the UK,  China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, and India. This cross-cultural dynamic is further complicated by the 
level of global integration, experience and cultural sophistication of participants, by their 
ability to bridge cultural gaps with their learned cultural repertoires (Swidler 1986), which 
can mask their deeply rooted cultural schemata (Erez and Earley 1993), thus increasing 
the probability of “talking-track” responses. This was a particular concern with 
participants who do not think in English. In these instances, I approached the interviews 
with a less pressing style, cognizant of the possibility that I might not be able to pierce the 
cultural wall, and that respondents might volunteer more practical industry information 
and possibly examples, but less interpretation and analysis.  
4.11. DATA ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS   
From inception, this study was not intended as an interview-based survey, but rather as 
a series of semi-structured expert interviews, seeking rich description and a dialectic 





constraints and the insights that each participant had to offer imposed significant 
deviation from the interview protocols, requiring me to make quick judgement calls 
regarding interview flow, line of questioning and usefulness of the responses, and to 
adjust accordingly. Since I was not willing to sacrifice emergent discovery to maintain a 
rigid interview sequence, I did not expect the collected data to be particularly suited for 
automatic codification, and planned to perform manual mapping of the interview data. 
In the first editing phase after transcription, I sought to include in my interview transcripts 
ALL CAP notations from a hierarchy of codes (Saldaña 2012) flowing directly from the 
theoretical model, and from the interview protocol, that was itself patterned according 
to the model’s hierarchy. Four general themes directly correlated to the theoretical 
model’s variables: 
• Buyer-supplier dyad interface governance (the dependent variable)   
• Institutional distance (country effects – an independent variable) 
• Supplier capabilities (the other independent variable)  
• Lead firm institutional brokerage (the model’s moderator)  
 I placed significant effort in the identification a priori of theoretically and 
practically useful categories specifically related to transactional and relational dimensions 
in the variables, and their constituent items; each of these themes, categories and items 
were given their own code to facilitate mapping of the interview data in the editing 
process. I added a code for trust, which was an emergent theme during the interviews, 
and for the eleven propositions, to label comments that directly addressed them. The 





themes, ten categories and total of 49 codes, including codes for the propositions. 
Following the release of NVivo 11 Pro, I subsequently used the software to code the 
interview transcripts according to the same coding scheme, which enabled me to assess 
more rapidly the most relevant categories through code mapping and other visual tools 
provided by the software.  
It’s important to note that coding is only one possible way of analyzing interview 
data, to facilitate interpretation of text (Saldaña 2012), and, although it can aid in the 
mapping of emergent consensus among interview participants, it is not designed to turn 
qualitative data into quantitative. The findings of a true subjectivist qualitative study are 
fundamentally incommensurable with quantitative approaches (Lincoln, Lynham et al. 
2011). Interview transcriptions are qualitatively different from interview recordings which 
are the actual data collected, and there is a certain “loss in transcription” that coding can 
accentuate; maximum richness of description in which not only the words, but also 
respondent emphasis, or hesitation are captured can only attained by combining reliance 
on interview transcriptions with a frequent review of the original interview recordings in 
the final write-u To bridge the quality gap between transcriptions and the interview 
experience with each participant, I have compiled a summary report for each interview, 
identifying key contributions, unique insights, and interview sticking points, describing 
the overall interview flow, and highlighting possible concerns with the quality or validity 





The reporting format of interview studies is the object of intense criticism, not 
least among which the overall dullness of the writing (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015), 
typically because of length and of the excessive use of interview quotations. Most 
critically, the researcher also often fails to capture and communicate the significance of 
the findings, and to connect them logically in themes that pertain to the research 
questions. To streamline the presentation of my findings, I chose to follow closely the 
theoretical model in the presentation of the data, discussing the areas of consensus 
among participants, contrasting them with any unique perspectives that may have 
emerged in the interview process and relating these to the research propositions. It is in 
this area that the use of NVivo was most helpful as I could arrange and sort interview 
fragments by node and arrangement in an order that follows the theoretical model and 
create a main narrative thread using exclusively interview materials prior to the final 
write-up, in which I limited the use of direct quotes to the most eloquent and 
enlightening, that required the least amount of editing. Finally, I conclude by synthesizing 
my findings in relation to the research intent, with focus on the institutional approach to 
the study of governance in global value chains and assessing the validity and usefulness 
of the concept of institutional brokerage and its associated capabilities in the study of 
firm strategies in cross-border economic exchanges. 
4.12. ISSUES OF RESEARCH QUALITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 
One of the greatest challenges for qualitative research, and especially for the 
constructivist approach to understanding complex human phenomena, is to overcome 





positivist criteria be extended to research conducted from a subjectivist perspective? The 
epistemological and ontological paradigms adopted by the researcher necessarily 
determine the applicable standards of research quality, and although the general issues 
of validity, credibility, rigor and trustworthiness are pertinent to all research, the 
goodness of qualitative inquiry must be assessed based on the paradigm of the research 
(Morrow 2005). The inapplicability of the objective standards of research quality for 
quantitative studies does not imply that qualitative research is ‘a free for all’ (Saldana 
2014), where anything goes; however the standards to ensure and assess the quality of 
co-constructions of reality through constructivist research will necessarily differ from the 
traditional positivist measures. 
There seems to be some agreement among researchers on general post-
positivism criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, which 
correspond directly to internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity. Lincoln and 
Guba  suggest that credibility can be obtained by prolonged engagement with participants 
and participant checks, and co-analysis (Lincoln, Lynham et al. 2011). Transferability is 
truly a decision of the audience; however, it is facilitated with full disclosure of the 
relationships between researcher and participant and of the context. The researcher 
should seek full awareness and disclosure of his own assumptions and biases,  a process 
for which phenomenologists use the term bracketing,  becoming fully aware of them and 
setting them aside to avoid influencing the research (Husserl 1931). In practice, this is 
done through triangulation and member checks. Credibility and research trustworthiness 





and Guba 1985). For this purpose, more important than sample size are the sampling 
procedures: quality, lengths and depth of interview data and variety of evidence.  
To ensure sample quality, its selection for this study was purposive and criterion 
based, not random: I sought participants with extensive high-level experience in the 
apparel global value, who could provide the most information-rich data. Snowball, chain 
referral sampling factored in the process, with the first participants having a greater 
influence on the final make-up of the sample. Referrals from three distinct key informants 
led to the participation four distinct types of stakeholder, with different backgrounds and 
roles in the GVC, decreasing the risk of community bias. I used great care to protect from 
anchoring. This was achieved by selecting participants of very high professional level 
across the sample and though the sequence of the interviews, grouped by design based 
on participant role and, for practical reasons, by geographical area, with interviews in Asia 
coming last. The grouping of interviews by functional role and geographic location also 
facilitated triangulation of data. Most critical to the ontological authenticity, to  the 
quality of the findings and understandings developed throughout the interview process 
were my openness of purpose, and trusting relationships with respondents (Lincoln, 
Lynham et al. 2011), extensive preparations, and my personal knowledge of the industry 
which contributed in most cases to a relaxed and engaging  interview climate, allowing  






Of course, a relaxed interview climate is not by itself a guarantee of quality of 
information. Several of the participants are quite accustomed to being interviewed by the 
trade press on issues related to apparel sourcing, some have been the object of case 
studies in Harvard Business Review and, in at least one instance, have themselves 
authored books on the apparel global value chain. Introducing elements of cognitive 
dissonance (McCracken 1988) to challenging the most media savvy participants 
(Brinkmann and Kvale 2015), has proven critical in eliciting original responses, beyond 
what I had already found in secondary sources.     
4.13. ETHICAL ISSUES  
Interview based research raises significant ethical issues regarding confidentiality during 
the interviews and in reporting the findings, regarding access by third parties and 
retention of the recordings and their transcriptions and to the use and publication of their 
contents. Many of these concerns were addressed following guidelines of the Institutional 
Review Board of the University of South Carolina. All participants received an informed-
consent invitation letter (Appendix E.) explaining the research purpose and their rights as 
participants, providing details on access, use and retention of the recording and their 
transcriptions, and assuring their complete anonymity in the dissertation and in any 
future publication that may be derived from it. Additional details were sent to participants 
in Asia, who were all sourcing agents, intermediaries and apparel suppliers whom I 
reached through referral from other retail executives, to assure them that none of their 





Managing confidentiality posed some interesting challenges during the interviews 
because of the need to balance the usefulness of the knowledge built from previous 
interviews and of statements from various participants in eliciting deeper reflection and 
more sophisticated responses, with the obligation to keep interview contents 
confidential. Any breach of confidentiality during an interview would not only represent 
a violation of my code of conduct as a researcher but also compromise the participants’ 
trust in the integrity of the research process, reducing their willingness to share their 
views with openness, and to contribute with invaluable examples from their experience 
with specific firms in the apparel global value chains. Fortunately, the process of referral 
itself, gave all participants a degree of awareness of my connections within the industry, 
and the caliber of my referents afforded me a level of ‘borrowed trust’ in discussing 
specific firms and industry dynamics. Because of the referral chain, many interviews went 
in much greater detail discussing my referents’ present and past firms, as well as insights 
on other firms in the industry with which I had no known connection. A few participants 
presented me with an unexpected twist in the issue of confidentiality, as they probed me 
for opinions and views from their clients and competitors, on and off the record. While 
their curiosity opened interesting lines of inquiry, confidentiality took precedence. The 
preliminary data collection, specifically industry press articles, books and case studies 
proved invaluable in these instances allowing me to pursue these unplanned threads 












In this chapter I follow the basic outline of the theoretical model to present the results of 
the field work associated with this study, and to discuss the finding in relation to the 
model’s propositions. The completed field work consisted in in-depth interviews with a 
total of fifteen sourcing executives, agents, suppliers and trade intermediaries, conducted 
in the US, Hong Kong and Indonesia; in addition to the interviews, I was invited to attend 
an internal training seminar for country managers at Li & Fung’ s headquarters in Hong 
Kong, featuring a presentation by the firm’s COO and principal.  The interview recordings 
span close to 30 hours, averaging 1h 53’ per interview, yielding 322 single spaced pages 
rich with content, as all formalities to introduce the research topic and regarding 
informed consent, were addressed via e-mail prior to the meetings, to maximize useful 
interview time in consideration of the participants’ schedule constraints. Besides the 
interview transcriptions, I have created interview reports with additional observations 
regarding each participant’s main contributions, recording issues that arose during the 
interview.   
 The analysis of the transcripts benefitted greatly from the use of NVivo 11 Pro for 





model (Figure 5.1) which provided the basis for the interview protocols was also the basis 
of the initial coding scheme (Appendix III).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Determinants of buyer-supplier governance mode in apparel GVC  
 In addition to the codes, categories and themes from the study’s theory 
development, I included nodes for the eleven propositions, and a code for quotable 
statements to facilitate their retrieval when presenting the data. Overall, the interviews 
yielded 1370 references to 35 nodes, and 73 direct references to the 11 propositions. 
These 1370 references represent the data points of the research and feature prominently 
in the presentation of the results, which I organized in sections by variable: I begin the 
presentation with a discussion of the GVC governance, the dependent variable, followed 
by the two independent variables, institutional distance and supplier capabilities, and 
concluding with the moderator variable, institutional brokerage. A quantitative mapping 






Figure 5.2 Coding and reference mapping vs. theoretical model  
 In order to organize the data, I have subdivided each variable section into 
subsections corresponding to the original coding scheme, I extracted all coded content 
for each node, weeded out non-usable or redundant passages, and then created a master 
document pasting all relevant coded data in their corresponding subsection. The resulting 
document maps out over 500 participants’ original contributions, edited only for clarity, 
preserving all the data pointing at emerging consensus, as well as those revealing 
divergence of opinions. Finally, I write up the results weaving the data points in a 
narrative, assessing the validity of a priori assumptions made in the theory development, 
and gauging the concordance of the model’s propositions with the opinions and 





challenges linked to cultural difference between Asia participants and US participants as 
well as difference in roles and positions in the value chain, as for example between an 
agent and a manufacturer. Another subtler challenge is posed by the immanent nature of 
many participants’ concerns, and the occasional banality and one-sidedness of some of 
the opinions offered as expertise. One executive at Li & Fung, the world’s largest Hong 
Kong based apparel intermediary, used an old Buddhist parable to describe the cognitive 
challenges ahead, as he described the narrow views and misconceptions among the 
industry buyers, suppliers and competitors about Li & Fung’s business model, and its role 
in the global value chain: 
ITI3: you know the old parable of the elephant and the blind men? They 
take a bunch of blind men and ask them to tell you what an elephant looks 
like: and the first blind man feels the elephant’s trunk so he says: “I know 
what an elephant looks like: it looks like a snake” another one feels his legs 
and says “No, no it is like a tree” the third one feels the body and says “No, 
an elephant is as big as a house …”  
5.1 THE END OF INTERMEDIATION? 
At the end of 2004, the expiration of the Multi Fibre Agreement which had regulated for 
30 years the apparel and textile exports from developing nations, primarily in Asia, to the 
US and EU by establishing export quotas, was expected to revolutionize the apparel 
industry, spelling doom for exporting nations like Bangladesh, where a garment industry 





elimination of export quotas, industry insiders wondered not whether China would 
become the only significant sourcing market for apparel brands, but how quickly. Besides 
the expected geographical shift, another momentous change was being predicted: the 
end of intermediation.  In the words of the CEO of one of the largest US based sourcing 
intermediaries:     
ITI1: “Up to 2005, until quota went away, our business proposition was: 
because we had quota we got the orders. Fundamentally, we were a 
trading company, and because we had the quota we would get the 
business. (…) [We] invested in Hong Kong quota over the years. We had the 
largest quota portfolio in Hong Kong, and developed the capabilities 
everywhere to go get quota. We always had quota. We traded on quota.  
AP: That was a nice part of the profit … 
ITI1. That was THE [respondent’s emphasis] profit. So back in the 90s, one 
of the biggest reasons for intermediation was that we had quota. As 
straight-forward and fundamental as it could get.  And when quota went 
away, we started thinking about what’s our value. When quota went away, 
the prediction was that intermediaries were going to go away.” 
 The elimination of quotas, and combined with accelerating evolution of 
information and communication technologies and productivity software, and web-based 
system integration were expected to allow buyers to source from remote factories in the 





and no intermediation costs. As one ex-sourcing executive, now owner of a small apparel 
company recollects:  
RET2: I was at [a large specialty retailer] between 2003 and 2008, and we 
were already hooked up with some of the factories directly with the Gerber 
PDM system [a product data management software system]. Our spec 
systems were hooked directly into the factory, so there was no delay 
associated having to go through an agent’s office, if the spec had already 
been approved.             
 Both sets of predictions proved to be widely exaggerated. On the geographic 
front, the competitive advantages of exporting countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh and, to a lower extent, India remained sustainable, keeping China’s share of 
US total apparel imports below 40% (OTEXA 2016). All specialty apparel retail executives 
interviewed have indicated that they source in at least three countries, besides China, for 
a significant percentage of their total business, and that they are implementing corporate 
strategies aimed at making their value chains less China-centric. On the governance end, 
contrary to expectations, intermediaries and agents have actually flourished (KSA 2016), 
a phenomenon best evidenced by the emergence of Hong Kong based sourcing giant Li & 
Fung, which alone accounts for almost 10% of global wholesale apparel sales. Not only 
have other intermediaries and agents grown in size and scope, but some of the traditional 
functions of intermediaries have also been taken over by the emergent manufacturing 





and S. Korea, who provide a number of brokerage services as they seek to capture a larger 
share of the value chain, at times competing with traditional intermediaries.  
AGE1: The big multinational factory groups: TAL [HK based TAL Apparel], 
Esquel [HK based Esquel Group] … they are manufacturing all over the 
world. Are they factories, are they agents or are they trading companies? 
They are falling into a hybrid role, and that results in a lot of turf wars.  
 Both the survival of intermediaries and the assumption of brokerage functions by 
these emerging Asian multinational manufacturing groups seem to confirm a broad 
assumption of this research: that the challenges in the apparel global value chain are far 
greater than simple transactional effectiveness, and that the capture of the economic 
arbitrage opportunities between developing economies and the US rests on a broader set 
of skills and activities required to overcome the transactional and relational barriers 
between buyers and suppliers.  
5.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
As the apparel GVC continues to be dispersed across multiple developing countries, with 
even greater geographic complexity if we consider the origin of the inputs of production, 
fabric, yarns and trim, lead buyers are confronted with a series of strategic decisions on 
country and supplier selection, and then with operational pressures regarding the 
governance of hundreds of supplier relationships spanning across multiple countries. This 
research seeks to shed light on the drivers of the governance decision, the institutional 





strategic response to these determinants play into the governance choice for their GVC.  
Building upon widely recognized work on the governance of global value chains (Gereffi, 
Humphrey et al. 2005) which identifies transaction complexity, codifiability of information 
and supplier capabilities as the determinants of GVC governance, I apply an institutional 
theory lens to shed light on the impact of host country institutional factors, and then 
explore the role lead buyer agency  on the choice of governance mode. In the analysis of 
dyadic buyer-supplier governance, my theoretical model retains supplier capabilities as a 
key determinant, but controls for transaction complexity and codifiability of information 
through sample selection, focusing on a sizeable industry subset, US specialty apparel 
retailers, within which these two factors are fundamentally invariant. The validity of this 
underlying assumption, inferred from trade publications and expert opinion (Birnbaum 
2000), was confirmed in the course of the interviews by virtually all participants. This 
line of inquiry leads to three broad research questions:  
1. How does home-host country institutional distance affect the lead buyer’s choice 
of governance in each GVC buyer-supplier dyad? 
2. How do supplier capabilities affect the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the 
GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
3. How do the institutional brokerage activities and capabilities of the lead firm 
affect the lead buyer’s choice of governance in the GVC buyer-supplier dyads? 
 Although there are anecdotal accounts of the additional costs associated with 





data of its effect on cross-border transactions and relationships. Several retailers have 
indicated that they apply transactional metrics and scorecards, but they do not even try 
to assess the differential in true cost of doing business in the various countries. Even more 
metrics-driven executives like the CEO of the world largest shirt factory, and owner of a 
network of factories in China and in four southeast Asian countries expressed serious 
doubts that applying activity based costing to country costs would yield actionable insight 
worth the expense. Ultimately, the upper limit of the value of cost information that Could 
be gathered analytically is set by the cost of alternative governance choices in which the 
complexity associated with doing business in any country is externalized to a third party. 
The cost of doing business in the various host countries appears to be inextricably 
embedded in a web of transactions and buyer-supplier relationships, and is linked to the 
cognitive, normative and regulative barriers instantiated at the IB interface; the 
governance choice represents the lead buyer's strategic response to these transactional 
barriers and to the trust gaps inherent to the GVC. The lack of suitable metrics and the 
complexity of the phenomena under investigation call for a qualitative inquiry, however, 
it also it also presents an epistemological challenge as the lack of metrics is also 
responsible for respondents’ cognitive blind spots, whereby (expensive) existing solutions 
mask the transactional and relational barriers in the GVC and their associated costs. 
Participants take these solutions for granted, underestimating the problems currently 
resolved by suppliers, agents or intermediaries.   
 Another challenge is posed by a degree of cross-fertilization of ideas and practices 





have worked for a combined 14 different top 50 specialty retailers at multiple levels of 
responsibility and multiple divisions. One respondent (RET1), a sourcing executive at five 
different specialty retailers over the last two decades, lamented a degree of “sameness” 
across retailers in the same space, and the diffusion of certain industry truisms about 
country selection, vendor mix and “best practices”. Below the surface, however, during 
the interview, her experience revealed more variation in sourcing practices, and 
governance choices that are reflective of distinct lead buyers’ strategic stances regarding 
their global value chains. 
5.3 GVC GOVERNANCE  
With virtually all garments sold in the US imported from developing countries, the US 
apparel brands are completely dependent on the apparel global value chain, bringing 
country and supplier selection and the governance of the supplier relationships to the 
forefront. Owing to the evolution of specialty retailing in the direction of multichannel 
retailing, with more SKUs and smaller orders, the industry is characterized by a 
generalized trend toward the transfer of operational responsibilities onto third parties. 
The growing number of styles developed and booked by a typical top 50 U.S. specialty 
retailer (most sourcing executives put that number of booked styles between two and 
three-thousand) greatly increases organizational complexity due to cross border interface 
demands with more factories, more with fabric, yarn and trim suppliers, in more 
countries, increasing the pressure to outsource some functions to suppliers and to lower 
cost countries. At the same time, this extreme level of offshore outsourcing strains the 





activities of their geographically remote and dispersed value chains, making the choice 
governance mode of the buyer–supplier interface ever more critical. For most specialty 
retailers, the governance decision has two dimensions: a global level decision regarding 
the role of sourcing activities in the organization and the resources, and a dyadic level, 
concerning the governance of individual buyer-supplier interfaces. At the global level, the 
retailer must decide the degree of direct control that it wants over its supplier base. In 
the view of one large Hong Kong based supplier, the global decision is a function of 
whether sourcing is viewed as a core function:  
MFG2: “How important is sourcing in the view of the C level executives? Is 
just something that you need to get done so you can sell, or is it truly part 
of your strategy to get into the whole manufacturing, so that you have 
value-add in your product at the end of the day. If you really feel it gives 
you value-added, then you’ll want more control over it.” 
 The global level decisions include the size of the sourcing department at 
headquarters, whether to have a regional sourcing office, commonly in Hong Kong, and 
possibly local offices in key sourcing countries. The decision is often one of degrees, as 
most U.S. specialty retailers in the billion dollars plus range often work in a variety of 
directions, they may have their own offices, they may supplement their offices with 
agents, they may find some factories with whom they work direct from headquarters. At 
the dyad level, the governance decision is more directly influenced by the institutional 





global governance decision is that it may limit the countries in which the lead buyer can 
source and the type of suppliers it can engage. 
 The interviews confirmed the three governance modes inferred from trade 
publications and set forth in my proposed theoretical model: for the specialty retail subset 
of the apparel industry they are limited to direct sourcing in which the lead buyers 
interface directly with the supplier (factory), and indirect sourcing either through agents 
or through trade intermediaries (trading companies). While one industry veteran regaled 
me with tales of travel, in the 1980s, to civil war stricken Sri Lanka to set up a bra 
manufacturing joint venture for the nascent Victoria Secret brand, the days of direct 
investment by specialty retailers are largely over, and there have been no recently 
reported equity investments in production by US specialty retailers. There are a few 
instances of important brands, with narrower product offering, and in the mass market 
space that own all or some of their manufacturing facilities, but none in the specialty retail 
space; strategic ownership of production assets is more an exception, as in the case of 
Hanesbrands (http://www.hanes.com/corporate), or a legacy of acquisitions, as in the 
case of the denim and active wear brands of the VFC group (www.vfc.com), than the 
norm. There are also very limited instances of the captive production set forth as a 
governance mode in the literature (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005) as both specialty 
retailers, and their vendors (factories, agents and intermediaries) deliberately avoid 
relationships that represent more than 30-50% of the total capacity, or the lion share of 





applicable to the apparel global value chain, which appears to be built on idiosyncratic 
buyer-supplier relationships, however governed.   
5.3.1 DIRECT SOURCING  
With direct sourcing, the lead buyer establishes a principal to principal transactional 
relationship with a manufacturer that bears the greatest similarity with traditional 
contract manufacturing. The interface with suppliers can be managed directly from 
headquarters, or through local and regional offices, most commonly in Hong Kong. It is a 
high fixed costs strategy, with a large headcount that gives the lead buyer the greatest 
level of control over its global value chain, and when implemented correctly the lowest 
variable costs. Although economies of scale can be significant, making direct sourcing 
more common with the larger retailers like the GAP, size alone is not a predictor of 
whether a retailer will go direct, as evidenced by the variability of governance choices 
across the direct competitors of similar size, as in the case of Ann Inc., with its focus on 
direct sourcing at the time of the interview, and Chico’s with its hybrid sourcing strategy. 
 Direct sourcing has some obvious advantages: it can yield lower prices, greater 
cost transparency and supply chain visibility, and overall greater control on production 
and potentially greater quality. It also saves 6-12% in intermediation cost compared to 
indirect sourcing. In theory, direct relationships with the manufacturer minimize the ‘loss 
in translation’ that can be experienced going through a third party, because the supplier 
is hearing about the design and requirements directly from the source. Finally, direct 





minimizing the risk of exposing the brand to damaging involvement in catastrophic events 
such as the Tazreen factory fire or the Rana Plaza factory collapse. 
 Managing direct sourcing from headquarters is relatively easy option with well-
defined products, and for simple production; product complexity hinders the ability to go 
direct without ‘boots on the ground’ from regional and local offices. An obvious downside 
of direct sourcing is the high cost of large regional buying offices, which are typically based 
in Hong Kong and don't necessarily give adequate coverage outside of China. Hong Kong 
buying offices frequently face cultural and operational difficulties in managing countries 
like Indonesia, or Bangladesh, and tend to revert to their preferred supplier network in 
China, giving rise to a potentially costly agency problem. Opening small effective local 
offices in countries like Indonesia or India becomes economically viable if the volume of 
business exceeds 11-12 MM on an FOB basis, according to a former sourcing executive 
involved in the decision to open a local office in India. For most retailers larger than 1 
billion in sales, three to five countries meet this threshold. Overall, even for retailers 
who seek to source directly from the manufacturer, large regional offices (typically in 
HKG) are losing favor in part because of their cost, but also because the traditional 
tensions between headquarters and subsidiary are accentuated by the cultural distance 
between HK and the US, which can impede the transfer and adoption of company 
practices. In the words of one retail executive who ran a sourcing office in Hong Kong for 





 The owners of two large factory groups contribute a different perspective: to 
source directly, the buyer needs an in-depth, thorough understanding of the 
manufacturing process, and needs adequate staffing to deal with detailed order 
processing and management. Direct sourcing is time consuming, expensive in terms of 
staffing and travel, with high search costs because of the sheer number of transactions, 
but also because of steep cultural, normative and regulative barriers in the host countries. 
Thus, the large manufacturing groups are often the main beneficiaries of direct sourcing, 
because of the western schooling, level of sophistication of owners and management, and 
their experience doing business with US retailers.  
5.3.2 SOURCING THROUGH AGENTS  
Sourcing agents in the apparel industry are specialized firms with embedded relationships 
with a network of factories in one or more country; industry consolidation has led to the 
survival of a relatively small number of large sourcing agent firms such as W.E. Connor in 
Hong Kong, New Times Group in Hong Kong and Taipei, and MGF (formerly MAST 
Industries) in New York, Triburg in India, and the largest, Hong Kong based Li & Fung. 
Many of these firms will have offices in multiple countries to manage the suppliers and in 
New York to interface with their clients, the lead buyers.  Sourcing agents are commission 
based buying agents who do not take title to the goods, but place orders with the factories 
on behalf of the lead buyer and manage them for a commission that is typically in the 
range of 6% of FOB value. While some of the firms mentioned operate exclusively as 
commission agents, notably W.E. Connor, others have a dual business model, in which 





the two types of intermediation, in practice most intermediaries keep the two forms quite 
distinct in terms of services provided and capabilities deployed. As one of the principals 
of the largest apparel trading company put it: “How much facilitation do you want? Do 
you want us to help the factory buy the fabric you have chosen?”. As this quip suggests, 
trading companies tend to remain transactional in their approach when they operate as 
agents. 
 The best traditional agents set themselves forth as extensions of the lead buyer in 
sourcing and in product development. From the contract manufacturing perspective, the 
lead buyer saves manpower, with the agent providing boots on the ground to manage 
orders and monitor production, and opening better access to local manufacturing 
resources in the countries where they have supplier relationships and offices. Because 
agents do not take title to the goods, the supplier interface is managed in a triangular 
relationship with the lead buyer, guaranteeing a desirable level of supply chain visibility 
and cost transparency. Beyond manufacturing, the best agents have invested in product 
development and design support, proposing themselves as 'resources' that shift the 
retailers’ development costs from fixed to variable cost. Although sourcing agencies 
position themselves closer to the lead buyer in the value chain, they have embedded 
relationships with a network of local suppliers and serve an important role as brokers of 
trust between geographically and culturally distant parties, providing local management 
expertise and mediating buyer-supplier communication. Typically, agents also have 
greater visibility at executive and ownership level with both the buyers and the suppliers 





awareness of their unique position in the global value chain and of the importance of the 
social capital that they bring to the table: 
AGE2: Yes. Absolutely (…) we do broker trust, because our clients are 
trusting that we are going to deliver for them and, frankly, the other way 
around, our vendors trust that, when we represent a client, they are 
reputable and that they are going to see their commitments through. We 
have been very blessed to create a very high standard of delivery, and that 
trust is self-perpetuating over multiple markets and clients. That’s how [our 
firm] moves: we are less transactional.  
5.3.3. SOURCING WITH TRADE INTERMEDIARIES  
Apparel trade intermediaries operate as traditional trading companies, acting as 
aggregators of supply and demand, and performing an essential role as experts (Biglaiser 
1993) in global trade, as guarantors of quality (Spulber 1996), and as transactional 
clearinghouses. Trading companies like MGF, Li & Fung Triburg and New Times will 
contract the entire sourcing and production on the lead buyers’ behalf, and deliver the 
finished goods to the retailer’s distribution center on a landed duty paid basis, or in some 
more advanced arrangements directly to the stores. Sourcing through trade 
intermediaries allows the lead buyers to distance themselves from manufacturing, 
outsourcing a lot of the organizational complexity associated with managingand 
monitoring remote and dispersed global value chains, while focusing on one specialized 





RET6: “I am looking at companies like MGF and Li & Fung [trading 
companies] as companies that can be used to lower fixed costs, who can 
replace your firm’s staff with theirs in performing certain functions.” 
 Among the advantages of dealing with trade intermediaries is their ability to 
finance their suppliers, while extending credit to the lead buyers with greater ease than 
remote suppliers; intermediaries will also source and finance fabric and trim for the 
supplier, when necessary. The ability to broker the financial side of the transaction is due 
not in small part to the institutional advantages of Hong Kong, where virtually all Asian 
intermediaries are based. From their base in Honk Kong, the intermediaries direct the 
work of local offices in countries like Bangladesh and Cambodia, that are home to 
factories  that offer cost advantages but that would be for the most part unmanageable 
for the retailer. The best trade intermediaries bring to market a turn-key operation, with 
good systems integration with both ends of the supply chain giving buyers gain access to 
instant plug-in sourcing options in lower cost and less compliant countries transferring 
the commercial, as well as reputational risks associated with possible violations of labor 
and safety standards onto the intermediary. Like sourcing agents, apparel trading 
companies are brokers of embedded social capital, orchestrating access to an extensive 
trust network in the whole supply chain, but compared to agents they have greater 
upstream presence in the value chain, position  themselves closer to the supply base, and 
maintain a more transactional view of the buyer-supplier interface, as noted, not without 
a nod and a wink at some international business stereotypes by one Hong Kong Chinese 





ITI3: Just think about it: a very big, very rich company in America gives an 
order to a small guy in China: he gets the order, he needs to have a factory, 
he needs to pay his people, he needs to buy the raw materials. There is a 
huge amount of trust involved because you don’t get paid until you produce 
everything properly. And then you still worry bankruptcies, customers 
buying the wrong thing and trying to get out of the goods. There is a huge 
amount of trust needed, and that’s where we have been bridging that gap, 
for a long time already. 
 The complete reliance of the factories on orders from the trade intermediaries 
accounts for the intermediaries’ ability to load-balance capacity utilization, and to keep 
some necessary slack in the supply chain for fast response to emergent fashion trends 
and to sudden changes of conditions on the ground as in the case of natural disasters, or 
flare-ups of socio-political instability in any of the main sourcing countries, giving the 
intermediary a greater ability reposition orders at the last minute compared to inflexible 
retailers’ supply chains. In the words of the principal of a large trade intermediary “Some 
[retailers’] supply chains are wound just a little too tight.” 
 Some brands have grown and thrived relying exclusively on trade intermediaries 
for global sourcing; the most notable perhaps is Tommy Hilfiger, which sold its sourcing 
operation to Li & Fung in 2007 and extended the agreement to include its home 
furnishings and furniture line in 2015. Other agreement however, have had less positive 





to separate sourcing outcomes from the brands’ identity struggles, several interviewers 
with direct knowledge of these sourcing deals have pointed at the downside of using 
intermediaries as part of the reason for the brands’ struggles (and, in the case of Liz 
Claiborne, its demise). The most obvious downside is the cost of intermediation itself, 
which according to veteran executive at a US intermediary is no less than 9% of the value 
of the goods, plus other margin opportunities along the global value chain that are outside 
the buyer's control, due to a lack of transparency in the financial arrangements between 
intermediary and supplier, fabric and trim supply arrangements, and potential double 
dipping, earning a sales commissions from suppliers, above and beyond the trade mark-
u One sourcing executive pointed explicitly at grey areas with regard to on double-dipping 
in the language of a contract with a Hong Kong intermediary, as the main reason for the 
eventual failure to reach a sourcing agreement.  
 Beyond cost and contractual issues there are other disadvantages: a significant 
loss design integrity as production is put through the intermediaries’ manufacturing black 
box, something that retailers describe as a ‘loss in translation’. This loss in translation is 
in part explained by the transactional nature of the buyer-intermediary relationship, in 
which each transaction has its cost sheet. Given the more transient nature of their 
relationships with buyers, intermediaries have interest in reducing supply chain visibility 
and in limiting knowledge transfer between the buyer and supplier. This information 
asymmetry built in the principal to principal relationship with the intermediary creates 
path dependencies making it more difficult for the lead buyer to regain control over their 





AGE2: If you use a trade intermediary, or a trading organization you often 
just are not given that information [supplier identity and capabilities], they 
will not declare this information to you. That’s their profit source and they 
don’t want to share that with you. Just literally “No, I am not 
communicating that to you.” 
5.4 INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE AND GOVERNANCE  
Institutional distance, as defined in the literature (Kostova 1997), incorporates both 
formal and informal institution, is a very comprehensive construct built on Scott’s  
cognitive, normative and regulative pillars of institutions (Scott 1995, Scott 2008). By 
virtue of its scope, the concept is suitable to gauge broad dyadic level institutional barriers 
between two countries, and potentially reducing them to a numerical scale, using domain 
specific country institutional profiles (Kostova 1997). Because of its qualitative 
methodology, this study stops short of an attempt to index institutional distance between 
the US and the GVC host countries, but it stipulates the importance of institutional 
distance in the apparel global value chains and proposes it as a key determinant of the 
governance choice. Institutional distance is instantiated at each cross-border buyer 
supplier interface, affecting transactional effectiveness and the development of the 
relationships required to coordinate production and to lower the cost of doing business 
abroad. There are several reasons to expect institutional distance to be especially 
important in the global value chain of US apparel retailers: a.) virtually all production is 





of transactions (over 1000 every year), the number of steps, about 100 distinct steps per 
SKU, more than half across borders, and the scope and number of distinct cross-border 
interfaces in each transaction (Figure 5.3) can be reasonably expected to amplify the 
institutional challenges dealing with suppliers in GVC host countries. c.) the high need for 
coordination of production, to deliver the desired product quality, and the required speed 
of delivery at the specified target prices.  
 
Figure 5.3 Lead buyer cross-border interfaces (green boxes) in apparel GVCs 
 
 The transactional and relational barriers associated with the high cultural, 
normative and regulative distance between the countries hosting production and the US 
are important cost drivers and key determinants regarding the inclusion of countries in 
the sourcing base, and then on the governance of the buyer-supplier interfaces once a 
country is selected. Most retailers do not employ formal country risk assessment tools, 





RET5:” I don’t think a lot of companies really look at the true cost of doing 
in a particular country; having bought a particular product, everyone looks 
at IMU [Initial mark-up], based on selling price, and FOB price or landed 
cost. There is a lot more to assessing the true cost than the IMU, and the 
metrics necessary to really look at whether that arrangement in that 
country is profitable …I think many companies just look at IMU.  [The cost 
of doing business in a country] should be loaded, but often it is not: there 
are few companies that are savvy enough to do that where they can see 
the exploded costs, and see if that particular arrangement is making sense, 
if it’s worth having the ten extra people.” 
 Because of the lack of specific country level cost metrics, the sourcing decisions 
are typically based on a combination of a combination of hard economics and logistics 
considerations filtered through the individual professional experience of the lead buyer, 
Industry “truisms” and country biases. An example of powerful intra-regional country 
bias, Chinese perceptions of Indonesia, emerged in the discussion with a Jakarta based 
agent: 
AGE1:” During the political turmoil of the late 90s, at the time when 
Suharto stepped down, there were riots and the Chinese were targeted. 
The merchandisers [buying offices and agents] in Hong Kong wanted 
nothing to do with Indonesia. There has always been a conflict between the 





much worse than reality, and you get these merchants in Hong Kong who 
say to their husbands, their wives, their neighbors “don’t go to Indonesia! 
It’s not safe!! You won’t like it”. There is a negativity toward Indonesia.” 
 Perceptions, judgments and sometimes the exclusions of certain countries may 
be unduly influenced by the performance of individual suppliers or intermediaries, and 
by the persistence of anachronistic views of countries’ characteristics based on 
experience. All interview participants, however, could be described as biased towards 
action rather than avoidance, with long histories of success at the highest level in the 
apparel GVC, sourcing or producing in ‘difficult’ countries. Their professional record of 
achievement and performance in many of the key exporting countries, give us a window 
onto the practical interplay of these institutional distance barriers with the demands of 
supply chains driven to action by unforgiving retail calendars, with strict seasonal 
deadlines, and constantly changing consumer preferences. 
 The practical manifestations of institutional distance and their costs are clearly a 
source of great anxiety for all the retailers interviewed, as revealed explicitly by the 
participants and by the scope and cost of their sourcing operations: making the GVC work 
is laborious, time consuming and costly. Distance operates as a form of friction every step 
of the way (Shenkar, Luo et al. 2008), more death by a thousand cuts than one deep fault 
line, and is burdensome to both buyers and suppliers, with the wear and tear associated 





have chosen to focus on producing for the domestic retail market in spite of significantly 
lower piece rates as compared to US retailers.  
RET1: …in China, we were competing for space with factories producing for 
the local market, and they may prefer to do that because it is simpler, 
easier. Because we can be a little demanding, we would get bumped 
because they have domestic orders, we can’t get additional capacity, or not 
even get space.  
 The first research question in this study seeks to establish whether and how 
institutional distance affects the lead buyers’ choice of governance for the interface with 
suppliers in the most various countries hosting apparel production. Although the 
proposed theoretical model rests on the assumption that institutional distance is in fact 
a significant factor in the business experience of decision makers in the apparel GVC, 
many of the questions and prompts are designed to first ensure that the categories and 
themes derived from literature and from preliminary industry research are in fact 
relevant, to isolate the most important among them, and then to assess how they affect 
the country selection and governance choice. In consideration of the highly transactional 
and relational nature of buyer-supplier interfaces in the apparel GVC I treat institutional 
distance in terms cognitive, normative and regulative barriers along transactional and 
relational dimensions. For the transactional dimension, I have focused on barriers in the 
transaction cost economics tradition, namely search, contracting, executing, monitoring 





moral hazard and adverse selection. For the relational dimension, I have looked at 
legitimacy barriers hindering trust development (Zaheer and Zaheer 2006), and the 
transfer of information, knowledge and practices from buyers to suppliers. The items and 
prompts in my interview protocols were grouped accordingly, to assess their relevance 
and importance “on the ground”. This line of inquiry starts from the participants a priori 
awareness and perceptions of the issue, and seeks to bring to the surface latent 
knowledge and experience, while seeking to avoid the quantum paradox of altering the 
nature of phenomena by the act of measuring them. During the interviews, this manifests 
itself as dual challenge to deepen the participants level of analysis by probing their 
responses, but eventually following their lead in identifying the essential themes, and 
abandoning the dead branches of inquiry.  
 The interviews clearly reveal that not all the analytical themes and categories 
used as initial guides for my inquiry are equally important or useful, even when I probed 
and prompted the respondents to take a second look. This is evident in Figure 5.5, which 
displays the first-round coding node frequency for the theoretically derived constitutive 
items of institutional distance: only traditional transaction cost barriers and barriers to 






Figure 5.4 Response node frequency for institutional distance items 
 
 
 Not apparent from these diagrams, but emergent from the responses of all US 
retail sourcing executives, is a hierarchical organization of the institutional distance 
barriers, whereby transactional barriers to exchange need a resolution to satisfactory 
degree of resolution before the relational barriers come into play in the possible 






Figure 5.5 Coding Map for institutional Distance  
 
 
5.4.1 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHY OF GOVERNANCE  
Overall, there seems to be little doubt that institutional distance influences specialty 
retailers’ choice of governance mode for the buyer-supplier relationships in their GVCs. 
Different types of institutional barriers seem to be at play in different geographic regions, 
even when comparing countries with similar low labor rates or levels of economic 
development as in the case of India in comparison to Indonesia or Vietnam. The top five 
Asian apparel exporters in Asia countries, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam, which account for over 60% of all US apparel imports into the US (OTEXA 2016), 
appear to grouped in three distinct areas when it comes to governance: China, Southeast 
Asia and South Asia. Although, because of their dominance, these five countries have 





exporters such as Pakistan for South Asia, or the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand for 
Southeast Asia tend to confirm the characteristics of each region. The distinction is not so 
much geographic in terms of logistical differences, but rather institutional, with each 
region posing a different set of governance challenges, linked to informal institutional 
factors such as cultural-cognitive differences business and social norms, as well as more 
formal barriers due to the general regulatory environment, trade policy and the country’s 
export orientation. The importance of the latter is further confirmed by within region 
comparison of country performance. 
 Retailers with a strong preference for direct governance appear to be 
geographically bound, with China taking the lion share of all sourcing, accounting in most 
cases for over 50% of their outsourced production; the largest number of direct buyer-
supplier for US retailers appears to be with Chinese suppliers, especially from the Pearl 
River Delta region, and from the Shanghai area, which have the highest level of 
manufacturing and trade maturity. This subnational qualification highlights the risk 
inherent with treating a complex, large country like China as a single institutional entity. 
In the words of one Hong Kong based agent: 
AGE2: “… going to Chongqing, or going up into the northern provinces, 
even just going to Henan [province] which is a six-hour drive from 
Shanghai, opens up manufacturing organizations that have never done 
exporting, and they just don’t understand what’s needed, whether that 
would be from the technical specification or from a logistics, 





them: “The client requires A, B and C” … “Why? Why do they need that?” 
or “We won’t do that; this is the way we do it”, with a take-it-or-leave-it 
kind of attitude. They are not used to working on different requirements 
that are not quite the fixed standardized ways, in certain locations. Just for 
a lack of exposure.”  
 The governance challenges associated with sourcing in these more remote 
regions of China are generally resolved by Hong Kong based agents and intermediaries, 
who still play a major role in China, and in about one third of the cases (KSA 2016), by the 
retailers’ own Hong Kong buying offices. Hong Kong based manufacturing multinationals 
like TAL or Esquel, that own manufacturing assets in China, are also an important player 
in this domain, dealing direct with buyers from their Hong Kong headquarters, and then 
manufacturing in various areas of mainland China. 
 The latter are part of a broader group of large apparel manufacturing MNCs 
headquartered in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, that ceased to manufacture in 
their own countries in the 70s and 80s, setting up factories in lower cost export oriented 
Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
subsequently into Vietnam. This set of firms, headquartered in industrialized East Asia, 
will deal direct with US buyers and manufacture in Southeast Asia, internalizing part of 
the institutional distance that would be in effect in a direct interface between a US retailer 
and a manufacturer in Indonesia or Vietnam. In fact, these arrangements represent the 





Southeast Asia; for the rest, using sourcing agents, many of them headquartered in Hong 
Kong, seems to be the preferred governance choice for specialty retailers sourcing in 
Vietnam and Indonesia. For most retailers, southeast Asia is the first choice in their quest 
to diversify from a China-centric sourcing base, perceived to be more difficult than China 
on a cognitive basis, especially because of linguistic and cultural distance, and education 
level of the work force. In spite of the reputational legacy of past labor violations by Nike 
suppliers (Locke 2003), and the endemic corruption, the regulative distance with both 
Vietnam and Indonesia appears to be more a nuisance than a concern that would lead 
retailers to distance themselves from manufacturing. 
 Corruption, compliance with labor and safety regulations, and a variety of real 
and perceived barriers to trade have a greater impact in South Asia, leading several 
suppliers to avoid the region altogether, or to distance themselves from the suppliers by 
means of local trade intermediaries, such as the Delhi based Triburg or the large trade 
intermediaries as Li & Fung. By relying on trade intermediaries, the retailers seek both a 
greater level of trade facilitation, to overcome the structural weaknesses of the regional 
manufacturing ecosystem and a degree of plausible deniability in the event of labor law 
violations or factory incidents. Surprisingly in the case of India, the potential advantage 
of an English-speaking workforce, appears to be more than offset by an unyielding cultural 
resistance to the kind of service orientation found in China and in Southeast Asia., and 





RET1: [ in India] I have had both local agent, or regional agents managing 
the factories in the country. There are, sometimes, some good factories, 
that make a good product but they want to make it their way and that’s it. 
They don’t want to embrace some of the customers’ requirement; the 
agent is supposed to help them understand this is what the customer 
wants, you have to do what the customer wants, but I have seen a lot of 
resistance from Indian factories where it’s their way or the highway. 
 The broad governance trends across the three regions lend strong support to 
Proposition 1, which posits that lead buyers would seek to externalize the buyer-supplier 
interface in their GVCs as institutional distance increases. While in the case of FDI, 
entrants in markets characterized with greater distance privilege governance modes that 
internalize distance, enhancing the firm’s control with wholly owned subsidiaries, for 
apparel GVCs the trend seems to run in the opposite direction: lead buyers distance 
themselves from distance, and outsource outsourcing.  
5.4.2 HIGH TRANSACTIONAL DISTANCE  
Apparel sourcing in South Asia seems to be affected by the most serious distance barriers, 
whereby US lead buyers see the greatest institutional distance, and transactions require 
the highest level of facilitation, as is typically provided by trading companies. Bureaucracy, 
regulatory complexity and in India’s case the legacy of protectionism significantly 
complicate transactions, not only for the buyers but for suppliers as well. Large trading 





ITI3: “The problem is that when we bring Wal-Mart into a factory in 
Bangladesh “Here is Wal-Mart, they want to pay 4 dollars for that pant.” 
The first thing the factory does, he turns to our guy and asks “Can you source 
fabric for me?”. In order to meet that 4-dollar price, I need $ 1.20/yard 
fabric. OK? They don’t have the resources to do it.” 
 Despite the profit potential from this trade facilitation, some intermediaries 
blame the regulatory environment, in particular in India, for their inability and 
unwillingness to do business in certain South Asian countries. A former principal of the 
largest US based intermediary pointed at the long-lived limits on foreign ownership to 
49% as a legacy that persists even after the limited was lifted, institutionalized in the 
country’s business culture: “We still can’t buy a free lunch in India.” The challenges for US 
buyers doing business in India surprise many executives who would expect Indian 
suppliers to have a language advantage over Southeast Asian suppliers; this advantage is 
offset by taller business barriers:  
RET1: “It’s certainly baffling in India for example, where the language 
barrier does not exist: just making things happen in India is so problematic. 
You have a lot of surprises; you can’t predict.”  
 One of the challenges, linked to regulatory deficiencies is the import of inputs of 
production (fabric and trim). Another retailer (RET2) lamented that practical trade 





RET2: “We just know that is something that we just avoid because it is too 
complicated: there are trade laws but then there is reality, and everybody 
is paying somebody off to get a box in the country.”    
 While the Indian regulatory system seems to be the barrier that hampers export 
business in the country, limiting its success as an exporter to the US, Bangladesh has had 
greater success in developing a thriving apparel. Duty free status with the European Union 
and an abundant young and inexpensive workforce created the premises for the 
development of a vibrant garment industry, with good institutional support from the 
government. However, poorly defined labor laws, weak enforcement and widespread 
corruption make compliance a greater problem:  
RET3: “With Bangladesh, there are different issues: even if you see the 
factory, you don’t know that your product is going to be manufactured 
there. There is a lot of underhand stuff going on over there, and having an 
agent, I don‘t think is going to necessarily safeguard your product in terms 
of where it is being placed ultimately. So. that is a problem for the brand.” 
RET5: “I would be very concerned [Sourcing in Bangladesh] and would 
make sure I have a very clear view of my supply chain, down to the factory 
itself, and be very diligent and vigilant with factory audits: who is doing the 
factory audit? what are they looking for? who else are they making product 
for? and would probably ramp up the compliance of the factory, for obvious 





collapses and child labor. My preference would be to just stay away 
because there is such a high probability that something awful could 
happen. There are certain products that are appropriate for Bangladesh, 
certain basic products, and it can be very cost effective, but you gotta be 
extremely careful with your due diligence.” 
 As these testimonies suggest, the governance problem in South Asia seems to be 
preceded by the question of whether to source there in the first place, and several 
retailers have indicated an unwillingness to engage suppliers in India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan with principal to principal relationships, due to the institutional weakness of the 
region. The use of large trade intermediaries in these countries gives the retailers a 
solvent counterpart to assume the country risk, and plausible deniability in the event of 
incidents in which serious labor law and safety rules violations occur. As one US 
intermediary reported, the institutional challenges are so grave in the case of Pakistan, 
the world’s fourth largest cotton producer (USDA 2015) that local suppliers have begun 
to migrate to other countries like Turkey and Bahrain to continue to serve their customers 
(RET2). In general, when the retailers must source in India because of the country’s 
specialization in certain embroidered, more boutique-like styles, they to work through an 
experienced local middleman, but not without reservations. Much to my surprise, a top 
US retail executives described even India’s largest and best known sourcing intermediary 






RET3: “I think in India there is some level of corruption in the industry for 
sure. There is corruption in every industry, but I think the apparel industry 
is especially fraught and I believe the agents are the biggest problem, 
because they will place your orders based on which factories they favor, 
with which owners they have the best relationship. The order will go to 
them, and the agent will get some kickbacks for sure. So, they get 6% from 
the US retailer they are working for, and maybe another 6% from the Indian 
factory.”  
One Hong Kong based manufacturer, of Indian ancestry, ascribed his own failed 
attempts to establish a manufacturing base in India to a lack of work ethic and 
to the country’s business culture; this was confirmed by a UK agent based in 
Hong Kong with extensive experience in India who also highlighted the contrast 
in management styles between the UK, and by extension the US, and India in 
these terms:  
AGE2: “In India …  the challenge that I faced … I am a very hands-on/lead 
by example kind of individual and that is not there in the culture for Indian 
management. Indian management style is “I say it - you do it” and that can 
lead to a lot of confusion and finger pointing when things go wrong, maybe 
a lack of ‘ownership’ in those Indian organization. And because I was 
hands-on and wanting to find resolutions as quickly as possible and bring 





because the other Indian senior managers were not necessarily as 
proactive as I was. Their mentality was more about “Well, I am the boss so 
I don’t do the work.” This caused frustration from my side, because I felt 
they should be more involved.” 
 Cultural difference in relation to timeliness of deliveries, considered by US 
managers fatal lack of responsiveness to their needs, and even regarding product quality, 
what a product should look like, what is or isn’t a defect, is interpreted by US buyers as a 
stubborn cognitive resistance to US buyers’ quality standards regarding product 
uniformity. In one telling episode, a Chinese factory, much more attuned with US quality 
standards, preemptively rejected a million-dollar shipment of fine Indian silk fabric it had 
ordered for a US retailer, because the high number of slubs (clots of fiber with a wider 
diameter compared to normal spun yarn) made it off-spec. As retailer involved in this 
debacle recalls, in the ensuing discussions, the Indian silk mill defended his shipment 
because it was “a beautiful fabric”, while the Chinese factory, steadfastly claimed that it 
was not what they ordered. The defective fabric was eventually disposed of by a trade 
intermediary, who placed it in production for a European buyer more acceptant of the 
silk fabric’s natural flaws. Because of the frequency of this type of business culture clashes  
RET6: “There is almost an immediate lack of trust on the part of the Indian 
vendor [supplier] to the retailer and from the retailer to the vendor 





to have moved to a different place in other countries, but in India direct 
[sourcing] doesn’t work very well.” 
 Overall, the participants confirm that lead buyers will externalize the buyer 
supplier interface to third party firms when institutional distance is greatest but also that 
in countries where weak formal institutions, and incompatible business cultures raise 
fundamental transactional barriers, the lead buyer will either not source in the country 
or will source through trade intermediaries, lending support to Proposition 2. Opening 
trade in low wage countries with the highest level of institutional distance between US 
buyers and local suppliers is in fact one of the competitive strengths of the trade 
intermediaries like Li & Fung. One caveat regarding this preference is that it is much 
stronger in the case of US buyers; buyers for European retailers and brands appear to be 
more tolerant of hurdles on the ground and have greater success sourcing directly in 
South Asia. This was brought to my attention by one NY based intermediary whose 
suppliers all over Asia work directly with European buyer but only through intermediaries 
with the US market, raising the question whether institutional distance instantiated at the 
buyer-supplier interface is as much a by-product of US ethnocentric business culture as it 
is of objective hurdles on the ground in the host countries.  
5.4.3 HIGH RELATIONAL DISTANCE  
Countries in which the transactional institutional barriers are especially high such as India 
or Bangladesh make deeper partnerships with suppliers difficult. For the clear majority of 





global value chain, and given the institutional barriers, exchanges remain transactional, 
with the buyers distancing themselves from manufacturing. Among the retailers 
interviewed only one had a significant reliance on Indian suppliers largely due to brand’s 
embroidered styles and more handmade, boutique-like styles for which India is often the 
only source. Because of its critical dependence on Indian manufacturing, this retailer 
differed in governance from the other retailers, seeking direct control over its Indian 
sourcing, with a liaison office in Delhi.   
 For the most part given the marketing demand for novelty and “newness” 
specialty retailers can ill afford distancing themselves entirely from their suppliers. 
According to the CEO of the of largest sourcing intermediary in New York (ITI1), specialty 
apparel retailers are constantly chasing the chaotic signals of fashion in a reactive manner 
because of the length of their development calendar (most are still working on a 40 to 50-
week calendar), and as a result of this chase, they are constantly changing designs and 
quantities for each style, testing the suppliers’ ability to understand requirements and 
execute according to specification, and increasing uncertainty along the whole supply 
chain. Operating under this level of apparent dysfunction requires a higher level of 
cognitive and cultural alignment between buyer and supplier, but above a suitable 
mechanism to establish a working level of trust, considering the diverging needs of 
buyers, seeking maximum flexibility and the suppliers, who seek to reduce commercial 
uncertainty. Trust development, of course, takes time and is ultimately based on 





factors in supplier selection on the part of buyers and in seeking orders, on the suppliers’ 
end:  
AGE1:” I think both sides can be too trusting, it can go too far that way: the 
factories can become too trusting when blinded by an opportunity, a big 
order. They don’t do enough homework to protect themselves, they go in 
over their head before determining whether this is a reliable buyer, do they 
stay on calendar, do they make rational decisions, do they pay on time. And 
I think that buyers, especially when you get outside of sourcing 
professionals, and you get into merchants or you get into design creative, 
or product development people: they will make decisions on placement 
based on something very superficial. They will put the trust in a factory 
because of a beautiful sample or because of a price that is exactly what 
they wanted, and will not look at all the other factors.” 
 This is where a knowledgeable and trustworthy agent can fill the gaps, starting 
from the search barriers associated with supplier selection across great distance, to the 
establishment of trust supporting business practices between the buyer and the supplier. 
In countries like Vietnam and Indonesia more export oriented policies have lowered some 
of the regulative barriers that hamper Bangladesh and India, and local firms show a 
greater customer-centric service orientation in their relations with US retailers. 
Significant barriers to direct buyer-supplier governance persist, however, starting from 





the language barrier and as one retail executive stated (RET1) still the primary reason for 
using local agents. Language barriers make it exceedingly costly to identify and verify 
suppliers and their capabilities remotely, as much information beyond company 
brochures used by the salespeople is not available in English. Past the search barriers, 
there are more serious language and cognitive barriers in terms of understanding and 
shared meaning that limit the ability of US buyers and suppliers in countries like Vietnam 
and Indonesia to deal directly. With few exceptions, English is a second language, if not a 
third language, learned in school and through trade, and although, as most interviewees 
confirmed, the level of English proficiency of industry professionals in these countries is 
fairly good, there are clear limits to their expression range and their true understanding 
of information and instructions as communicated by the buyers. This linguistic distance 
is exacerbated by the behaviors and assumptions of US buyers, who often remain 
culturally insensitive to these barriers: 
AGE1: “My position many times is that of a cultural anthropologist that is 
trying to explain these crazy Americans to the Indonesian factories, and I 
try to explain to the Americans what the factories are trying to get across, 
and what their aims are. It is not immediately apparent because the 
Americans, less in the sourcing staff but in product development, have 
miserable writing skills: when they write, they tend to use a lot of 
shorthand, a lot of idioms that even in a country like Indonesia where the 
English skills can be quite good, but it’s classical book learning … when they 





[laughing] what does this person want me to do???!!!  and I can give you 
so many examples that become increasingly absurd.” 
 Beyond pure semantics, there are deeper cultural barriers to a good mutual 
understanding especially when it comes to the nuances that might distinguish one brand 
from another and that might determine buyer demands that are not intuitively clear to 
the supplier. One agent (ITI2) described her hour-long struggle to explain the differences 
between the Aeropostale brand and other known teen brands to a supplier in Vietnam, 
only to hear the supplier comment, at the end of the meeting “Ah, like Abercrombie.” 
Local agents, typically staffed by a combination of American or British, and local 
management play an essential role in smoothing some of these cultural barrier, and an 
even more important role in monitoring operations once a supplier is selected for a 
program. Sampling, fit approval and finalization of orders are very time consuming, 
involving intensive back and forth between communication from the factories to the 
buyer, with errors and misunderstandings at any step of these process inevitably affecting 
final product quality, and delays in finalization leading to production delays. A locally 
embedded agent is essential in monitoring progress and in early detection and resolution 
of problems along the way because differences in business culture, many of them 
generalizable across the region would make both problem detection and resolution 
arduous relying on direct buyer-supplier communication. The level of employee 
empowerment in Southeast Asian countries is much lower than in US firms; in fact, as the 
sourcing agent I interviewed in Bali emphasized, workers in Indonesia are very diligent 





resolve minor issues themselves. As a result, even small problems need to be elevated to 
senior ranks or ownership in the company, resulting in critical production delays. Visibility 
at the top also exacerbates the effects of another well-known cultural phenomenon seen 
in most Southeast Asian and East Asian countries: the need to save face, and the reticence 
that it engenders when problems inevitably arise. Only a local agent will have the fine-
grained awareness of the inner working at the suppliers and preempt the escalation of 
conflict between the buyer and the supplier. 
AGE1: “Asian workers have a very hard time dealing with, accepting that 
they are at fault: they would rationalize it come up with an excuse, and do 
anything to avoid say we were really wrong here. At all levels, even the 
most senior people, the senior managers – and I would really have to sit 
them down privately, quietly and go through it with them: what did we do 
wrong, what do we wish were had accomplished, let’s learn from this and 
try to fix it. Let’s not try to push back and say it’s not our fault, we didn’t do 
it, because that is a very common reaction that inflames the relationship 
further.” 
 Although sourcing agents are paid by the buyer, they are embedded in the local 
environment and attuned with its business culture, allowing them to be perceived as 
trusted partners by the factories as well, not only because they bring them business, but 
also because of their essential role as interpreters and mediators between two distant 





behalf of the lead buyers, agents are true brokers of trust, the missing ingredient in the 
direct interface between buyer and suppliers. Trust gaps in the global value chain 
emerged in most interviews as the most powerful impediment to the alignment of goals 
and coordination of economic exchange, limiting the potential for partnering between 
parties that are otherwise as mutually dependent such as lead buyers on one end and 
suppliers on the other. Buyers and supplier struggle because buyers don’t understand 
factories very well, and the factories don’t understand what the buyers are trying to say. 
Then, there can’t be trust (MFG2). This is where the sourcing agents fit in:  
AGE3: “I can give you our perspective of buyer and suppliers: what they are 
afraid of is a function of what they want. So, what the buyer desires is that 
product delivered. As you know, this varies, based on their orientation 
towards life, their orientation towards social compliance, quality price and 
all that. Let’s say they want the product, they want performance, they want 
what they ordered on time at the quality and price level that they have 
agreed to. That’s what a buyer wants. Most of our clients [US specialty 
apparel brands] take it a step further: they want it done in a manner, at 
least the ones that hire us, in a socially compliant ethical manner. Not 
everybody does in the world but our clients do. So, that’ s what the client 
wants: they want to source ethically on time at the price they agreed to. 
What the suppliers want, what they are afraid of is that they won’t get 
paid, or that the product gets rejected. Our trust [role] is that we make sure 





 The dynamics of trust itself differ between from buyers to suppliers due to their 
different position in the GVC. The buyers’ top concern is having to make the decision to 
place trust in the competence of suppliers and their ability to perform, with imperfect 
information and the search barriers associated with distance. Suppliers, on the other end, 
fear buyer opportunism: orders being cut or cancelled, as well as bogus quality claims 
resulting in the reduction of payments due, a practice called charge-back, because of poor 
retail results rather than a legitimate issue of supplier performance.  
AGE1: “The supplier is afraid of not getting paid: as I mentioned, it can be 
millions of dollars and it’s incremental: they keep buying fabric, they keep 
making goods but in the course of six months it can be a lot of money, and 
there is no protection other than sheer trust, and performance. If the buyer 
has paid on time in the past you can safely assume that it will happen 
again. Sometimes that doesn’t happen, sometimes there are financial 
problems that you can’t see from the outside.” 
 Suppliers will often question the motives of lead buyers’ quality claims, asking 
agents whether the retailer’s business is slow when quality claims are brought up, or 
goods are rejected (AGE1). Evidence of buyer opportunism also increases the suppliers’ 
distrust of the retailers’ own competence in making product decisions, and in 
understanding the impact that their product development practices and demands have 





AGE1: “Then it’s a cycle of distrust, which leads to lost opportunity, and 
that’s where an agent with a cool head and judgment can come into it. 
What I have found is that with my years and years of experience, and the 
grey hair that comes with it, my opinion was trusted by both sides, so that 
when I would get on the phone with the [retailers’ sourcing executives]; I 
would say look this is the best you are going to get, or these are your 
choices, don’t try to go in that direction because this is the direction you 
need to go, and they could trust my judgment on it. And the same thing 
with the factory: I could tell them ‘you may not want to do this but you 
need to do it’, and they would trust me, because they had been through it 
with me and they knew it would come out ok in the end, or it would be the 
least of many worse choices.”  
 For lead buyers in the specialty apparel space seeking to establish a strong 
alternative sourcing base outside of China, export-oriented economies like Vietnam and 
Indonesia are the first choices, one step above South Asian countries in terms of overall 
ease of doing business in terms of transactional effectiveness. Regulative barriers are 
lower than in Bangladesh and India, especially in the area of labor laws (Verma 2016) and 
worker safety, and an effective agent can be the buyers’ ears and eyes, and their boots 
on the ground, to ensure compliance, as well as performance. Because of their cross-
cultural savvy, and reputation-driven business model, sourcing agents effectively broker 
the buyer-supplier relationship past the cognitive and cultural distance barriers, and play 





Hong Kong manufacturer with factories in Southeast Asia (MFG2), a potential contributor 
to the special role that Hong Kong-based agencies have in managing business in Southeast 
Asia is the dominant role of ethnic Chinese in the region’s garment industry, which 
minimizes intraregional distance challenges, a factor indirectly corroborated by the 
struggles faced when the same agents move from the culturally friendly Southeast Asian 
region, and attempt to manage production in South Asia,  on behalf of the same retailers 
(RET1, AGE1). As several retailers indicated in the interviews, sourcing through agents is 
the dominant governance mode in Vietnam and Indonesia (and in the past Thailand, now 
a minor exporter) where the barriers to exchange are primarily relational, lending 
support to Proposition 3.   
5.4.4 GOING DIRECT IN EAST ASIA  
China, Hong Kong, S. Korea and Taiwan a group of countries where the benefits of direct 
buyer to supplier relationships can outweigh the governance costs. In reality, we are 
talking about two distinct set of countries based on their institutional and economic 
characteristics: Hong Kong, S. Korea and Taiwan on one hand, and mainland China. The 
Asian Tigers are now high income, highly developed nations, with well-developed 
institutions and established rule of law that were the original host countries of garment 
production. Some of their most successful garment manufacturers were also pioneers in 
country migration when domestic labor costs became unsustainable as a result of their 
rapid economic growth in the 70s and 80s. Hong Kong, Korean and Taiwanese garment 
suppliers invested aggressively in southeast Asian setting up factories in Malaysia, 





commercial control of the relationship with global buyers at their original headquarters. 
As my host at Li & Fung illustrated in the management presentation that I was invited to 
attend, Hong Kong firms naturally privileged expansion into China, establishing 
manufacturing in the nine provinces of the Pearl River Delta. This special class of mega 
suppliers like Tai Nan Enterprises, the TAL group, Esquel ranging in size between US$ 300 
MM to over US$ 1 billion.   
RET4: “The guys [suppliers] that we invite over to brainstorm and do 
problem solving in [key vendor meetings], are not coming off the factory 
floor and sitting down with us … these are very educated owners, a lot of 
them very westernized. They all know what we are talking about – and they 
know their business better than anybody else.” 
 China, which has opened its economy in the late 70s and facilitated the 
development of a dominant garment manufacturing sector in its special economic zones, 
especially in the Guangdong province, in the municipalities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Dongguan. China’s immediate success in the apparel industry was the result of a 
combination of abundant disciplined, low wage labor, government policy and the strength 
of Hong Kong intermediaries and their entrepôt trade. When China opened to the world 
as a provider of cheap labor for offshored and outsourced manufacturing, retailers from 
the US rushed to establish liaison offices and fully staffed sourcing offices to take 
advantage of the sourcing opportunity, creating an intensity of direct and mediated 
exchanges between US buyers and Chinese factories. One of the retail executives 





she was given the opportunity to live in Hong Kong for almost a year, and manage her 
employer’s production in China, dealing with Hong Kong agents and directly with Chinese 
factories, shuttling back and forth between Kowloon and factories in Guangzhou, driving 
on dirt roads still filled with bicycles and ox-drawn carts.  
 Frequency of travel to Hong Kong and into China, and sheer length of stay created 
a generation of sourcing executives in the US comfortable doing business in China, and a 
management class both in China and Hong Kong prepared to take the challenge head-on. 
In addition to an ecosystem that facilitated exchange, thanks in part to trade through 
Hong Kong, and to government policies in China aimed at transforming China into an 
industrial powerhouse, the most enterprising Chinese suppliers were forced early on to 
upgrade their service capabilities to overcome the quota limitation imposed by the Multi 
Fibre Agreement. Companies like the Limited working initially with Li & Fung (Fung, Fung 
et al. 2007), and subsequently through its own sourcing company MAST Industries, 
experimented in transferring more ancillary and service functions to the low cost factories 
that were manufacturing their garments (RET2). By the time quotas were eliminated in 
2005, the Chinese apparel industry as a whole had established itself as the “easy button” 
of apparel sourcing. These superior service capabilities, institutional support in trade 
financing, infrastructural development and relatively efficient goods markets facilitated 
the emergence of a whole class of suppliers with whom retailers can work directly, either 
form headquarters or through Hong Kong sourcing offices. While the traditional Hong 
Kong office have become expensive to maintain and overall ineffective is serving the lead 





China-centric sourcing strategy; the retailers with a strong preference for direct sourcing 
source over 60% of their product in China and still maintain large Hong Kong offices, in 
what becomes a self-perpetuating cycle:   
AGE1:” The buying offices … again, it depends on how much they are willing 
to put into it, but there are some excellent people there [in Hong Kong]. The 
problems start when you leave Hong Kong and China: it’ s almost a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The retailers put weak people in the offshore 
[peripheral] offices, they put the communication through Hong Kong, and 
sometime they get around to passing the information to the offshore office 
in the middle of the afternoon and things [fall through the cracks] - and 
guess what … “we can’t work in Indonesia, Sri Lanka is hopeless, forget 
about Bangladesh … let’s just go back to China!”  And everybody is happy 
again – except the sourcing manager who is trying to diversify! It’s really 
an uphill battle.” 
 Cultural barriers persist, and both the opacity of close Chinese trust networks and 
the reticence in Chinese communication styles clash with US direct and low context 
communication style:  
RET5: “I found that in general transparency is a challenge in China, not only 
with vendors but also with agents, and suppliers; it’s almost like a cultural 





 However, Chinese business people show some sophistication in using this to their 
advantage, helping overcome the cross-cultural gaps between them and US buyers, 
especially when the latter become overly analytical and data-driven in their negotiations:  
AGE1: “The Chinese are the consummate diplomats: they can manage to 
get things done without offending anyone. This is where the Chinese excel: 
they understand that they have to figure out a way to make things happen; 
they have to figure out a way to make it look like they are compromising. 
For example, on pricing, as the brands [lead buyers] have become more 
sophisticated, they have become more granular in the way they look at 
pricing: they look at the cuts and make, they look at the buttons and they 
add it all up and they come up with a figure that they think is fair. And the 
[Chinese] factory knows that and then starts to manipulate it – because it 
doesn’t really matter to the factory: they want to get to 10 dollars per unit 
and they don’t care if it’s four in labor and six in fabric. So, a skilled 
merchandiser at a factory will finesse these numbers to get to the buyer’s 
target. The buyer walks away feeling happy because they achieved what 
they need, and the factory walks away happy because they stayed within 
their range. But it isn’t necessarily as precise as the buyer thinks it is…”   
 While all three governance modes have pros and cons, virtually all specialty 
apparel retailers I interviewed have expressed a desire to retain a degree of direct control 





expressed the strongest preference for direct control over sourcing (RET4) find itself in 
fact limited to sourcing from the “super vendors” based in Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
and from a handful of large full-service factories in China, a key vendor strategy that 
allocates 75-80% of the production in dollar value to 10-15 key suppliers based in these 
East Asian countries. For most other retailers who pursue a more hybrid sourcing strategy, 
the governance in China is more of a mix between agent-managed and direct sourcing, 
with the latter prevalent in Southern China (RET1). Overall industrial maturity, an 
educated and experienced work force, and institutional development in Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and in coastal China lower the transactional and relational barriers for US lead 
buyers, making the direct governance mode relatively frequent. While the overall 
governance in China remains a hybrid, with plenty of relationships buyer-supplier 
relationships managed through intermediaries, China, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan 
constitute the only Asian region in which a direct sourcing strategy can be successfully 
implemented, lending support to Proposition 4.  
5.5 SUPPLIER CAPABILITIES   
The second research question of this study concerns the influence of supplier capabilities 
on the governance choice. The extant literature (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005) on GVC 
looks at suppliers’ capabilities primarily in terms of control: the lower the supplier 
capabilities, the greater the level of control that the lead buyer seeks to exercise, primarily 
through hierarchical governance through direct investment, or captive contract 





sectors like consumer electronics or auto parts sector, in which fewer, more specification 
driven products with tighter tolerances are offshored in the case of the specialty apparel 
industry, as discussed previously, because of the sheer number of distinct SKUs and the 
constant changes in style, direct investment is virtually non-existent, and captive 
governance undesirable for both buyers and suppliers. Since all production is outsourced 
offshore to third party suppliers, I look at governance from a different perspective: the 
degree of internalization of the cross-border buyer-supplier interface. From this 
perspective, I propose that suppliers with better production and service capabilities have 
greater strategic value for the lead-buyer, who capture it by internalizing the interface, 
through direct sourcing. Suppliers with less valuable capabilities are used solely or 
primarily for their production capacity, they have less strategic value, and the interface is 
more commonly outsourced to specialized middlemen, either sourcing agents or trade 
intermediaries.  
 The general pattern that I seek to verify is a positive correlation between supplier 
capabilities and the lead buyers’ internalization of the buyer-supplier interface. To do so, 
it is necessary to identify a continuum of supplier capabilities that can be correlated with 
the degree of internalization of the governance. In consideration of the highly 
transactional and relational nature of the apparel GVC, and in parallel to the analysis 
applied to institutional distance, I look at suppliers’ transactional and relational 
capabilities, trying to assess how the capability sets cluster in the apparel global value 





possible to correlate each cluster with a predominant governance mode, and possibly one 
in which the lead-buyer’s governance preference matches that of the supplier.  
 Supplier selection hinges on the priority each retailer places on price, quality and 
speed, and the trade-offs that the retailer is willing to make among them; as one industry 
veteran emphasized (AGE1), compliance has now become a non-negotiable fourth factor 
in the sourcing decision. To ensure the appropriate supplier mix, suppliers undergo a 
length approval process either directly or through the buyers’ agents, and their 
performance monitored and routinely assessed in supplier scorecards; the workload 
imposed by these practices is such that the use of agents, and limiting the number of 
interfaces through supplier consolidation are often necessary:  
RET6: “An important tenet of how we approach our supply chain is that, as 
we go through each one of our product categories, we want to be more 
important to fewer suppliers [includes MGF, and intermediary]. At the 
same time, we want to make sure that the supplier is relevant to the 
category, so we go through each of our product categories, and for each 
category we have anywhere between three and five suppliers, it’s not 
broad, and that may make up 70-80% of the business, and then there are 
a couple of ancillary suppliers that fill in as needed from the trend 
standpoint.” 
 Virtually all specialty apparel retail executives interviewed stressed the value of 





budgets; if we look at the coding map for the supplier capabilities portion of the 
interviews (Figure 5.7), to high capability suppliers with whom direct sourcing is possible 
receive much greater attention than lower capabilities suppliers, for whom the interface 
is outsourced. This interest does not necessarily correspond to a greater volume of trade, 
as agents and intermediaries still manage significant portions of the supplier 
relationships, but it reflects the strategic importance for the retailer not to distance 
themselves entirely from production. 
 
Figure 5.6 Coding Map for Supplier Capabilities 
 
 
 Part of this strategic interest rests on the need to focus on core activities, which 
for specialty apparel retailers are first and foremost in design, brand development and 





factory stores, and e-tailing. Multi-channel retailing increases the complexity of the 
supply chain and its associated management costs, and makes the retailers critically 
dependent on outsourced services, even in core activities that define the brand. 
RET1: “We usually look for vendors and factories with some R&D design 
capabilities. Even though we have our own design team for apparel, we still 
want our supplier to provide design support, to be able to either reinterpret 
concepts, or come up with concepts. That is very important, so if it’s just a 
good factory that makes fine clothing good quality clothing, that’s not 
enough for us.” 
RET6: “As a business, we’ve got to be plugged into newness. If a supplier 
has a new manufacturing capability, whether in apparel, or in jewelry, or 
footwear or whatever it is, we have to be able to plug into that, because 
that’s where the trend is from the business standpoint.”   
 There is little doubt that the governance mode choice is heavily influenced by the 
supplier capabilities; not only are retailers quite explicit about their desire to transfer 
greater service responsibilities onto capable suppliers in a direct buyer-supplier 
relationship, but the suppliers themselves who invest heavily in the desired design, 
production and service capabilities do so with the expressed intent to cut off the 
intermediary, wherever possible. This expressed preference is not so much driven by 
transactional economics, since the cost of these investments in capabilities eventually 





and coordination, the reduction of business uncertainty and avoiding the “loss in 
translation” and the information asymmetry which characterize mediated exchanges. 
Moving down the ladder of capabilities, suppliers enlist the support of agents and trade 
intermediaries, distancing themselves from suppliers with limited or no strategic value 
beyond production capacity. The behaviors, strategies and expressed views of virtually all 
participants suggest that lead buyers will seek to internalize the buyer-supplier interface 
as supplier capabilities increase lending strong support to Proposition 5.  
5.5.1 SUPPLIER TRANSACTIONAL CAPABILITIES  
Outsourced garment production started as a low labor cost chase: because it is still a labor 
-intensive production, in the 60s US retailers and apparel brands began to outsource in 
low-wage, non-unionized developing economies, like Taiwan, Hong Kong and S. Korea. 
The original form of contract manufacturing involved buyer purchasing fabric and trim 
that would be cut and made into garments in offshore factories, according to the buyer’s 
specification. In this type of arrangement, known as CM (Cut & Make) or CMT (Cut Make 
& Trim), the factory’s capabilities might be limited to cutting and sewing, with the buyer 
supplying the raw materials, and then picking up the goods at the factory and arranging 
for their shipment. Over the years CMT suppliers have evolved and in general they will 
now purchase fabric and trim, make the garments and load them in a container for 
shipment, relieving the buyer from much of the micro-management of their orders. 
Outside of small subcontractors used by some suppliers to manage their order overflows, 





RET1: “In Asia to my knowledge there aren’t really any factories that are 
working on a CM basis: they are all full package. In North Africa, there are 
still some, and the agent will manage them.” 
 Full package suppliers represent the lower end of the spectrum of transactional 
capabilities in the specialty apparel GVC, offering basic value for a low price. Virtually no 
specialty apparel retailer works directly with full package suppliers, but they all tap on 
them for production capacity through intermediaries, as part of their modular supply 
base. Trade intermediaries reduce marketing costs and mitigate commercial risk for these 
suppliers who would be otherwise at the mercy of buyer opportunism, they manage the 
inbound logistics of raw materials and the shipment and delivery of the goods; on 
occasion, trade intermediaries like Li & Fung will also act as lenders of last resort. Large 
manufacturing MNCs, the mega-suppliers, also tap on the manufacturing capacity of basic 
full package suppliers to manage order overflow, or to meet particularly tight price 
targets; in these instance these MNCs function more as intermediaries than as 
manufacturers.   
MGF1: “[on contract work] we are almost working on a CMT basis because 
we would nominate the mill, and place the yarn order for them. Them 
having an international scope? I don’t want that; I don’t want competitors. 
I don’t want [factories] that are focusing their effort on things we can do. I 





 From the transactional capabilities perspective, a separate class of suppliers has 
evolved in Asia, upgrading their product and service capabilities to meet the increasing 
requirement of US specialty retailers: the full-service supplier. Virtually all lead buyers at 
US specialty retailers have explicitly indicated a set of high expectations from full service 
suppliers, looking at them for both complementary and supplementary capabilities, as 
summarized by one veteran sourcing executive, with experience at five different Top 50 
retailers:  
RET1: “Full service means: [product] development, creative design, fabric 
research, trim (raw material research, as we call it), and then they produce 
it for you, So, ideally we are looking for that end-to-end capability, with 
speed and flexibility. How quickly they can create and produce a product, 
develop a product? Do they have a compatible mentality with our business 
model? Are they innovative? Are they constantly looking for new ways to 
work? That’s really important to us, that continuous improvement mindset, 
that they are constantly reinventing their business, not standing still, not 
becoming stagnant.”   
 Although East Asia may have a larger number of full service suppliers, these 
capabilities are sufficiently distributed across the sourcing regions; as one retail executive 
confirmed (RET5), there full service suppliers for each product category in multiple 





also of European brands, whose sourcing has a different geographic distribution, with a 
stronger presence in India and Bangladesh. 
5.5.2 SUPPLIER RELATIONAL CAPABILITIES  
Besides the basic manufacturing and service capabilities, suppliers can be distinguished 
based on the geographic scope of their business social capital and its global reach. Given 
the relatively low capital intensity of garment production, there will be a significant 
number of local entrepreneurs setting up garment factories in China, Southeast Asia and 
South Asia. As the CEO of the world’s largest shirt manufacturer (MFG2) explained, a Juki 
sewing machine, one the industry standard piece of equipment, will cost between one 
and two thousand dollars depending on its specifications, and a basic mid-size factory 
with three hundred sewing machines can produce 40-50,000 units a week, enough to fulfil 
sizeable orders from global buyers and possibly add capacity. These factories tend to be 
embedded in local business networks, and don’t have great depth in the supply chain, with 
limited access to suppliers of raw materials and to trade finance. In the experience of 
several sourcing executives, these factories may be owned by people who have limited 
international experience, uncomfortable speaking English making business with overseas 
buyers difficult. These locally embedded suppliers are not necessarily small in size and 
scope of business; as one Indonesian sourcing agent noted:  
AGE1: “In Indonesia, the factories were always big; Indonesia never had 
that workshop mentality. The factories are minimum one thousand 





Indonesians didn’t have was the marketing, so they were really depending 
on the agents and the buying offices to get them the orders.” 
 Locally embedded factories of this scale may upgrade their transactional 
capabilities, whereby they are capable of doing fabric research, and of providing product 
development and technical design support to their clients, thus offering full service 
capabilities, but in many cases they fail to develop strong connections with global fabric 
and trim suppliers, and to invest in the quality of staff necessary to work independently 
as a global supplier. Other firms have made that qualitative leap, becoming globally 
integrated suppliers, pursuing deliberate strategies to become globally integrated in raw 
materials markets, in fashion trends, in production technology, and in marketing. One 
large sweater manufacturer highlighted the scope and expense associated with this 
strategy:   
MFG1: “We have an office in New York; it’s a small office, of course we are 
very concerned with the cost. Our strategy is we want whatever job needs 
to be done we want to make sure it’s done right, but also at the lowest cost. 
So we are in China, Hong Kong and in the States. In the States it’s 5 people 
managing 150 MM dollars in business.They are very focused: they are the 
interface with part of it. But some of the interface is direct with Hong Kong 
[retailers travel], and part of it we’ll be moving direct to China, in time; we 





 While the largest manufacturing MNCs are all globally integrated suppliers, size is 
not the only the determinant of global intergration; retailers have given several examples 
during the interviews of relatively small firms that are well plugged in with suppliers,  that 
keep abreast with global fashion trends and stay technologically current. As much as size, 
specialization and firm leadership seem to be the driving forces behind strategies of global 
integration.  
5.5.3 SUPPPLIER CAPABILITIES AND GOVERNANCE 
 
Interviews with sourcing executives in all roles seem to confirm the model’s assumption 
on clustering of supplier capabilities and that suppliers can be divided into three broad 
classes based on their transactional and relational capabilities, ordered here from lower 
to higher: 
1. Locally embedded full package suppliers  
2. Locally embedded full service suppliers  
3. Globally integrated full service suppliers  
 The key question that this research needs to answer is whether these three 
clusters are sufficiently distinct in their characteristics and their competitive advantage to 
engender different governance preferences. The evidence points at a strategic 
convergence of suppliers, intermediaries and lead buyers in terms governance modes, 
whereby the lead buyers’ preference matches the suppliers’ preference, with the 
intermediary firms specializing to operate in the governance space defined by this set of 






5.5.3.1 LOCALLY EMBEDDED - FULL PACKAGE SUPPLIERS 
This first set of firms bring production capacity to the market, and have a cost competitive 
advantage due to their limited investment in other capabilities. There are many of these 
suppliers in every sourcing country, and due to their sheer number and their limited value 
added, they are typically managed by third party firms:  
RET1: “Just the cut and make? That’s really a model that has largely gone 
away in our area, in our industry, where you would just contract with a 
factory to cut the fabric and sew it. Now they expect the [middleman] and 
factory relationship to manage the whole thing purchase the raw material 
on our behalf, finance it, purchase the trim finance the trim and really 
manage it end-to-end, with all the resources need to do that, including 
technical resources, and then ship it. So that we don’t have to hire those 
people to do it.”   
 These full package suppliers themselves have limited capabilities to fend 
for themselves in the global markets and rely on trade intermediaries for orders. 
Not all the full package suppliers are small, but the large ones are typically larger 
in scale but narrow in scope, focusing on capacity expansion rather than service 
extension. This narrow focus of production capacity can lead to issues in 
compliance with labor and safety laws, leading US lead buyers to distance 





trade intermediary firms (MFG1) like LI & Fung that specialize in managing 
production in this environment, and bring to market an extensive network of full 
package suppliers. Virtually all retailers have expressed little interest in 
establishing relationships in the full package manufacturing space, and seek to 
distance themselves completely from direct contact with the supplier; the 
frequency of references to the CMT/Full package suppliers in the coding map 
(Figure 5.7) is in large part due to my prompting in seeking to define suppliers’ 
characteristics, and to references to the past. Overall, interviews with both 
retailers and intermediaries show that full package suppliers are best managed 
through trade intermediaries, lending strong support to Proposition 6.  
5.5.3.2 LOCALLY EMBEDDED - FULL SERVICE SUPPLIERS 
A smaller number of factories which accounts however for a significant portion of total 
supply have upgraded their manufacturing quality as well as the scope of their service 
capabilities in terms of design support, fit approval process, and fabric development. 
Some of them specialize in a single product category and pride themselves with their 
manufacturing quality and technological leadership, but in many instances they remain 
owner managed, locally embedded, lacking the organizational depth necessary to 
establish and maintain a direct connection with the lead buyers. While their 
manufacturing capabilities make them strategically important for the lead buyers, who 
may book critical programs with them, these firms lack the international business 
connections, and can’t contribute a sophisticated perspective on global trends that would 





facilities, they are still contract manufacturers at heart. This is best exemplified by 
description that one retailer offered of a multimillion-dollar linen program produced in a 
Thai factory:  
RET5: “[The agent] he brokered the fabric transaction, all the negotiation 
and all the arrangements, it was not the factory. And not that the factory 
was not potentially capable of doing it, but it was an established 
relationship with one of the better linen weavers in Northern Ireland and 
the owner of the agency was in Ireland a lot, six to eight times a year. He 
was there all the time following up on our business because there was so 
much yardage we committed to in the course of the year, that it was 
important for him to be personally present, troubleshooting and making 
sure that nothing was going to go amiss in the delivery.” 
 This highlighted lack of global connections with fabric suppliers, as well as an 
overall limited ‘ownership’ of the overall sourcing process limits the value of direct 
relationships for the lead buyer. This is the domain in which agents excel, supplementing 
and complementing the suppliers’ capabilities, linking buyers and suppliers in a triangular 
relationship, mediating between the two parties and monitoring and managing 
production with ‘boots on the ground’ (RET1). These suppliers are quite valuable to the 
buyers because of their product quality and overall service capabilities, but the interface 
remains difficult, and is best managed by sourcing agents like Hong Kong based W.E. 
Connor; their economic importance is underscored by the willingness of many of the 





agents with these suppliers. With few exceptions, the lead buyers will not pursue direct 
governance; at the same time niether the suppliers nor the buyers will accept complete 
separation, making sourcing through agent the preferred governance mode, lending 
support to Proposition 7. 
5.5.3.3 GLOBALLY INTEGRATED - FULL SERVICE SUPPLIERS 
Over the past few decades several world class garment suppliers emerged primarily as 
the result of two separate drivers. Some Chinese suppliers that integrate textile and 
garment operations, whether state or privately owned, have reached a very large scale 
and sophisticated production capabilities, with strong institutional support at central and 
provincial level; although a number of these companies are classified as “self-exporting” 
by their trade association, the China National Garment Association, in many cases they 
still work through affiliated trading companies or through agents because of service gaps 
and because of their local embeddedness in Chinese business networks. Technology and 
scale are not the only requirements to become a direct supplier and the most successful 
firms have grown organically adding capacity and gaining greater global business 
sophistication over time: many of them are the heirs of the original contract 
manufacturers in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong who have established productive 
facilities in China, and Southeast Asia becoming true garment manufacturing MNCs. 
Second generation owners were often educated at top UK and US universities, bringing 
modern management practices to their firms, along with a sophisticated understanding 
of the global retail and fashion business, and of the global buyers’ product and service 





manufacturing technology, and become trusted suppliers with leadership role in 
corporate social responsibility and compliance, but they have invested in ICT, introducing 
buyer-supplier interfaces to reduce interface human errors such as fully developed EDI 
(MFG1), and to minimize the bullwhip effect (MFG2) such as Vendor Managed Inventory 
(WMI). Besides the valuable systems integration, these firms have become the ‘easy 
button’ in sourcing for their categories, thanks to their superior production capabilities, 
their innovation and knowledge of markets and trends:  
RET2: “Full service suppliers have a front of the house that can design for 
you, but for them to do that they are going to either need operations in the 
US or travel a lot to the US to interact directly with the buyers, not so much 
with the sourcing people, but with the buyers and the merchants, through 
the retailers’ sourcing people, because the sourcing people are like the 
quarterback of the transaction. Full service factories now have people who 
can do all that.”  
RET6: “They develop in their own factories. We co-source fabrics, but 
sometime they bring their own developments to the table, but they perform 
a very similar function to that of MGF (a major sourcing agent and 
intermediary) but only for one product category. We have a similar vendor 
in dresses, and in knit tops. Our LDP (landed duty paid) suppliers are those 
that fall in this realm of suppliers who can deliver a full package, including 





 Supplier evolution driven in part by the desire of both buyers and suppliers to cut 
the middleman, and by developing superior relational capabilities these global suppliers 
eliminate their dependency on third-party firms for placement, and equally important to 
the buyer eliminate the loss in translation that characterizes all mediated exchanges: 
RET3: “Some large factories have become more like agents over time. 
When I was working on the collection for [large womenswear brand], I used 
to work with two factories in Korea that were cut and sewn knits; one of 
them had become so large and so capable that we started working directly 
with them. They placed a product development (PD) team for us in-house, 
they bought two or three knit mills so that they could service us right from 
the beginning with the fabric development from the mill: if we wanted a 
certain type of knit fabric, they would make it for us. The PD got to a very 
sophisticated level where their people would go to Pitti Filati [a yarn trade 
show in Europe] and other shows, and bring back development and then 
develop things for us. It cut back our cycle time, and they took on a large 
expense in developing for us.” 
 Sourcing agents feel the sting of competition as they face the loss of suppliers that 
might have worked through them in the past but have now upgraded to direct sourcing: 
AGE1:” The big multinational factory groups, or trading companies like the 
Korean, the Taiwanese, TAL, Esquel [HK based Esquel Group], some 





manufacturing all over the world so …  are they factories? are they agents? 
are they trading companies? They are falling into a hybrid role, and that 
results in a lot of turf wars.”  
 MFG2, the CEO of a Hong Kong based manufacturing MNC with factories in China, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, has invested significant resources in 
upgrading his quality systems and in becoming a full-service supplier to many of the top 
global apparel brands, and now 95% of his business is direct and only 5% through agents 
or intermediaries. He emphasizes the potential gains from positioning himself as a direct 
supplier: 
MFG2: “Customers [lead buyers] look at quality and say “I am really going 
to reward factories for having certain quality standards, and below a 
certain level I don’t care if they are cheap I am going to move away from 
them.” They give a strategic plan to manufacturers and say “I am trying to 
rout, to kick out the cost of inspection. I want ‘right-first-time’, I am going 
to reduce my inspection costs, I am going to vet the suppliers; it might cost 
me more money upfront, but you know what? all that back-end trouble I 
face, all the inspection costs, all the issues when the goods get to the US? 
All gone.” So, people who have that strategy I find manage to reduce their 
overall costs. It doesn’t matter in what country they manufacture: they 
overall cost comes down. And that strategy can only happen, in my mind, 





 For retailers and brands with a strong global preference for direct buyer-supplier 
governance, there is a sufficient number of globally integrated full service suppliers in 
most product categories to make it possible; one such buyer, who unabashedly describes 
her company, a US$ 2 billion US womenswear brand,  as a “tough first date” and with an 
industry reputation as a “difficult” buyer, places the lion share of its production directly 
with a group key suppliers with facilities in China, Vietnam and Indonesia: 
RET4:” Our top 15 suppliers produce about 75% of our goods. These are our 
partners: they know they are going to get business from us so they are 
willing to work with us. Are you opening a new facility? You are going to 
undergo the same rigor and audits, but we know you well enough, you are 
not Alex coming in with his earrings from his factory on Broadway. So, we 
focus so much on that relations, the top 15 are hugely important for us. We 
know everything about them, they’ll do work for us, they’ll develop, they 
really partner with us. They know they are going to get business from us.”  
 As these comments highlight, lead buyers and these globally integrated full service 
suppliers seek a direct governance mode for their interface strongly supporting 
Proposition 8. 
5.6 INSTITUTIONAL BROKERAGE  
The third research question in this study concerns lead buyers’ agency, the different forms 





governance of the global value chains. In my theoretical model, institutional brokerage is 
the strategic response of lead buyers bridging the transactional and relational barriers to 
exchange imposed by institutional distance, and because institutional distance is 
instantiated at the individual buyer-supplier interface, it is simultaneously a response to 
bridge supplier capability gaps. From the methodological perspective one of the greatest 
challenges in the interviews presented itself in trying to distinguish country level activities 
and capabilities associated with institutional brokerage from those that operate strictly 
at the buyer-supplier interface. Separating the two proved impervious because the dyadic 
buyer-supplier dynamic is operationally much more salient to buyers, suppliers and 
intermediaries than cross-country dynamics; this was also reflected in the tally of nodes 
directly addressing the three propositions related  to institutional brokerage, whereby 
only proposition 10, concerning the reinforcing effect of  institutional brokerage on 
supplier capabilities registered a significant response level.  
 From the analytical perspective, dividing institutional brokerage into its 
transactional and relational components, to parallel the treatment afforded to 
institutional distance and supplier capabilities, provides insights into its distinct effects at 
country level and at supplier level as a matter of strategic choice. Although one can 
conceive the level of lead buyer’s investment in institutional brokerage activities and 
capabilities along a continuum, strategic choices with regard to the role of the global value 
chain and the allocation of costs to it, tend to cluster lead buyers in three main camps: 
firms with low investment, lead buyers focused on transactional institutional brokerage,  





executives interviewed fall into one of the latter two camps, but there are brands like 
Tommy Hilfiger that have chosen to simplify their global value chains to a single interface 
with intermediary powerhouses like Li & Fung, avoiding much of the complexity and 
expense involved in interfacing with suppliers. 
 In broad terms, lead buyers engaged in transactional institutional brokerage seem 
to have choces a strategy that resolves the challenges imposed by cognitive and business 
culture distance at the supplier level, following a systems based, more traditional supply 
chain management approach of minimizing transaction costs, including supplier 
rationalization. The routines and practices used and skills set developed, fall in the 
traditional contract manufacturing management, and tend to be more directional  and 
more punitive to suppliers in the event of quality problems or shipment delays. The 
transactional focus seems to come at the expense of activities and capabilities that lower 
country level cognitive and normative distance barriers, thus opening up a broader 
supplier base. This country level skill set is the focus of relational institutional brokerage, 
which represents a significant inivestment in human capital on the part of the lead buyer 
to create a sourcing team and a corporate business culture that facilitates tapping on the 
capabilities of suppliers in a wider arange of countries.  
5.6.1 TRANSACTIONAL INSTITUTIONAL BROKERAGE  
Any dismissal of institutional distance as a key factor in the apparel global value chain, is 
belied by the organizational complexity and by the cost incurred in overcoming it. This is 





that at the time of the interview, had 270 people working in its Hong Kong sourcing office, 
and a little over 80 sourcing managers and executives in their New York office to manage 
the flow of over two-thousand orders a year, at an estimated fixed cost greater than US$ 
50 MM, about 5% of the cost of goods sold. This number does not include the cost of two 
other critical groups of managers and executives who are also involved in the transactions 
and in the relationships with suppliers, directly and through the Hong Kong office: the 
merchant teams for each division and the creative and technical designers, who are also 
involved in the transactions and in the relationships with suppliers. As discussed 
previously, institutional distance in the GVC has a transactional and a relational 
dimension; correspondingly, the lead buyers’ strategic response to it can focus on either 
one of these dimensions, with distinct governance and performance outcomes. We could 
characterize transactional institutional brokerage as a systems-oriented solution focused 
on fool- and fail-proofing the transactions; this focus appears to be highly desired by the 
most capable suppliers for whom the accuracy and detail of the purchase order is 
essential. Transactional institutional brokerage tends to be a systems-based approach to 
overcome the costs imposed by institutional distance and by supplier capability gaps, and 
in this sense, it is related to traditional supply chain management solutions. In this study, 
I try to break it down in some of its components and to analyze the impact that investment 
or lack thereof, and reliance on it can have in the lead buyers’ choice of governance mode 






5.6.1.1 CONTRACTS AND IT SYSTEMS  
In the development of my theoretical model I have identified a few key transactional 
factors that can influence governance: systems and technology, routines and standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), order processing and contracts. During the interviews, it 
became clear that these factors are not perceived as equally important; not surprisingly, 
given the transactional pressure on participants in the apparel GVC, the attention of lead 
buyers, intermediaries and manufacturers appears to be more focused on factors that 
help move individual transaction forward, and the approach to the buyer-supplier 
interface more reactive than proactive. This may be due in part with somewhat 
crystallized perceptions of institutional distance as sticky and pervasive; although 
suppliers in most of the GVC host countries have matured in their ability to do business 
with US companies, some of the institutional barriers to conducting business in the host 
countries, such as the rule of law, and law enforcement have not evolved at the same 
pace, while demands and expectations from US lead buyers have increased. The hurdles 
to doing business with suppliers in all three regions cannot in general be overcome with 
contracts, a reflection of shakier rule of law and uneven law enforcement, that feeds into 






Figure 5.7 Coding Map for Transactional Institutional Brokerage  
 
 Contracts could facilitate direct sourcing, but end up being more important 
between US lead buyers and agents or intermediaries based in Hong Kong, where the 
common law legal system supports them, and much more infrequent in the relationship 
with suppliers in the various Asian host countries. A Hong Kong based sourcing agent 
indicated that references and experience of his staff are his primary tools to limit risk 
when starting new business relationships:   
AGE3: “A third tool that we use is contracts. We contract what we verbally 
say we are going to do in a legally binding contract, which works more with 
the American firms, with Australians, and with the UK – I guess western, if 





retailers or brands. That contractual tool is uncommonly used in China; of 
course, there are some sophisticated businesses in China, but they typically 
go direct with that model [contracts].”  
 Law enforcement and legal remedies remain a great concern when the jurisdiction 
is in a country with a weak judicial system, and discriminatory application of the law, as 
agents and several buyers with extensive regional experience suggest is still the case in 
China and in Southeast Asia. Overall, any insistence of lead buyers on using contracts 
seems to be more symptomatic of a desire to separate themselves from production and 
their GVC than it is an effective solution to institutional distance or to supplier capabilities 
gaps.  
 The use of information systems and technology to lower transactional barriers and 
to facilitate exchanges of information with suppliers is another supply chain management 
approach that somewhat surprisingly does not receive great attention from US retailers. 
The development of fool proof systems for the transfer of production specification and 
for real-time tracking of the progress of production programs should favor direct buyer-
supplier interfaces but they have only been embraced by retailers at the product level, 
with systems designed to codify and transfer product specifications. For the rest, most us 
lead buyers report that retailers’ information systems tend to serve internal management 
functions in critical areas of financial and retail control, rather than being relational, 
providing seamless interfaces with direct suppliers and with the intermediaries that 





reports published in the trade press (KSA 2016), some retail executives were outright 
dismissive of the value of investment in interface systems: 
RET4: “Investment in supply chain technology is not going to generate 
sales. You can make an argument for it that, it will save costs and 
headcount, but you must be really well-planned to implement it, and you 
are never increasing sales with it.”  
 Not surprisingly, investment in interface EDI and middleware to communicate 
across platforms is more extensive on the part of trade intermediaries, as exemplified by 
proprietary systems developed by Li & Fung to interface with over 12,000 suppliers in 41 
countries and with hundreds of buyers in the US and in the EU (ITI3), and at the level of 
the large manufacturing MNCs, who invest in the necessary technologies to cut the 
middleman (MFG1, MFG2). One large sweater manufacturer lamented the lack of 
adequate EDI systems at one of the US top 3 big box retailers as the reason that made 
direct governance unmanageable:  
MFG1: “So, we spoke to [Big Box retailer] and they said, if you want to go 
direct with us that’s fine. It was the biggest nightmare because they are 
not set up to do it. I remember just setting up EDI – I was up every night 
two hours a night for a month with someone setting up EDI, while if that 
had been [ITI3], it would have been half a day. Because they just don’t know 
…  it’s such a big organization, and I feel that [ITI3] is holding it all together: 





done a million dollars with them the first year, a million dollars with them 
the second year. The third year, we made a decision that we’d work 
through [ITI3], and we went from 1 to 12 Million. In a year!” 
 The lack of adequate interface systems at the lead buyer’s end limits the 
number of suppliers with whom direct governance is feasible to a handful of top 
tier global suppliers that have invested in these missing capabilities, giving the 
incumbents a great advantage over potential competitors. The above-mentioned 
retailer (RET4) has reportedly sourced about 70% of all its production directly from 
the same 15 key top tier global suppliers headquartered in Seoul, Taipei and Hong 
Kong, with manufacturing in China and Southeast Asia, for the last 10 years. Over 
the same period, sourcing in India, which represent about 20% of the total has 
continued to be channeled through the same trade intermediary, primarily 
because of the difficulties dealing with barriers to trade and the business culture 
(RET4). 
5.6.1.2 ROUTINES, SOPs AND ORDER PROCESSING  
From the transactional perspective, routines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
reduce business uncertainty by establishing and communicating buyer expectations to 
the suppliers; often translated into checklists, they are helpful in overcoming cognitive 
barriers that impede unequivocal understanding and execution of instructions in the host 
countries. Routines and SOPs also help establish clearer inter-organizational interfaces, 





most part, these operating routines and SOPs are basic supply chain management tools 
that are rather commonplace in US businesses, but their implementation overseas is 
constrained by the transactional aspects of distance, as they are not typical in emerging 
markets; even in countries like China that have seen significant upgrades in their 
capabilities, it would be a fateful decision to assume that basic instructions are 
understood, transmitted internally further away from the interface and then executed 
correctly. Business cultures seem to truly collide when instructions are misunderstood, 
misinterpreted or ignored and result in a production problem. As several retailers and 
agents pointed out, there is a general reticence across East and Southeast Asian business, 
and an unwillingness of suppliers’ staff to recognize their own mistakes, or acknowledge 
fault, due in part to distrust in the retailers’ fairness but also to fear of personal 
repercussions within their own organizations, if they shine a light on a potential problem. 
Thus, problems that could be resolved if addressed in a timely manner tend to escalate, 
out of sight, until it is too late to remedy, at significant cost to the retailer and the supplier.  
 While one could not say that an intense managerial focus on routines and SOPs is 
sufficient to promote direct buyer-supplier interface, it appears from all sources that it is 
a necessary condition, and that where lead buyers fall short, it is the service proposition 
of agents and trade intermediaries to step in with their local staff. While all the agents 
and intermediaries interviewed have indicated that they make extensive use of checklists 
and monitor production progress very closely, retailers that consider suppliers’ tacit 
knowledge and capabilities a valuable resource see a serious limitation in ‘management 





RET1: “[SOPs and checklists] have been extremely important for us, but you 
reach a point where it can be too much, where people stop thinking with 
their own head because everything is so defined. We see that sometimes 
people just stop using their head, so we are walking a fine line.”  
Q: Could you give an example of a situation in which this happens? 
RET1: “I think in the case of quality problems: when we have a quality 
problem in manufacturing there is a list of things we must do, but the menu 
doesn’t always apply to the situation. In some cases, you must think beyond 
it because the solution is not going to be in that checklist. In the countries 
in which we work, the suppliers appreciate, to some extent, being told what 
to do, and the checklist really helps when they try to solve problems on their 
own, so that fewer problems come to us. But sometimes they may have 
other solutions that they will not bring to the table because they are in that 
robotic state, and they stop thinking outside the box.” 
 From the perspective of direct suppliers, the most important checklist is the actual 
purchase order, which should contain all the information necessary for production, once 
the order is finalized. Viewed from the perspective of a large multinational supplier, lack 
investment in order processing capabilities and staff on the part of the buyer is possibly 





MFG2: “At the most transactional level, issuing a P.O. is a quite a detailed, 
cumbersome process, and retailers that don’t want their US staff, in their 
US offices, with high wages doing that, find it very hard to do direct, 
because that’s what we take direction from: the official purchase orders. 
Q: So, they are giving up on contractual clarity …  
MFG2: “They are giving up on the detail level of managing all the P.O.s, 
and having that agent manage the P.O.s for them. It definitely saves 
manpower on the retailer side:  you are giving all that transactional stuff 
off to the agent and you think it saves cost. It does, but it prevents you from 
having the capability to deal directly with the manufacturer. You need to 
be able to handle the O.s, in order to go direct.”    
Q: You are putting a certain amount of emphasis on contract – what is the 
thing you would be most afraid of with a retailer? 
MFG2: “It’s not so much contract – it’s the P.O. details, because in the P.O. 
you have the quantity, the style, the specs, the details, the delivery date, 
the FOB accuracy and that’s all agreed beforehand, the accuracy of data, 
that kind of detail. The contractual we couldn’t care less: we sign a master 
service agreement sign once we start working together. It’s not the 
contractual issue I am worried about, it’s the level of detail, the transaction 





detail, I don’t need to handle it: I’ll let my Hong Kong team which is a lot 
cheaper, on wages and benefits, and then let my China team do it, and let 
me focus on something else. When you do that, you are out of the game, 
you can’t deal directly. If you want to deal directly you don’t have someone 
else do your work for you: you are going to have to do your work! If they 
want to go direct they must handle the P.O. issuing, which retailers 
sometimes don’t want to do because it takes a lot of manpower: you are 
talking about teams of 20-30 people that just manage P.O.s.”  
 These comments highlight that the lead buyers’ governance choice is at least in 
part a function of their investment in order processing capabilities, a fixed cost if 
internalized and a variable cost if transferred to agents or trade intermediaries. While 
scale plays a role in the choice between fixed and variable cost, so that at the high end of 
volume we see the three main brands of GAP Inc. internalizing the function, for 
companies like Chico’s and Ann Taylor who occupy the one to two billion-dollar specialty 
apparel space, it is not scale that drives the decision between fixed costs and 
intermediation, but rather a philosophy of the role and value of supplier relationships.  
Overall, the activities that constitute transactional institutional brokerage, as highlighted 
by the interview participants, contribute to moderate the effect of transactional barriers 
associated with institutional distance, supporting Proposition 9. Regarding supplier 
capabilities, there is some direct evidence from retailers that lead buyer transactional 
institutional brokerage activities enhance supplier capabilities, facilitating a more direct 





investment in transactional brokerage as a key impediment to direct sourcing. Both 
viewpoints lend support to Proposition 10.    
5.6.2 RELATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL BROKERAGE  
One of the strongest findings in this research is the prevalence of trust barriers associated 
with cognitive and normative distance in the cross-border buyer-supplier interface; these 
trust barriers operate at the interpersonal and at the inter-firm level, making transfers of 
knowledge and practices more difficult, adding to coordination costs. While the existence 
of these barriers to trust-development is not in general questioned by any of the interview 
participants, there are some striking differences in views among lead buyers regarding 
the extent to which they should be tackled by the buyer, the best strategies to address 
them in practice, and whether the different strategies truly result in different outcomes 
(ITI1). One camp, best represented by RET4 takes a more adversarial and transactional 
approach to the governance of its value chain, seeks to avoid engagement with the 
complexities of bridging the gaps created by institutional distance, preferring principal to 
principal relationships with suppliers who internalize institutional distance and are adept 
at transacting in the mode preferred by a traditional US buying organization. There are 
only two types of organizations with this type of capabilities: the large manufacturing 
MNCs based in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong with factories in China and Southeast Asia, 
and trade intermediaries like Hong Kong based Li & Fung or Delhi based Triburg. The 
sourcing strategy of RET4 reflects this reality with 75% of all production outsourced to 15 





factories in China and Southeast Asia, whereas production in India being entirely sourced 
through one trading intermediary. Transactional brokerage is essential to the success of 
this strategy because, at the end of the day, in the words of one direct supplier (MFG2): 
“The purchase order is king.” 
 On the other end of the spectrum we find lead buyers (e.g. RET1) who truly believe 
that engaging a broader range of suppliers adds value and product capabilities to the firm, 
because nowadays these capabilities reside at industry and cluster level, rather than at 
the retailer level; not only are there more suppliers with valuable capabilities than the 
handful of manufacturing MNCs used by RET4, but also agents and intermediaries acting 
as agents have economies of scale and scope in the aggregation of these supply 
capabilities that no retailer can match. To tap on the supplier resources in a wider range 
of countries, lead buyers need to make a substantial investment in relationship building 
in the GVC, starting from selection and training of staff, engaging in activities that develop 
cultural intelligence and cross-cultural communication skills (Figure 5.7), supported by 
corporate culture seeking a flexible approach to the governance of each buyer-supplier 
relationship. The underlying idea behind relational institutional brokerage is that idea is 
that suppliers are essential contributors of value, that a strategy aimed at maximizing the 
firm’s social capital in the global value chain is a topline contributor and that the 
governance costs associated with what could be described as a hybrid, ad hoc approach 
to GVC governance are more than offset by the contribution to sales from product 






Figure 5.8 Coding Map for Relational Institutional Brokerage  
 
 A sourcing strategy founded on relational institutional brokerage has high fixed 
costs because it engages the retailer with its direct suppliers, as well as in triangular 
relationships among the lead buyer, agents with local offices in the host countries, and 
the suppliers. Lead buyers does not only incur high overhead costs to manage so many 
cross-border interfaces; they also incur substantial costs in developing a corporate culture 
that is capable of sustaining trust development across borders consistently. Whereas the 
transactional lead buyer can reduce the sourcing equation to the simplest terms “Here is 
my detailed order, you will make nothing else than what is on my order, you’ll deliver it 
by the agreed upon date, and we’ll pay you 60 days after delivery.” the relational buyer 





support of managerial and executive staff to ensure their ability to develop and maintain 
strong and effective relationships with overseas suppliers and agents. 
5.6.2.1 CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE  
A key ingredient for the development of cross-border buyer-supplier relationships, 
whether direct or mediated through agents, is cultural intelligence. Although this might 
sound common place, even in the limited cross-section of specialty retailers interviewed 
in this study, cross-cultural intelligence is not truly valued or cultivated by all lead-buyers: 
the more transactional buyers take a more directive, normative approach to their 
interactions with suppliers, and a quite ethnocentric view of the management challenges 
in their value chains. The words of one such retailer (RET4) sums up this attitude in 
discussing her approach to relations with suppliers: “…we are tough first date and, in 
general, we don’t really care what everyone else is doing.” On the other end of the 
spectrum, lead buyers who engage in relational institutional brokerage, as well as some 
key suppliers and agents agree on the importance of a corporate culture that values the 
kind of cultural intelligence to develop lasting trust-based relationships with remote 
suppliers based in institutionally distant regions.  
 Relational oriented lead buyers focus a significant amount of attention to 
recruitment, and while product knowledge and experience sourcing overseas are 
important (ITI1), they are not the key determinants in the hiring decision, and once 
recruited aggressiveness in pursuing financial goals is not a key to internal promotion. 





scenarios and through extensive interview processes extending over several weeks and 
multiple meetings to ensure a good initial cultural fit. This effort is mirrored by the hiring 
practices of the lead buyers’ agents:  
AGE3: “We have so many scars, so I have some scenarios [in the interview 
process] that I’d want to see how this individual would react, whether it is 
a corruption issue or more importantly a product-client confrontation or 
interaction issue, for example with this vendor from Korea with a factory in 
Indonesia, a client based in the United States with and office here in Hong 
Kong. In this context, a manager’s compensation in Indonesia is a fraction 
of what it is in Korea and the individual found out. How would you resolve 
a situation like that? And you know how it is, an ethnocentric response 
“that’s how it is in America” is not appropriate ...  
The percentage of people who have [cultural intelligence] is not that great. 
How you give it to them is tough: some people are born leaders, some 
people are born mathematicians, and then you enhance it. It’s very hard to 
teach someone cultural sensitivity, if they don’t have it. We typically look 
for someone with a more global perspective when we are recruiting, and 
that could be from anywhere from Pakistan, from China or from America. 
Have they had more sophisticated global experiences in life: have they gone 





 Lack of cultural intelligence can lead to costly mistakes that then get exacerbated 
by the typical cross-cultural barriers that characterize communications between US and 
east Asian staff. One trade intermediary (ITI1) with a past as a retail sourcing executive 
recalled an incident from his days at a very large US retail chain that illustrates how the 
effects of an ethnocentric approach to cross-cultural challenges can snowball:   
ITI1: “Years ago, I had this woman working for me in Hong Kong, a real 
dragon lady … and she wanted to hire a designer for our brand. I said fine, 
so she hired this Japanese guy who was interesting, but had trouble with 
the American market. This went on for about 6 months and it wasn’t 
working, I started talking about it “this isn’t working” … and I couldn’t get 
her to budge about doing something with this guy. It was a mess. The 
biggest thing was that culturally, this was back in the 90s, he was too 
ahead of the American market in fashion: he just wasn’t connecting with 
our brand, and his communication skills were not great either ... it just 
wasn’t working.  And I looked at her and said, why don’t we put him on 
contract? As opposed to putting him in full time, put him on a contract, that 
will free up the headcount. Problem solved. She goes ahead, puts him on 
contract and two days later he resigns. And it finally occurred to me what I 
was up against: she had “face”, she didn’t want to give up on her concept 
of having a designer, and for her to fire him would have been a loss of face. 
He, being Japanese, thought when you got a job with a company, you got 





nobody fired Japanese people … so when he got the message that he was 
going to be on a contract as opposed to full time – he resigned.”  
 Beyond careful selection in recruiting, relationally oriented lead buyers adopt a 
number of formalized and informal means of developing the cultural intelligence in their 
sourcing staff, and of management at large; several retailers and their suppliers have 
developed internal training programs, and encourage academic development of their 
staff with scholarships and tuition support, but the most useful training, and the least 
disruptive to work schedules, comes in the form of ‘embedding’, which consists in 
sourcing managers, the technical people, and sometimes merchants spending several 
weeks embedded at a key supplier’s factory, or at an agent’s office overseas, shadowing 
their transactional counterparts, as well as hosting suppliers and agents at corporate 
headquarters for periods of comparable length: 
RET1: “One of the greatest advantages is that it builds a new enthusiasm 
in what they are doing; they develop an appreciation for what the suppliers 
are doing and they come back and they share with the team. They are much 
more vocal about what goes on over there: the culture, the experience, the 
actual manufacturing and technical process. We see them sharing the 
knowledge more, and seeing the vendor and the country less as the ‘other’ 
but more part of the team. It builds that cultural understanding and sense 
of partnership – that they are just an extension of us – that is probably the 





suppliers: they talk to others about them. and they explain things more in 
detail to other members of their cross functional teams, because they 
understand the ‘why’ behind certain things. They’ll explain to the merchant 
who hasn’t been there, and might want a supplier to do certain things - 
that it can be done, but it will slow down productivity and here is why.” 
 Embedding develops a strong connection between the lead buyer’s organization 
and the key suppliers, and when sourcing is managed indirectly with the agents, and 
provides an excellent on the job ‘onboarding’ for new recruits, shadowing their supervisor 
in some of these extended visits. Embedding exposes managers to the host country’s 
culture and humanizes the relationship, effectively reducing communication barriers and 
promoting interpersonal trust. This interpersonal trust also projects at the firm to firm 
level because the experience translates into greater trust in the suppliers’ systems, 
preventing conflict escalation and facilitating problem solving and dispute resolution, 
with greater equity, and in a manner conducive to business continuity. More forward 
thinking retailers also emphasize overseas travel of senior executives to reinforce trust in 
their commitment to the relationship with suppliers and agents. The trust established 
through these frequent exchanges and direct in person interface has a measurable impact 
on suppliers’ performance, and in their willingness to accommodate the needs of lead 
buyers who invest in their relational capabilities: 
MFG1: “Aeropostale wanted to launch a whole new product line last year. 





of in this business: we were flying it [shipping by air rather than by ocean], 
but you still have to dye the yarn, you have to produce, and it was in the 
middle of peak season. We did it because of that relationship If somebody 
else asked us to do the same, I would have said no.” 
 The investment in embedding staff is often reciprocated by suppliers and agent, 
further reinforcing the buyer-supplier bond; one supplier (MFG1) mentioned travelling to 
the US with management from his factories during Thanksgiving, to give them first-hand 
experience of “black Friday”, for them to understand the devastating business effect of 
missed product deliveries in that critical holiday season.  
5.6.2.2 CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS 
As can be inferred by the preceding discussion, cross-cultural communications are one of 
the most significant barriers to exchange associated with institutional distance, and in no 
industry is this more apparent than in the specialty apparel industry, with its transaction 
frequency and with the level of detail involved with each transaction. Cross-cultural 
communication barriers will naturally affect the proper execution of individual orders 
with an adverse effect on buyers’ trust of suppliers’ competence, and lack of adequate 
communication skills will hinder the development of interpersonal and inter-
organizational trust necessary for the desired level of cooperation and coordination. One 
solution to the problem is avoidance, which can be achieved by limiting the supplier 
interface to the globally integrated manufacturing MNCs or by using specialized trade 





communication issues for their clients by shielding them. Avoidance creates however 
information asymmetries that give incumbent suppliers and trade intermediaries greater 
power in the relationship, resulting eventually in the erosion of the competitive 
advantage derived from supplier consolidation. This type of concern drives several 
retailers to pursue sourcing strategies that maximize access to a broader range of 
suppliers’ capabilities, beyond manufacturing capacity, and that actively seek their 
contribution to the topline as extensions to the firm. Many executives at these firms have 
previously worked for some of the more transactional and adversarial retailers and 
chosen to expand their supplier base to a larger number of suppliers, in more host 
countries. While the best example of a strongly transactional supply chain among the 
interview participants (RET4) sources over 90% of its production from 15 key suppliers 
and one intermediary, with the lion share of the business in China, some of its most direct 
competitors (RET1, RET5) regularly work with over 50 suppliers in four or five countries, 
and with close to a hundred when considering all the ancillary factories that may supply 
one item per season. In order to work effectively with such a variety of suppliers and 
across different regions, these retailers make a conscious investment in their managers’ 
cultural intelligence and in the associated soft skills that are the foundation of relational 
institutional brokerage. As echoed by many of these retailers and by the agents who work 
with them, leadership sets the tone for sourcing management and staff, starting with 
weeding out successful but more adversarial and potentially “toxic” hires when recruiting.  
RET5: “Depending on the size of the company, of course with a bigger 





team, I am driving that theme home. When I interview somebody for a 
position, I make sure that [cross-cultural communications] are a big part of 
the conversation. I mean written communication, the awareness that if you 
are importing from overseas, you are communicating with people for 
whom English is their second language, and you gotta be careful about 
using slang and colloquialisms: it can’t be conversational, it has to be very 
professional.” 
 The importance of strong sourcing team leadership is echoed by agents with 
experience working with US retailers in the host countries:  
AGE1: “It’s not a formal training process but it’s a training process by 
example. When you have a good person at the top in a sourcing 
organization who is reasonable, and thoughtful and very person-oriented, 
that person sets the tone.” 
 The cross-cultural communications barriers are exacerbated by the preferred 
medium of communication: e-mail, due to time zone difference and to the need to 
transmit information or details regarding progress or issues in the dozens of steps 
involved with each transaction. The use of e-mail communication seems to metastasize 
rapidly because of the ease with which sender will include several recipients on both sides 
of the ocean, at times out of lack of trust in other parties in the transaction (RET7). As an 
executive noted, this lack of trust also ensures that no one gets off the recipient list, 





importance of managing supplier communications is evidenced in a study commissioned 
by one retailer (RET4) which revealed that managers and executives in the sourcing were 
spending and average of 55% of their time answering e-mails, a problem that many 
interviewees attribute to poor communication skills. The problem can be mitigated by a 
dedicated effort to improve cross-cultural communications across the organization; as 
one executive noted, leadership can be as simple as gentle mentoring, predicated on a 
collaborative atmosphere in which the front-line managers feel free to ask for a second 
opinion:  
RET5: “It’s really hard to write a manual for this kind of job; companies 
have done it, but every day is like a new adventure in the sourcing world, a 
new problem, a new challenge, a new opportunity. There are wrinkles with 
those daily, so a lot of it [leadership] is hopefully instilling in people the 
ability to do their work, but also knowing the differences: ‘Ok, I am really 
not sure what do next, so I‘d like to get another opinion before I open my 
mouth or write another sentence’, or they might draft an e-mail and give it 
to me to read. I used to love it when they did this, they would draft and e-
mail and ask: ‘Is this ok to say? Here’s the scenario … has the way I have 
written this come across ok to you, as the reader … if you got this e-mail, 
what would you think about the person who sent it to you?” 
 The challenges with cross-cultural communication in the fast moving context of 





proper form and using the right medium; there can be some level of academics inside the 
corporate environment by which the new person you just brought in as assistant 
purchasing managers receives some training on cross-cultural communication and 
negotiations training but at the end many participants noted that people tend to follow 
the culture of the organization, so that leadership by example is crucial. One way 
leadership can improve the cross-cultural communication outcomes is by providing 
institutionalized support for travel, so that when e-mails and midnight phone calls have 
reached the limit of what they can accomplish (RET5), managers can meet in person with 
suppliers and agents to review issues and resolve them face-to-face. This view is 
supported by agents as well, who greatly value frequent travel by the buyers and 
embedding at one another’s location for the benefit of all parties involved. 
Communicating and negotiating in person at the appropriate time is not only conducive 
to more harmonious relationships in the global value chain, but it has significant positive 
impact on economic outcomes for the retailer, a view confirmed by suppliers and agents: 
MFG1: “Yes … I get better prices if I am in person! Honestly, customers 
seem to pay more; if you are there negotiating in person, there is a certain 
comfort, they lay their cards down, and so do we. And we do the same [give 
better prices] quite honestly, because we understand where they are 
coming from: they tell a lot more detail when [the negotiation] is in person, 
and then we understand. Are they negotiation just because they want to 





something coming from senior management, do they need to hit this price? 
If you can understand that, you can make better decisions.” 
5.6.2.3 CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS  
Cultural intelligence and good cross-cultural communication skills are critical when 
negotiating across borders and the interviews have revealed many scars and failures to 
develop a working trust with suppliers resulting from unyielding, adversarial negotiation 
tactics. Some sourcing executives (RET7) have found that the reputational effect from 
past employment at very large retailers known for their confrontational and punitive style 
in global sourcing carried over for years after leaving, resulting in suppliers’ complete lack 
of trust in their fairness and reasonableness, even after they had joined retailers with an 
excellent reputation in the industry. The contrast in style among UIS lead buyers is such 
that some executives have indicated, off the record, that they would be inclined not to 
recruit sourcing professionals from the most adversarial retailers. While, as many 
interviewees noted, the specific skills and behaviors that make up a good cross-cultural 
negotiator are intuitive and rather standard fare (AGE2), the sheer number of contracting 
negotiations and micro-conflicts that arise in the set up and execution of each order 
amplifies the differences between lead buyers’ corporate cultures, their perspective on 
the global value chain, of the role and importance of suppliers and intermediary firms. 
Without a steadfast corporate commitment to developing relationships and trust in the 
global value chain, each order is rife with opportunities for cross-cultural communication 





ITI2: “I have been sitting with the customer many times in price 
negotiations, and I have seen it happen, even with associates whose 
English isn’t so good. The customer is sitting there asking questions, and 
they [the suppliers] get nervous, starting to laugh, to cover their face. The 
customer takes it as ‘They are nervous, they are laughing at me’, ‘They are 
silly’, ‘They are hiding something’. How do you broker that?” 
 The ability to navigate the treacherous waters of cross-cultural negotiations are of 
course founded on the cultural intelligence of the lead buyer and of their local 
intermediaries, and are the foundation of the lead buyers’ legitimacy in the eyes of the 
suppliers. To that effect, cultural intelligence, preparation and a transactional body of 
knowledge are essential to maintaining reasonable expectations and a degree of fairness 
and reciprocity in the negotiation:  
RET1: “[the negotiators] need to know what the labor costs are in that 
country and understand the different cost components: what are the labor 
cost in the different countries, what are the efficiencies and the 
inefficiencies of that particular country? We try to get full cost 
transparency from our suppliers but we don’t always get it, so they need to 
really break cost down into each major component to be more effective 
negotiators, rather than just going in saying I need this price.   - the other 
thing I did not mention is that they need good collaboration skills, really 





focusing just on that negotiation piece. You may give up 10 cents today but 
you might really need it tomorrow, so they need to sit back and look at the 
bigger picture. We deal with a lot of business owners, so we need think of 
it [the negotiation] from their perspective.” 
 The reasonable expectations, transparency and reciprocity necessary for good 
cross-cultural negotiations are clearly the result of a deliberate strategy by the lead buyer, 
promoted internally, and communicated directly, and through agents to the suppliers. 
Not surprisingly, the lead buyers that focus on collaborative relationship with suppliers 
will avail themselves of the help of sourcing agents whose reputation for fairness and 
integrity is such that even large direct suppliers, who by preference avoid interfacing with 
agents, make an exception and accept working with them (MFG2). The managing director 
of one such agent describes his approach to fairness and integrity in negotiations as 
follows:    
AGE3:” If somebody in the chain tries to take more than whatever their 
piece is worth, it not going to work, or if it works, it’s not going to be 
sustainable. If that supplier charged too much for that good, he might be 
able to get one off, but it’s transactional: it’s not sustainable. Or if the 
agent, which we have never done, is taking more money from them than 
they are telling the client [e.g. by double dipping], that ultimately is put 
back in the cost, or quality is taken out. You really can mathematically look 





with an 80% IMU; if there’s more nickeling and diming into that, something 
must give.”  
 More relationally oriented lead buyers tend to value a degree of transparency, not 
only on cost but also on compliance, that can only be achieved with a sustained effort to 
bridge trust gaps in the global value chain that is fully supported at executive level, 
working directly with some suppliers and in triangular relationships with suppliers and a 
reputable agent, who can be essential brokers of trust:  
RET3: “When you go through an agent the trust is really between the 
factory and the agent, and then between us and the agent. If you are not 
dealing directly with the factory, you don’t really have that contact: you 
are not communicating daily with the factory. It is really the agent 
communicating daily with the factory, and you are communicating with the 
agent, so your trust level and work is really with the agent. (…) So, you hire 
the agent based on history and on their reputation in the market place, and 
if they are a well-known agency, the factories trust them.” 
 It is clear from the preceding discussion that relational institutional brokerage is a 
costly investment in capabilities and resources that maximize the value of the buyer-
supplier relationship as opposed to a simple on minimizing transactional errors. Selecting 
and training for cultural intelligence reduces the country level cognitive and normative 
barriers to communication and trust development, facilitating a more direct interface 





relationship development, with training and in general greater attention to cross-cultural 
communications and negotiations skills also valorizes supplier capabilities, favoring more 
direct governance mode. Lead buyers who invest in relational institutional brokerage tend 
to have direct buyer-supplier relationships in a larger number of countries, establishing 
triangular relationships through agents with suppliers that more transactional lead buyers 
will contract through intermediaries, supporting Proposition 10. 
5.7 RESOLVING MULTIFINALITY IN GOVERNANCE MODE 
The interaction effect of institutional distance and supplier capabilities on the preferred 
governance mode can be visualized arranging the two variables in a 3x3 matrix (Figure 
5.9).   
  





 Although both institutional distance and supplier capabilities are on a continuum 
they tend to cluster as shown in the matrix for competitive reasons by virtue of their 
investments in transactional and relational capabilities. While lead buyers have indicated 
that they can find suppliers with all ranges of capabilities in all the main sourcing regions, 
in many cases supplier capabilities tend to fit the prevalent governance profile of the 
country in which they are located, so that there is a greater concentration of  high 
capability suppliers in countries with lower institutional distance, with direct governance, 
and a greater concentration of suppliers with low relational capabilities in countries for 
which the preferred governance mode is indirect, through intermediaries. This is 
represented in the matrix by the boxes along the diagonal in which the governance 
expected based on supplier capabilities matches those expected for the host country.  
 Lead buyer institutional brokerage capabilities seems to assist in resolving the 
governance equation in the two boxes in which the governance is not unequivocally by 
the two independent variables: different levels of brokerage capabilities, and focus on 
different types of brokerage seem to lead to different governance options. In broad 
brushstrokes, retailers who focus their effort on transactional institutional brokerage are 
more comfortable with principal-to-principal relationships, and will use externalize the 
interface to trade intermediaries when direct governance is not an option. Lead buyers 
who invest in relational institutional brokerage on the other hand tend to place value in 
maintaining an interface with suppliers whether direct or in triangular relationships 
mediated by an agent, and will opt for governance with agents when in situations where 





anecdotal evidence, namely instances in which sourcing agents have reported competing 
for manufacturing space with trade intermediaries retained by rival retailers, and from 
executives who have worked with the same factories for different retailers, the 


























DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
The primary objective of this study was to extend the existing theory on the governance 
of buyer led global value chains to incorporate two determinants of the governance mode 
that have been largely neglected in global value chains scholarship: host country 
characteristics and lead buyer agency. To this purpose, I isolated a large subset of the 
apparel sector, large US specialty apparel retailers, within which transaction complexity 
and codifiability are relatively invariant, thus controlling for two of the three conventional 
governance determinants, retaining only supplier capabilities as a variable. I have also 
discarded three of the five governance modes in the established model, hierarchy, captive 
and market because they are rarely, if ever, encountered in the specialty apparel retail 
space, and then redefined the relational and modular governance modes in terms of 
degree to which the lead buyer internalizes the buyer-supplier interface, in order to 
exercise direct control, or externalizes it agents or trade intermediaries,  in order to avoid 
some of the costs and the organizational complexity associated with contracting and 
coordinating production in institutionally distant host countries. By doing so, I have 
selected governance modes that match actual industry practice, as suggested by 







6.1 INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS   
With governance thus defined, I applied an institutional theory lens, and specifically 
looked at institutional distance to assess the effect of host country characteristics on the 
governance of buyer-supplier relationships. Given the high frequency of transactions, the 
large number of steps involved in each transaction and the need for buyer-supplier 
cooperation to coordinate production I framed institutional distance in terms of 
transactional and relational barriers to exchange, anticipating that cognitive, normative 
and regulative barriers would loosely correspond to interpersonal, inter-firm and country-
to-country level barriers. The interviews, as well as other informal conversation that 
continued with some of the participants, leave very little doubt that institutional distance 
is a key determinant of the buyer-supplier interface governance, and that industry 
experience and ongoing assessment of country characteristics divide the five countries 
from which over two thirds of all US garments are imported into three regions each with 
its preferred governance mode. The governance choice appears to be a country level 
decision that bundles suppliers with very different capability level within one specific 
country level governance mode, because despite frequent claims to the contrary, lead 
buyers’ perceptions regarding institutional distance barriers trump supplier capabilities, 
even when they are significantly upgraded.  In the world of outsourced apparel 
manufacturing, higher perceived institutional distance is clearly associated with lead 





therefore outsourcing management of distance barriers to either agents or trade 
intermediaries. This seems to contrast with the approach taken in equity entry modes, 
where the dominant response to distance is to control its effects through internalization, 
establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.  
 Analyzing cognitive, normative and regulative distance in terms of the 
transactional and relational barriers to exchange and cooperation provides a detailed 
framework that captures on one hand creeping transaction cost increments that 
compound over multiple extended transactions, and on the other, the barriers to 
development of trust between buyers and suppliers to a level that would facilitate 
knowledge and information flows, as well as legitimize buyers’ demands and 
requirements, removing barriers to the acceptance and adoption of lead buyers’ 
practices. The interviews have clearly indicated that while transactions eventually take 
place because of the mutual dependencies of buyers and suppliers in the global value 
chain, there is limited trust in the other party’s competence, with buyers failing to 
establish the business legitimacy of their demands and of the practices they seek to 
impose. This result either in ceremonial adoption, as has often been the case in China 
regarding labor working hours and subcontracting, or in actual opposition and resistance 
as several interviewees reported in the case of India.  
6.2 SUPPLIER CAPABILITIES IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS  
The importance of supplier capabilities in the governance decisions is intuitive and had 





drawn by Gereffi et al. (2005), low supplier capabilities do not lead to internalization of 
the buyer-supplier interface as would be the case of captive or hierarchical governance, 
but rather to greater distancing from the supply base. In a fully outsourced environment 
like the US specialty apparel retail sector, deep involvement in manufacturing is clearly 
not a lead buyer’s priority and the associated capabilities are not viewed as a core 
competency; as a result, the more a supplier needs “hand-holding” the more likely that 
buyers will choose to distance themselves from the supplier interface, using the services 
of third party firms adept at bridging gaps between the supplier capabilities and the 
buyer’s requirement. By doing so, they either establish a triangular relationship with the 
supplier through sourcing agents, or fully outsource the buyer-supplier interface by using 
trade intermediaries, despite intermediation costs in the order of 6% of the cost of goods 
sold for agents, and 9-12%, and possibly higher, in the case of trade intermediaries. 
6.3 INSTITUTIONAL BROKERAGE  
The existence of transactional and relational barriers to exchange at both country level 
and supplier level creates a special challenge for lead buyers in the specialty apparel 
sector who rely in average on 50-100 suppliers in four or five different host countries to 
produce one thousand or more orders every year, each involving dozens of steps in which 
buyers and suppliers need to interface. It is easy to see how the small incremental costs 
that arise at the interface from institutional distance barriers and supplier capability gaps 
can add up to significant cost overruns that significantly affect the bottom line. A quick 





years, net incomes are in the same order of magnitude of the sourcing department costs, 
without counting any intermediation costs, making sourcing the object of continuous cost 
reduction experiments in governance. Understanding the true impact of GVC governance 
on performance is complicated by at least two other factors: firstly, the time lag between 
any changes in sourcing strategy and their impact on the bottom line exceeds one year, 
during which the effects of old sourcing decisions carry over. The full year-long effect of 
a change in sourcing strategy is not really seen until two years after the change, making 
for a more tenuous causal correlation between sourcing strategy and performance, 
especially because quarterly income pressures may lead to additional reactive changes 
such as staff and travel budget cuts, and the severance or establishment of sourcing 
relationships with agents and intermediaries that could confound the effect of the new 
strategies. Secondly, an emergent trend of acquisitions by private equity firms like Ascena 
Retail Group and Sycamore Partners who also own global sourcing and shared services 
companies, leads retailers targeted for acquisition to disinvest in global sourcing staff and 
capabilities for tactical reasons associated with valuation, rather than for long term 
performance and growth. Despite these confounding factors, a few clear patterns 
emerged in the interviews regarding how lead buyers seek to address institutional 
distance barriers and to bridge supplier capability gaps by means of institutional 
brokerage and how this is procured through their choices of governance mode for their 
interfaces with suppliers in the various host countries. 
 To engage successfully with a wide range suppliers in host countries in emerging 





relational costs associated with the cognitive, normative and regulative institutional 
barriers linked to institutional distance. In this light, the governance decision is 
fundamentally about the extent to which the lead buyer intends to engage in the 
brokerage activities and develop the associated capabilities as opposed to outsourcing 
them to specialized third parties; this decision hinges on the firm’s view of the strategic 
value of their supply chain and of the role of suppliers as a core resource. Institutional 
distance in GVCs manifests itself in the form of hundreds of daily communication barriers, 
micro-conflicts, misunderstandings, rework and delays, as well as in clashes of business 
culture that fuel mutual distrust between buyers and suppliers.  
 The ‘Holy Grail’ in the professional experience of all executives interviewed seems 
to be the perfect balance between control and disengagement in their global value chain. 
Lead buyers’ institutional brokerage seems to be determined by their strategic views of 
the value chain, resulting in two bottom-line oriented, cost-minimization strategies and 
one topline, resource-maximizing strategy. In a fixed cost minimization strategy, the 
retailer outsources most sourcing to a trade intermediary, in one famous instance, in 
2009, Liz Claiborne sold the exclusive rights to its sourcing to Hong Kong based Li & Fung 
for US$ 83 MM (Li & Fung 2009a) and in the process virtually shut down its own sourcing 
organization. In the same year, another retailer under cash flows and cost pressures, 
Talbots also drastically reduced the size of its highly respected sourcing team (Birnbaum 
2000) entering a similar agreement  (Li & Fung 2009b). While both Talbots and Liz 





firms like Tommy Hilfiger have successfully outsourced production and product 
development to Li & Fung, while focusing on brand development.  
 In all cases, these were strategies of disengagement from the global value chain, 
with the institutional brokerage function also outsourced to the intermediary. This 
extreme outsourcing option has the advantage of taking advantage of an extensive key-
in-hand modular supply chain managed by an experienced trade intermediary, reducing 
the commitment of managerial resources to sourcing, product development and logistics, 
but it also brings with it extreme dependency from one trade intermediary, with very high 
switching costs due to lack of connections in the supply chain, as well as lack of managers 
and executive with true international business capabilities.  
 A second cost minimization strategy focuses on disintermediation, with a strong 
preference for direct sourcing. As discussed in Chapter 5, direct sourcing requires a 
commitment to minimizing transaction costs, and to maintaining in-house capabilities 
associated with order management. This type of lead buyers tends to focus and specialize 
in transactional brokerage, which really consists in fail-proofing cross-border order 
management, through standard operating procedures, routines and detailed order 
processing, activities that fall within the traditional domain of supply chain management. 
This approach limits the supply base to a few compatible suppliers, for the most part the 
largest manufacturing MNCs headquartered in developed East Asia, namely Taiwan, S. 
Korea and Hong Kong, who have the capabilities to manage production in China and in 





intermediaries between the lead buyer and these host countries than as pure 
manufacturers. By selecting East Asian suppliers with a very high level of international 
business sophistication and greater brokerage capabilities within their region, 
transactionally oriented lead buyers are de facto distancing themselves from production, 
entrusting its management to regional MNCs. There are obvious advantages dealing 
exclusively with these well-known globally integrated manufacturing groups in terms of 
production capacity, management and information systems and compliance; at the same 
time, high switching costs due to the lack of true institutional brokerage capabilities 
narrow the supply pool excessively, giving the incumbent suppliers greater bargaining 
power, eventually leading to loss of competitiveness. 
 Several lead buyers adopt a different approach, based on a view of the global 
value chain as a resource to be maximized, and engage with a broader range of suppliers 
in multiple countries in search of product capabilities, and of economic arbitrage 
opportunities. These firms will also source from large manufacturing MNCs and forge long 
term relationships with them as in the case of their more transactional peers, but they 
differ in the number and variety of suppliers and countries in which they have a direct 
interface with supplier. Not only are suppliers viewed as resources but agents are often 
viewed as extensions of the firm, offering a second institutional bridge between the buyer 
and the supplier. This strategic approach can be described as a social capital strategy, in 
which the lead buyers place themselves as central nodes in a cross-border network of 
trust networks made up of raw material suppliers, agents and factories. This social capital 





institutional barriers to trust in the global value chain and require a significant investment 
on the part of the lead buyer, in terms of human resources as well as in terms of 
development of a corporate culture conducive to effective institutional brokerage.  
 Relational institutional brokerage starts with recruiting; while virtually every 
participant agree that cultural intelligence comes from exposure to multiple cultures and 
professional experience, companies that value more cooperative relationships with 
suppliers and agents, and definitely the agents who help bridge the gaps with suppliers 
make the assessment of the cultural intelligence of potential hires an important part of 
the recruiting process, well aware that a host of candidates, from intermediaries and from 
retailers with a more adversarial approach to the value chain, may have the global 
sourcing experience but have not acquired the necessary knowledge of the business 
culture sin which they are called to operate and the behavioral scripts associated with 
good cultural intelligence. Selecting the right skill set in new hires is especially important 
because, while some skills can be taught through training, most companies, on both sides 
of the Pacific, expect new hires to be up and running quickly and do not have extensive 
‘onboarding’ training; thus, many executives put prospects through extensive interviews 
probing them the kind of real-world business scenarios they are expected to encounter 
in their work. 
 Much of relational institutional brokerage activities promote the continuous 
development of cultural intelligence of all staff that may interface with suppliers overseas, 





merchandisers at the suppliers and at the agents facilities for periods of two to three 
weeks, as well as hosting supplier and agents for similar lengths of time to continuously 
improve cross cultural communications and negotiation skills: this represents a significant 
investment in time and money, but results in a far superior understanding of the business 
culture and of the constraints under which suppliers operate, building more cooperative  
and trusting relationships with the suppliers, and legitimizing buyers’ expectations and 
requirements. More importantly, these lead buyers establish a corporate culture in the 
feedback from embedded staff is valued for problem solving and preemption, reducing 
escalation of the inevitable conflicts that arise in pre-production and in manufacturing.  
 Relational institutional brokerage is not only a ‘feel-good’ cooperative approach 
to the global value chain: by establishing greater trust with agents and suppliers, the lead 
buyers enjoy freer communication with all parties in the GVC, with agents accepting direct 
communication channels between buyers and suppliers without fear of buyer 
opportunism, creating truly effective triangular relationships that facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge among parties, and give the lead buyer preferential access to the capabilities 
and knowledge of its suppliers, which can free more creative options for the brand’s 
designers. While relational institutional brokerage may contribute to reducing some 
transaction costs associated with miscommunication or distrust between buyers and 
suppliers, it is for the most part a topline contributor, opening access to more creative 
and productive resources from a wider range of suppliers, as well as reaping the benefits 
of supplier trust through preferential treatment in production, and through a greater 





Table 6.1 Institutional Brokerage, Governance and Strategic Outcomes in GVCs 
Strategic Driver in GVC  Dominant Governance and 
Institutional Brokerage  
Strategic Outcomes 
Fixed Cost Minimization 
   
Trade Intermediaries  
No Institutional Brokerage 
Outsourcing of sourcing 
functions.  
Leaner organizational 
structure; lower fixed 
costs.    
Modularity trap, high 
switching costs.  
Variable Cost Minimization  Direct. 
Transactional Institutional 
Brokerage: focus on 
transaction cost 
minimization, SOPs, 






high fixed cost. 
Good strategic alignment 
with loyal suppliers.  
Inflexible, narrow supply 
base, dependency on key 
suppliers, high switching 
costs.  




embedding, leadership and 
training, selective recruiting, 
high focus on cross-cultural 
communications and 
negotiations.   
Uses agents in triangular 
interface with suppliers. 
Maximizes access to 
supplier capabilities, 
greater product variety.  
Establishes supplier 




High fixed costs, 




The most important contribution of this study is the extension of the theory of 
governance of global value chains to include home-host country institutional distance and 





in buyer led global value chains. The critical finding that in outsourced GVC lead buyers 
will externalize the buyer supplier interface as institutional distance increase, explains the 
continued importance of intermediary firms that specialize in facilitating the coordination 
of complex and geographically dispersed GVCs. The finding also suggests that for lead 
buyers, pressures to control production are not as strong as pressures to outsource the 
associated functions. A second related contribution comes from analyzing institutional 
distance in terms of cognitive, normative and regulative barriers, and then breaking them 
down them along transactional and relational dimensions, a promising analytical 
perspective that can be particularly valuable in understanding the hidden transaction and 
organizational costs associated with sourcing through extended global value chains, 
characterized by high transaction volume and great need for coordination of production 
across borders. 
 The third contribution to theory comes with the introduction of the concept of 
institutional brokerage, a set of activities and capabilities aimed at lowering institutional 
distance barriers that lead buyers seek to procure with their governance choice. In parallel 
with institutional distance, institutional brokerage has a transactional and a relational 
dimension, each representing a distinctive strategic focus by the lead buyer: cost driven 
in the case of transactional institutional brokerage, a resource driven in the case of 
relational institutional brokerage. In this light, the governance mode decision is 
fundamentally a decision on whether to procure this essential brokerage function or to 





 The study also makes a contribution to management highlighting a critical set of 
capabilities in GVCs, especially as the apparel global value chain migrates to lower cost 
countries, like Myanmar and Ethiopia, and closer to home countries, with near-sourcing 
(KSA 2016) raising the stakes for US buyers in currently secondary Central and South 
American countries. Investment in these institutional brokerage capabilities are not only 
critical for lead buyers, but will also be the key to continued success for emerging market 
apparel manufacturing MNCs, with whom lead buyers deal directly, as they expand the 
geography of their manufacturing base to these emerging regions to continue to serve 
their clients’ needs.  
6.5 LIMITATIONS 
This research has several limitations associated with its exploratory nature and the 
qualitative methodology selected, in the absence of viable metrics for a quantitative 
study. For one, the selection of the specialty apparel retail subset by design amplifies the 
effects of institutional distance and supplier capabilities at the buyer-supplier interface 
because of the number of transactions and the detail that goes into each order, making 
institutional brokerage whether by the lead buyer or procured through agents, 
intermediaries, or manufacturing MNCs essential. The generalizability of the construct, 
and its importance in the commodity side of the apparel sector, dominated by big box 
retailers could be in question, because of the specialization of suppliers, the simplicity of 
the goods procured and the scale of the orders. Wal-Mart obviously has the scale and the 





factories in Bangladesh that specialize in these large, technically simple, low cost 
productions, with little need for cultural ‘subtlety’. Large trade intermediaries like Li & 
Fung, and large manufacturers who work with Wal-Mart, Kohl’s and Target all the big-box 
retailers have given however anecdotal evidence that even for these mass retailers global 
sourcing presents some trappings that are not resolved by the sheer scale of their 
purchases, making it necessary for them to avail themselves of the services and brokerage 
capabilities of intermediaries in certain countries, and with certain suppliers. 
 Across sector comparison in global value chains also brings with it questions of 
generalizability of the institutional brokerage construct, especially when comparing the 
geographically dispersed apparel, footwear, toy and accessories global value chains with 
cluster based producer GVCs such as electronics and automotive, which are more capital 
intensive and specification driven, dominated by large global original component 
manufacturers and original equipment manufacturers, contracted directly by the auto 
makers and electronics brands.  Considering the relevance of the institutional distance 
construct, and the promise shown in this study treating it as a set of relational and 
transactional barriers that are instantiated at cross-border interfaces, institutional 
brokerage as a strategic response to institutional distance is a promising concept that 
needs further refinement, and empirical hypothesis testing. 
6.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research in the use of transactional and relational dimensions of institutional 





contribute to management, facilitating the assessment a priori of the challenges 
associated with outsourcing cross-border. The research would require the validation of a 
survey instrument constructed to assess cognitive, normative and regulative barriers 
from a transactional and a relational perspective. The resulting metric can be used to 
score the institutional distance of country pairs, as a decision-making tool for country 
selection and to identify the appropriate strategic response to home-host country 
institutional distance. A second line of research will further investigate the institutional 
brokerage construct in buyer led GVCs, and assess the conditions under which relational 
institutional brokerage can be a lead buyer core competency, as opposed to when the 
function is outsourced to specialized third parties. As relational institutional barriers 
appear to be primarily a reflection of trust gaps between buyers and seller, this line of 
research explores the role of intermediaries as brokers of trust in the GVC. 
 An unrelated line of inquiry emerged during the interviews concerning some 
possible generational effects in the perceptions of cognitive and normative distances 
between home and host countries in GVCs; I was initially alerted to this possible effect by 
the youngest among my interview participants (ITI2), and it continued to resurface as I 
paid more attention to the variation of attitudes and perceptions based on the 
respondents’ age. Younger participants appear to see greater cultural convergence with 
the various GVC host countries due to globalization, and attach less importance to the 
cognitive and normative barriers in cross-border exchanges; older participants on the 





unchanging perceptions. This generational difference can be assessed with both a survey 
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DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
Several terms used in this dissertation are used with slightly different meaning in different 
disciplines, and at times altogether different terms are used. The terms listed below are 
either trade terms in the apparel industry or were explicitly defined as listed below, during 
the interviews.  
Agent: A sourcing intermediary who places orders and administers relations with 
suppliers at the direction of a lead buyer, typically compensated with commission on the 
FOB value of goods booked. A sourcing agent does not take title to the goods, does not 
finance transactions and does not own manufacturing assets.  
Apparel: Articles of clothing, as defined in chapters 61 and 62 of the US Harmonized 
Tariffs Schedule.  
FOB value: The dutiable value of imported goods at the port of origin, before ocean 
freight, duties, agent commissions, and US import and distribution costs. For apparel, this 
is typically 20-25% of the initial retail price. 
IMU: Initial Mark-U Term used in the apparel industry representing the target percent 






Intermediary: Any third-party firm or individual performing intermediation sourcing 
services on behalf of a lead buyer. The term includes both sourcing agents and trading 
companies, or trade intermediaries.   
MMU: Maintained Mark-U Term used in the apparel industry representing the net 
percent margin after all discounts and loss factors, calculated as the final average unit 
retail price less unit FOB cost. 
Specialty Retailer:  A retailer specializing in the sale to consumers of its own apparel 
brands, in its own physical and online stores. 
Supplier: A garment factory or network of garment factories, with manufacturing assets.  
Trade Intermediary: A trading company that purchases garments from suppliers at the 
direction of a retailer, and then resells them and delivers them to the retailer. Trade 
intermediaries take title to the goods, finance transactions but do not have significant 
manufacturing assets.     















     APPENDIX B. 
Retailers’ Interview Protocol 
 
I. Dependent variable – GVC governance 
1. What is the governance of your value chain? [Governance intended as how your 
firm’s GVC is governed; the boundaries of your firm in its GVC; the degree to which 
your firm internalizes or outsources its global sourcing activities] 
i. Describe your value chain  
1. Mostly direct sourcing  
2. Mostly outsourced 
3. Hybrid / ad hoc  
ii. What are the advantages of your GVC governance mode?  
iii. What are the shortcomings of your GVC governance mode?  
2. Why have you chosen this governance mode?  
i. What was the decision logic? 
1. Variable costs  
2. Fixed costs  
3. Internal capabilities  
4. Social capital 
3. How was the decision made? 




ii. How much are changes in GVC governance determined by prior choices  
iii. How much are GVC governance decision influence by competitors’ behaviors  
iv. How much advantage do incumbents have over new vendors (incumbency 
rate) 
4. Do you have knowledge of / experience with alternative GVC governance modes? 
i.  What are the pros / cons of the alternative GVC governance modes? 
 
II. Independent variable – Country level variance - Institutional distance  
1. Does governance vary as a function of the host country? 
i. Provide examples of different governance modes in different countries / 
regions 
1. China  
2. Southeast Asia  





4. Mexico and Central America  
5. Maghreb and Turkey  
2. Why does governance vary with the host country?  
i. Do vendor trust relations vary with the host country? 
ii. Provide examples of trust issues across countries in your GVC 
3. What are key barriers to doing business in your key host countries?  
i. Probe on institutional barriers - defined as the barriers imposed by cultural 
and institutional distance with the host country 
ii. Probe on person-to-person barriers – related to interpersonal exchange  
Specifically: language, cognitive styles and cultural schemata 
iii. Probe on firm to firm / firm-to-network barriers – related to differences in 
informality / non-market exchange coordination with the local vendor 
network 
iv. Probe on country-to-country distance – refers to cultural and institutional 
distance; differences in legal system, contract and trade laws, and 
enforcement  
4. What are ways to overcome these barriers?  
i. Probe on existing solutions (local offices, exclusive agents, trade 
intermediaries) 
1. What are the advantages of the current solutions?  Probe on 
organizational aspects. 
2. What are the disadvantages of the current solutions? Probe on 
competitive constraints.  
 
III. Independent variable – Vendor level variance  
1. Does governance vary as a function of vendor characteristics? 
i. How would you categorize vendor capabilities?  
ii. What is the geographic distribution of these capabilities?  
2. Is there a difference in governing relations with full package vs. CMT 
(Cut+Make+Trim) vendors? 
i. What organizational demands do the different types of vendors impose on 
your firm? 
ii. Do you engage in direct sourcing with full package vendors?  
iii. Do you engage in direct sourcing with CMT vendors?  
3. Is there a difference in governing relations with globally integrated vs. locally 
embedded firms? 
i. What organizational demands do the different types of vendors impose on 
your firm? 
ii. Do you engage in direct sourcing with globally integrated vendors?  
iii. Do you engage in direct sourcing with locally embedded vendors?  
4. How do these vendor characteristics (FP vs. CMT; GI vs. LE) affect the development 
of trust relations with them?  






i. How much trust do you have in your vendors?  
ii. How is it established? (Signaling? history? compliance? performance? 
credible commitments?)  
iii. What are the consequences of trusting relationships with a vendor (or 
lack thereof)?  
iv. Is trust important in determining the governance mode?  
ii. Provide examples of how trust relations may vary with vendor characteristics  
 
IV. Moderator – Lead buyer institutional brokerage capabilities  
1. On what particular set of skills, routines and procedures do you depend when you 
do business in your host countries? 
i. Provide examples 
2. On what particular set of policies, systems and organizational/reporting structure do 
you depend when you do business in your host countries? 
i. Provide examples 
3. How much do you rely on cultural intelligence, cross-cultural communication and 
cross-cultural negotiation skills do you depend when you do business in your host 
countries? 
4. How important is it to develop trust with your vendors? 
i. What barriers hamper it? 
ii. What activities and capabilities facilitate it? 
5. How important is knowledge transfer in doing business with your vendors? 
i. What barriers hamper it? 




























Intermediaries’ Interview Protocol 
 
GVC governance – your clients  
For the purposes of this study, governance is the manner by which retailers’ GVC is 
governed; the boundaries of the lead firms in their GVC; the degree to which the lead 
buyers internalize or outsource their global sourcing activities (reliance on HQ and local 
sourcing offices, vs. agents and/or intermediaries)  
I. What are most common governance modes in the apparel GVC  
a. Mostly direct sourcing  
b. Mostly outsourced 
c. Hybrid / ad hoc  
II. What are the advantages of the different governance modes?  
a. Mostly direct sourcing  
b. Mostly outsourced 
c. Hybrid / ad hoc  
III. What are the shortcomings of the different governance modes?  
a. Mostly direct sourcing  
b. Mostly outsourced 
c. Hybrid / ad hoc  
IV. What was the decision logic behind the different governance choices – what 
drives them? 
a. Variable costs  
b. Fixed costs  
c. Internal capabilities  
d. Social capital 






Country level variance - Institutional distance  
Doing business in countries like China has become a lot easier over time; vendors have 





cultural and institutional distance are persistent; and the solutions in place often carry 
significant “taken for granted” costs, among them, of course, intermediation costs.  
I. What is the most critical brokerage function you perform in the GVC?  
II. What are the key transactional barriers faced by a US buyer doing business in the 
various (Asian) countries in which their GVC is dispersed? 
a. What are possible solutions?  
b. What do intermediaries “do better”?  
III. What are the relational barriers faced by a US buyer doing business in the 
various (Asian) countries in which their GVC is dispersed? 
a. What are possible solutions?  
b. What do intermediaries “do better”? 
IV. What are key barriers imposed by cultural and institutional distance with the 
host country – how important are they and how do you lower them 
a. Person-to-person barriers – related to interpersonal exchange  
b. Specifically: language, cognitive styles and cultural schemata 
c. Firm to firm / firm-to-network barriers – related to differences in 
informality / non-market exchange coordination with the local vendor 
network 
d. Country-to-country distance – refers to cultural and institutional 
distance; differences in legal system, contract and trade laws, and 
enforcement  
Vendor level variance  
For the purposes of this study a vendor is a garment or accessory manufacturer – the 
vendor may own/control a small number of factories and may provide additional 
services, but is essentially a maker of goods. Specifically, intermediary firms that do not 
own significant manufacturing assets, but may take title to goods produced by many 
third-party producers, such as Li & Fung or MGF, are not vendors for this analysis, but 
intermediaries.  
 
I. How would you categorize vendor characteristics?  
a. What are you looking for?  
b. What metrics do you use to assess vendor capabilities?  
c. What is the geographic distribution of these capabilities?  
II. Does governance vary as a function of vendor characteristics? (in terms of acting 
as an agent vs. trade intermediary)  
III. Is there a difference in governing relations with globally integrated vs. locally 
embedded firms? (in terms of your brokerage functions)  
IV. Is there a particular type of vendor than intermediaries bring to the table with 
whom your clients would be unable to do business ’direct’? If so, why? 





For the purposes of this study we define as institutional brokerage the set of activities 
that lower cultural and institutional distance in the Buyer – Vendor dyadic relations. This 
function can be internally by the buyer, but is often best performed by intermediaries.   
Please compare and contrast how you perform this brokerage function vs. the buyers 
and/or the vendor. 
I. On what particular set of policies, systems and organizational/reporting 
structure do you depend when you do business in your host countries? 
a. Do you have formalized country risk management tools? 
b. What is the involvement of your legal team in transactions with foreign 
vendors?  
II. On what particular set of skills, routines and procedures do you depend when 
you do business in the various host countries? 
a. How do they help? Provide examples 
b. How are they institutionalized within your firm? 
III. How much do you rely on cultural intelligence, cross-cultural communication and 
cross-cultural negotiation skills do you depend when you do business in your 
host countries? 
a. How are they developed inside the organization? 
b. Is transaction performance more important than maintaining 
relationship? What is the threshold?  
Trust 
I. What is the essence of trust in the GVC? Please define trust in vendor and buyer 
relationships.  
II. Does trust mean something different depending on the role (buyer, vendor, 
intermediaries) in the global value chain?  
III. What does trust mean for your US retail clients? What do they fear most from 
their vendors? 
IV. Does it mean something different for the vendors in your network?  What do 
they fear most from their buyers? 
V. How do you broker the trust gap between buyers and vendors? 
a. Is it difficult for US buyers to trust overseas vendors?   
b. What barriers hamper trust development in the GVC? 
c. What activities and capabilities facilitate it? 
d. How is trust established? (Signaling? history? compliance? performance? 
credible commitments?)  
e. What is the cost of mistrust in the GVC? 















CODE MEANING NODE CAT THEME PROP   













 TRUST Trust   X     
GOV Governance     X   
DIR direct sourcing X       
AGE agents X       
ITI intermediaries X       
GOVDIR direct governance   X     
GOVAGE governance through agents    X     
GOVITI governance through intermediaries   X     














NORBAR normative barrier x       
REGBAR regulative barrier x       
TRUSTDEV trust development barriers x       
TRABAR transactional barriers   x     
RELBAR relational barriers   x     
ID institutional distance      x   
PROP1 Proposition 1       X 
PROP2 Proposition 2       X 
PROP3 Proposition 3       X 
PROP4 Proposition 4       X 















FS full service X       
SUPTRA supplier transactional capabilities   X     
SUPCAP supplier capabilities      X   
SUPREL supplier relational capabilities   X     
LE locally embedded X       
GI globally integrated X       
PROP5 Proposition 5       X 
PROP6 Proposition 6       X 
PROP7 Proposition 7       X 
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ROUTSOP routines SOPs X       
CONTR contracts  X       
TIBR transactional institutional brokerage    X     
IBR institutional brokerage      X   
RIBR relational institutional brokerage    X     
CQ cultural intelligence X       
CCC cross-cultural communications X       
CCN cross-cultural negotiations X       
PROP9 Proposition 9       X 
PROP10 Proposition 10       X 




























Informed Consent Letter 
 
 
Sonoco International Business Department 
 
 
July 3, 2014 
Dear …  
My name is Alessandro (Alex) Perri, and I am a doctoral candidate in the International Business 
Department at the University of South Carolina. I am currently conducting field research as part 
of the requirements of my PhD degree in International Business, and would like to invite you to 
participate in a study entitled: “Institutional Brokerage in Global Value Chains: The Case of the 
Global Apparel Industry.” This project is funded by a research grant by the Center for International 
Business Education and Research (CIBER).       
[…]  kindly referred me to you for your help and expertise. For my dissertation, I will be conducting 
interviews with sourcing executives in the US apparel industry and in Hong Kong to investigate 
the impact of cross-national business barriers on lead buyers’ global sourcing activities, and the 
different strategies employed by lead buyers and intermediaries to lower the costs imposed by 
these cultural and institutional barriers. Should you agree to participate, I can meet you at a 





be recorded in audio-tapes to be transcribed and analyzed by the research team and then 
subsequently destroyed.  
Although you will probably not benefit directly from participating in this study, your responses 
will contribute to our collective understanding of the challenges posed by cross-national 
differences in global sourcing, and to the identification of the key skills and strategies to overcome 
them. 
Your participation is confidential, and the study information will be kept in a secure location at 
the University of South Carolina. The results of the study may be presented at academic 
conferences, and submitted for publication in academic journals, but your identity will not be 
revealed. Most importantly, your participation is voluntary, and you may decide not to answer 
any specific questions, or quit being in the study at any time. 
I will be glad to answer any question you have about the study. You can contact me by phone at 
(803) 447 3243 or via e-mail (alessandro.perri@grad.moore.sc.edu), or my faculty advisor, Prof. 
Tatiana Kostova (Kostova@moore.sc.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a 
research participant, you may also contact the Office of Research Compliance at the University of 
South Carolina at (803) 777-7095. 
If you would like to participate in this research, you can contact me at your convenience for 
scheduling; I look forward to the opportunity to learn from you and thank you in advance for your 
consideration. 
With kind regards 
Alessandro (Alex) Perri 
University of South Carolina  
1705 College Street  
Columbia SC 29206 
Phone: (803) 447 3243  










APPENDIX F.  
Selection of Top US Specialty Apparel Retailers 
 
Specialty Apparel Retailer   2014 Sales  
Victoria's Secret Stores, REYNOLDSBURG, OH   $                           6,681,000,000  
Gap, SAN FRANCISCO, CA   $                           6,351,000,000  
Old Navy, SAN FRANCISCO, CA   $                           6,180,000,000  
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., NEW ALBANY, OH   $                           4,116,897,000  
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., NEW YORK, NY   $                           3,799,500,000  
PVH Corp., NEW YORK, NY   $                           3,668,886,000  
American Eagle Outfitters Inc., PITTSBURGH, PA   $                           3,305,802,000  
Forever 21 Inc., VERNON, CA   $                           3,084,900,000  
Urban Outfitters Inc., PHILADELPHIA, PA   $                           2,901,412,000  
Banana Republic, SAN FRANCISCO, CA   $                           2,603,000,000  
Chico's FAS Inc., FORT MYERS, FL   $                           2,586,037,000  
Ann Inc., NEW YORK, NY   $                           2,493,491,000  
J. Crew Group Inc., NEW YORK, NY   $                           2,428,300,000  
Express Inc., COLUMBUS, OH   $                           2,219,125,000  
Aeropostale Inc., NEW YORK, NY   $                           2,090,902,000  
Lands' End Inc., DODGEVILLE, WI   $                           1,562,876,000  
Charming Shoppes Inc., BENSALEM, PA   $                           1,369,200,000  
Retail Brand Alliance Inc., ENFIELD, CT   $                           1,300,000,000  
The Buckle Inc., KEARNEY, NE   $                           1,128,001,000  
The Talbots Inc., HINGHAM, MA   $                           1,095,089,000  
Guess? Inc., LOS ANGELES, CA   $                           1,075,475,000  
Dress Barn, MAHWAH, NJ   $                           1,020,700,000  
Eddie Bauer Inc., BELLEVUE, WA   $                           1,000,000,000  
Rue 21, WARRENDALE, PA   $                              992,000,000  
Charlotte Russe Holding Inc., SAN FRANCISCO, CA   $                              950,000,000  
New York & Company Inc., NEW YORK, NY   $                              939,163,000  
Maurices Inc., DULUTH, MN   $                              917,600,000  
The Cato Corporation, CHARLOTTE, NC   $                              910,500,000  
Pacific Sunwear of California Inc., ANAHEIM, CA   $                              770,580,000  
Hot Topic Inc., CITY OF INDUSTRY, CA   $                              760,000,000  













Specialty Apparel Retailer   2014 Sales  
Michael Kors Holdings, NEW YORK, NY   $                              659,444,000  
American Apparel Inc., LOS ANGELES, CA   $                              633,941,000  
Levi Strauss & Co., SAN FRANCISCO, CA   $                              627,220,000  
Tommy Hilfiger LLC (Retail), NEW YORK, NY   $                              602,236,000  
Gordmans Inc., OMAHA, NE   $                              600,000,000  
Wet Seal Inc., FOOTHILL RANCH, CA   $                              530,134,000  
Bebe Stores Inc., BRISBANE, CA   $                              484,686,000  
VF Outlet, READING, PA   $                              480,000,000  
The J. Jill Group Inc., QUINCY, MA   $                              450,000,000  
Christopher & Banks Corporation, PLYMOUTH, MN   $                              435,754,000  
Limited Stores, LLC, NEW ALBANY, OH   $                              412,261,000  
BCBG Max Azria Group North America, VERNON, CA   $                              400,000,000  
US Specialty apparel brands subset sales  $                         77,317,112,000  
Sales of Interview Participants companies   $                         38,015,178,000  
        Source: Chain Store Guide, 2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
